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Does corruption make us less likely to trust political institutions? Comparative investigations of 
this question have shifted from a resounding “yes” to more uncertain prognoses in the last 
decade. I engage with theories in political economy to help explain high-trust, high-corruption 
patterns in the former Soviet states, with minor comparison to Latin America and East Asia. 
Specifically, I use quantitative methods to investigate whether citizens trade off petty corruption 
concerns in good economic times, and whether they are equally punitive of corruption across the 
regime spectrum. Finally, I investigate whether economic growth is a boon or burden for 
incumbent support across Russian subnational regions. To bolster my empirical approach, I 
critique existing conceptions of political trust and test for the measurement equivalence of 
political trust across heterogeneous populations. In doing so, I offer new theoretical insight into 
how citizens relate to their political institutions in the presence of public institutional 
dysfunction, and I offer new methodological insight into how we can better measure political 
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 John Locke argued that government is fundamentally “established by society as a trust” 
forged from individual consent. In a healthy republic, “arbitrary or absolute power can never be 
legitimate, consented to, because ‘God and Nature’ do not allow ‘a man so to abandon himself as 
to neglect his own preservation’” (Pitkin 1965, 994-5). This dissertation concerns the underbelly 
of Locke’s ideal by examining societies where arbitrary power meets consent. As survey data has 
expanded around the globe in the last decade, we increasingly find that people express support for 
political institutions even when they face extortion and other forms of discrimination to obtain 
basic public services. The co-existence of corruption and strong political approval raises 
interesting questions about how governments across the regime spectrum retain public support in 
dysfunctional institutional conditions.  
 I aim to shed light on this phenomenon in rarely examined parts of the Soviet space where 
rampant corruption thrives alongside comfortable levels of trust in political institutions and rapid 
economic growth. In this context, I examine the applicability of corruption tradeoff theory, the 
idea that people trade off concerns about corruption for material gains and thereby help prevent 
institutional reforms toward the rule of law from the bottom up. I draw on empirical insights about 
corruption tradeoff in Latin American clientelist democracies, hypothesizing that economic 
performance moderates the extent to which citizens with high exposure to petty corruption and 
extortion punish political institutions in their trust assessments. I ultimately find that there is more 
to the data than meets the eye. Economic performance is not an opiate of the masses and does not 
weaken the notion that political authorities bear responsibility for petty corruption, not even among 
citizens living in authoritarian countries where petty corruption has become part of everyday 
transactional life over multiple generations. 
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 Survey data currently offer our best glimpse into the story of political trust and corruption 
responsiveness in closed societies across Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. Although often 
overlooked as case studies even in the post-communist area studies literature, public opinion 
patterns in these countries can offer important insights into the study of development, institutional 
change and political transition. To my knowledge, I make the first attempt in the literature to 
compare political attitudes in these authoritarian and kleptocratic regimes to their post-communist 
counterparts in Eurasia and Eastern Europe.  By adopting a large N comparative design which 
includes democracies and non-democracies, I risk using unreliable public opinion data which are 
neither internally valid in repressive contexts nor externally comparable with other countries. In 
undertaking this risk, however, I believe that there are certain payoffs in learning not only about 
the substantive dynamics of trust and corruption in the region, but about the methodological 
challenges of using survey questions which vary in sensitivity and meaning across space. This 
dissertation ultimately combines insights about methodology, theory and empirics to enhance our 
understanding of the political economy of political trust formation and corruption responsiveness 
in cross-regime contexts. 
 The dissertation is split into five chapters, moving gradually from an emphasis on 
methodology to an emphasis on theory and empirics. In Chapter 1, I survey conceptions and 
measurements of political trust in cross-national survey research, discussing the importance of 
balancing the demands of local measurement validity and large N measurement equivalence to 
facilitate the best possible comparative inferences about political trust using flawed and limited 
data. In Chapter 2, I offer an empirical test of the cross-national measurement equivalence of 
political trust in my sample. I show that averaging heterogeneous sets of survey questions can 
mask important differences in how people interpret those questions across the regime spectrum. In 
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Chapter 3, I introduce the theory of corruption tradeoff and discuss how it can potentially explain 
high trust and corruption concurrence in the former Soviet space. I outline potential causal 
mechanisms and measurement choices in my empirical tests of the theory, which follow in Chapter 
4. I finish the dissertation with a case study in Chapter 5, where I analyze the influence of economic 
performance across time and space on incumbent approval in Russia, commenting on the different 
influences of subjective and objective economic indicators on political attitudes and what they 
might teach us about political legitimacy in hybrid authoritarian regimes. In the conclusion, I 















If we ask someone to rate her trust in government on a scale from 1 to 5, what are we 
measuring, and how do we interpret responses to this question across countries? My goal in this 
chapter is to examine the conceptual and methodological challenges of studying political trust 
cross-nationally. To better understand what we can meaningfully infer from survey measures, I 
want to engage three related questions: 1) what does political trust mean? 2) how valid are survey 
measures of political trust? That is, how closely do measures correspond to what they mean? And 
3) how equivalent or comparable are survey measures of political trust across countries? Do survey 
respondents around the world have similar things in mind when evaluating political institutions? 
Although the empirical literature is fairly unclear about the meaning of political trust, it 
appears to me that measures of trust in government are capturing three possible things: 1) a broad 
concept of trust as an expectation of political performance, 2) a specific, normative conception of 
trust as an expectation that political authorities will act in accordance with citizens’ wishes, or 3) 
a proxy for political trustworthiness or political legitimacy. In the first part of this paper, I draw 
on an interdisciplinary social science literature to consider the meaning of each concept in an effort 
to better pin down what we are measuring empirically. I wish to argue that we are measuring 
neither a broad concept of trust nor political legitimacy, despite the heavy use of such terms in the 
empirical literature.  
I believe we are describing a specific, normative conception of trust which is empirically 
difficult to capture. In the second part of the paper, I wish to examine more closely how we might 
better operationalize political trust. There is no easy way to do this because extant survey questions 
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rarely inquire into what standards people use to evaluate political institutions. Since I am currently 
unable to commission more sophisticated cross-national surveys to alleviate these concerns, I will 
discuss the importance of balancing the demands of local measurement validity and large N 
measurement equivalence to help us make the best possible comparative inferences about political 
trust with the flawed data that we have.  
 
1.2 What is Trust? 
In its broadest sense, trust is synonymous with expectation. For Dasgupta (1988, 51), trust 
can be defined “in the sense of correct expectations about the actions of other people that have a 
bearing on one’s own choice of action when that action must be chosen before one can monitor 
the actions of those others. Luhmann (1979, 39) writes that trust is “an attitude which allows for 
risk-taking decisions” and more explicitly “the generalized expectation that the other will handle 
his freedom, his disturbing potential for diverse action, in keeping with his personality – or, rather, 
in keeping with the personality which he has presented and made socially visible.” Barber’s (1983, 
9) widely cited definition refers to trust as “the expectations, which all humans in society 
internalize, that the natural order – both physical and biological – and the moral social order will 
persist and be more or less realized.” His three modes of trust include the expectation of the 
“fulfilment of the natural and moral social orders,” the expectation of “technically competent role 
performance” and the expectation that “partners in interaction will carry out their fiduciary 
obligations and responsibilities” (ibid.). Fukuyama (1995, 26) follows Barber to some degree in 
defining trust as “the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, cooperative 
behavior, based on communally shared norms, on the part of other members of that community.” 
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In these general accounts, trust is an expectation that someone else’s behavior will be consistent 
over time and appropriate to its context.  
Others like Hart (1988, 187) and Dunn (1988, 80) define trust as a means of coping with 
the freedom of others. Gambetta (1988, 218) defines trust as a “particular level of the subjective 
probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a 
particular action, both before he can monitor such an action (or independently of his capacity ever 
to be able to monitor it) and in a context in which it affects his own action.” Trust operates as a 
“threshold point, located on a probabilistic distribution of more general expectations, which can 
take a number of values suspended between complete distrust and complete trust, centered around 
the midpoint of uncertainty” (ibid.). Sztompka (1999, 25) follows a similar conceptualization as 
an evaluation of probability, defining trust as a “bet about the future contingent actions of others.” 
Offe’s (1999, 47) interpretation also echoes this idea: “trust...is a reflectively fallible ex ante guess 
based upon an assessment of others.” Trust is different from attitudes like faith, which tends to 
indicate complete uncertainty or “blind trust,” and confidence, which indicates something closer 
to complete certainty, little vulnerability and little confrontation with specific trustees or tasks 
(Luhmann 1988, 96 and 1979, 33; Hardin 2002, 72). A probabilistic conception of trust along the 
lines of a bet, guess or “subjective level of probability” can still be seen as a form of expectation. 
Indeed, trust is not the same thing as probability; it is rather an expectation of another’s actions 
given a perceived level of probability that the trustee will follow through.  
Some define trust as a form of vulnerability or transfer of control to another person. Elster 
(2007, 344) defines trust as the lowering of one’s guard: one will “refrain from taking precautions 
against an interaction partner, even when the other, because of opportunism or incompetence, 
could act in a way that might seem to justify precautions.” Coleman (1990, 91) sees it as “the 
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transfer of control over one’s actions in a conjoint authority relation” that “must occur at some 
time before the expected benefits can be realized.” This is slightly similar to Baier’s (1986, 240) 
definition as “letting other persons (natural or artificial, such as firms, nations, etc.) take care of 
something the truster cares about, where such ‘caring for’ involves some exercise of discretionary 
powers.” On the whole, wording like “refrain[ing] from taking precautions,” “transfer of control” 
or letting other persons “take care of something” are variations on a theme of delegation. Yet even 
in this sense, trust is not quite the same thing as a transfer of control because transferring control 
is action that is separate from a state of trust. I would argue that for these authors, trust is 
nevertheless an expectation that the trustee will follow through after surrendering discretionary 
power to her over a task. 
If we go by this stock of conceptual development from a wide social science literature, we 
can define political trust as the expectation that political actors or institutions will perform in a 
way that is consistent with past performance, roles or norms. Luhmann (1979, 26) describes 
political trust as the expectation of political performance after surrendering control in an election: 
a political candidate’s electoral “success – if it appears at all – does not appear till after the action, 
while there must be commitment beforehand. This problem of time is bridged by trust, paid ahead 
of time as an advance on success for a certain time and unless called back…” Trust is based on 
hypothetical evaluations of actions that can only be observed after the trust has been invested. It is 
fundamentally “a technique for extending the availability of time and thus rendering possible the 
choice of delayed gratification, for increasing men’s tolerance of uncertainty, for the contrafactual 
stabilization of expectations” (Dunn 1984, 281). Rosanvallon (2008, 48-49) similarly argues that 
trust acts as an “invisible institution” or “assumed stock of information,” an essential “property of 
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a relationship between persons or groups, for example, between governors and governed” in which 
a “politician’s reputation becomes his certificate of warranty.”  
Although this definition seems easy enough to accept in an empirical study, for 
commentators like Hardin (1999, 25), an expectations-based account of trust does not truly capture 
what we mean by the term, neither generally nor specifically with regards to political institutions: 
If trust is nothing more than the reasonable factual expectation that another will behave 
in a relevant manner, than it is nothing more than, say, the trust with which we 
sometimes inductively assert that the sun will rise tomorrow morning because, after 
all, it has always risen every morning that we can remember. We may similarly 
inductively trust some part of the government in this very limited sense because we 
may simply extrapolate from behavior until this moment to predict future behavior. Of 
course, this means, among other things, that we can trust some government bodies and 
agents to continue to act corruptly against our interests, we can trust others to continue 
to be incompetent to do what they are appointed to do, and we can trust many agents 
of government to lie to us with regularity about important matters for which they are 
responsible. 
 
 When we trust, Hardin argues, we are not merely expecting consistent behavior from the 
trustee. We are rather expecting that the trustee will perform a task with the specific intention of 
fulfilling our interest. In other words, our interests will be encapsulated in the trustee’s actions. 
Kant’s neighbors might expect him to take a morning walk at a certain hour every day as a means 
of reminding them of the time. But for them to trust him to take his walk would mean that he does 
so expressly in their interest (ibid., 30). Hardin’s account transforms the task of conceptualization 
into theory building about what trust entails. In his view, in order for us to trust, we not only have 
to hold certain expectations granted some uncertainty about the trustee’s subsequent actions, but 
our trustee must adopt a certain mental state and behave accordingly.  
 In similar ways, some conceptualizations of trust, particularly in economics, describe not 
merely what trust is, but how others must respond for it to work. Trust is seen to economize on 
resources, allowing us to forego monitoring or third party enforcement over the trustee’s actions 
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(Stigler 1961). Like Hardin, Dasgupta (1988, 51) argues that trust entails more than a unilateral 
expectation or assessment of the trustee’s constraints or promises: “You do not trust a person (or 
an agency) to do something merely because he says he will do it. You trust him only because, 
knowing what you know of his disposition, his available options and their consequences, his ability 
and so forth, you expect that he will choose to do it.” Not only that, but the trustee must be aware 
that the truster can refuse to cooperate in the future in the case of defection. For Gambetta (1988, 
219), “if it were only others who enjoyed freedom while we had no alternative but to depend on 
them, then for us the problem of trust would not arise; we would hope rather than trust.”  
 On the basis of such accounts of what trust does or what is required for trust to work in 
empirical settings, a number of critical voices deem the idea of political trust empirically untenable. 
Before launching into his critique of the notion of political trust, Hardin (1999, 24) invites the 
reader to “consider trust in another person, from which we might expect conceptually to be able to 
generalize to claims about trust in groups, organizations, or institutions.” Using his conception of 
trust as encapsulated interest, Hardin proceeds to argue that “trust” is an inappropriate term to 
describe one’s orientation to political institutions because one has little reason to believe that a 
large organization (the government, no less) will take her interests into account when performing 
a “trusted” task. Public officials, Hardin argues, are self-interested and citizens do not usually 
possess enough information about their motivations or commitments to develop trust in the same 
way that they do with regards to individuals they know. Offe (1999) writes that “before ‘they’ 
[elected officials] act, ‘I’ have no sufficient evidence to form beliefs about how they are going to 
act and whether there is sufficient reason to trust. But even after they have acted, what comes to 
‘my’ awareness is at best an aggregate effect, not the specific behaviour of specific individuals 
that have caused it” (ibid., 56-7).  
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In Hawthorn’s account (1988, 112), four “reality conditions” must be met for trust to 
sustain cooperation: that “people know what each other’s motivations actually are, that they know 
that they know, that this knowledge is not too expensive to obtain and maintain, and that the 
outcomes of any course of action are not too difficult and themselves too expensive to determine.” 
He concludes that in this case trust is only possible between friends. If one were to transfer micro-
level trust characteristics to more complex social settings, “the only possible society is an 
aristocracy” in which “simplified, stylized, symbolized” social relations achieve a level of 
familiarity and reciprocity similar to personal friendship (ibid., 114). Based on fieldwork research 
on trust relationships in the slums of Accra, Ghana, Hart (1988) also suggests that trust is 
conceptually relevant only to friendship based on free and voluntary association. Trust must be 
granted in conditions where reliance on the trustee is freely chosen, something which is not always 
possible in one’s orientation to political institutions.     
 In short, a number of empirical approaches suggest that it would be inappropriate to 
describe one’s evaluations of political institutions as “trust” on grounds that the relationship 
between citizens and their government does not meet the criteria necessary for trust to work in the 
same way that it works between individuals. Such critiques would lead us to conclude that political 
trust is an empty concept simply because it does not refer to any real empirical phenomena. In my 
view, these critiques are not entirely correct because they conflate what trust does or what is 
required for it to work with what trust is. However desirable these criteria, it ultimately does not 
matter whether a citizen has the ability to choose or terminate agreements with political authorities, 
whether she has intimate knowledge of their motivations or whether they encapsulate her interest 
while in office. It still makes sense to say that she expects political authorities and institutions to 
perform in a certain way. When she is asked to rate her trust in government, her response is fully 
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consistent with an expectations-based account of trust. Auxiliary questions about how trust works, 
or whether it works well are empirical, not conceptual in nature. Even if we were directly interested 
in answering such empirical questions at the present time, we would have no reason to assume that 
individual-level trust works in the same way as institutional trust. Such claims would have to be 
properly theorized and tested.  
 Despite the conceptual and empirical limitations of Hardin’s approach, he is correct in 
pointing out that we do not merely expect continuity when we evaluate political institutions. When 
prompted to rate our trust in government, we are probably not thinking, “I trust my government to 
always be corrupt.” We are instead likely rating whether the government’s performance is 
compatible with our notion of what is right or desirable. This is a specific, normative conception 
of trust which depends on citizens’ beliefs about how institutions ought to perform. Hardin (2002, 
153) himself lands close to this proposition, suggesting that “the question of whether we can 
reasonably trust institutions reduces to the question of whether institutions can be trustworthy” or, 
in other words, “reliably expected to fulfill their missions.” In this perspective, what we really 
mean when we say we trust a political institution is that we believe that it is trustworthy. Offe 
(1998, 70) shares this interpretation, arguing that institutional trustworthiness is based on a 
commonly held understanding in society of what institutions ought to be doing: institutions are  
endowed with a spirit, an ethos, an implicit moral theory, an idée directrice, or a notion 
of some preferred way of conducting the life of the community…it is this implied 
normative meaning of institutions and the moral plausibility I assume it will have for 
others which allows me to trust those that are involved in the same institutions – 
although they are strangers and not personally known to me. 
 
Pettit (1998, 305) narrows this normative conception, equating political trustworthiness with 
republican virtue: “Every republic has to be one of morals as well as one of laws.” Beyond law 
and regulation, political institutions must be sustained by elected officials’ adherence to commonly 
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shared moral principles and civic duties. Virtuous, trustworthy, or synonymously “legitimate” 
government depends on “leaders’ keeping faith with the citizens who have given them authority 
to act on the public’s behalf” so long as citizens believe that the government will “act in their 
interests, that its procedures are fair, and that their trust of the state and of others is reciprocated” 
(Levi 1998, 88).    
 The idea of political trustworthiness is similar to political legitimacy. Indeed, the concept 
of “political trust” is often seen as a proxy for political legitimacy in the survey-based empirical 
literature (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Chang and Chu 2006; Christensen and Laegrid 2005; 
Hooghe 2011; Kim and Voorhees 2011; Mishler and Rose 2001; Suh et al. 2012). In defining 
legitimacy, Beetham (2013, 11) argues that “we are making an assessment of the degree of 
congruence, or lack of it, between a given system of power and the beliefs, values and expectations 
that provide its justification.” Power in this account rests not on one’s ability to exercise authority, 
install proper incentives or enforce sanctions, but on “the degree of others’ willingness to 
cooperate,” which “depends on the normative status of the power holder, and on the normative 
considerations that engage us as moral agents” (ibid., 38). This is a thinner notion of legitimacy 
than what Pettit and Levi describe in so far as it makes no claims about the necessity of virtue or 
the performance of civic duties in legitimating political authority. What a republican theorist might 
consider non-virtuous behavior by a political authority can still be legitimate if congruent with 
shared understandings of proper behavior in the public.  
 Despite frequent references to these notions in the empirical political trust literature, 
political trust is a highly imperfect proxy for political legitimacy or trustworthiness. 
Measures of empirical legitimacy are often defined both in terms of individuals’ subjective 
“judgement of [the] appropriateness” of institutional behavior and in terms of their “judgement of 
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entitlement,” or their belief that the institution is entitled to its authority (Jackson et al. 2017, 2). 
While the former subjective element of legitimacy might be reasonably proxied by a simple 
political trust question, the latter element is better captured with survey questions assessing 
compliance with the decisions of the institutions under inquiry. That is, if you believe an institution 
is entitled to its authority, you will agree to its decisions or rules. One element of legitimacy 
concerns attitudes while the other concerns actions: “Critically, the empirical study of ‘popular’ 
legitimacy addresses antecedents (the inherently value-based set of criteria that citizens use to 
judge the right to rule) and behavioral consequences—legitimacy, after all, is a reason to act” 
(ibid.). A comprehensive empirical study of legitimacy will therefore require the researcher to 
assess both components. Although political trust (broadly conceived as an expectation of future 
performance) can indicate a normative match between individuals’ expectations and institutional 
reality, legitimacy is a more complex empirical phenomenon that cannot be operationally captured 
by indicators of political trust alone. 
  In short, a number of interpretations of political trust are possible when we ask someone 
to rate her trust in government. 1) The broadest of these regards political trust as an expectation of 
continuity. This expectations-based account encompasses interpretations of trust as a delegation 
of authority to others or a bet about the probability of a trustee’s performance of a task. 2) A 
narrower, normative conception of trust is not merely an expectation of continuity, but an 
expectation that political authorities will act in accordance with the truster’s wishes. 3) A third 
way of conceptualizing political trust is as a proxy for political trustworthiness or legitimacy. Some 
approaches urge that trust is only trust as long as it advances cooperation or conformity to political 
authority, or that our ability to trust depends on what others do with it.  
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 I argue that we should not conflate empirical approaches about what trust does with 
conceptual ones about what trust is. Although political trust does not result in cooperation between 
citizens and authorities in the same way that it does between individuals, it does not mean that it 
is a barren concept or that trusting government, as Hardin (2002, 152) argues, is “conceptually and 
epistemologically impossible for most citizens in large modern societies…” The way we define 
political trust, I would argue, should remain limited to a normative conception of trust (the second 
option above) which describes people’s expectations of institutions in accordance with their beliefs 
about how those institutions ought to perform. It is neither a general expectation of continuity nor 
a proxy for legitimacy. It is “normative” in so far as it relates to what people think is desirable 
performance, not what theorists studying political trust think is desirable performance.  
 It would seem, however, that a student of political trust can say very little about it without 
understanding these normative frames of reference. Discovering the criteria people employ in their 
evaluations of political institutions is an important, but highly contested empirical exercise. 
Getting at this rich normative content has become the center of an increasingly prominent but 
unresolved discussion as survey data has expanded around the globe. Although we have steadily 
increased the territorial scope of our studies on political trust, it seems that we have come to know 
less and less about what we are truly capturing with our survey questions. At the same time that 
researchers have begun to develop more sophisticated operationalizations of political trust, we 
have become less confident about the validity and comparability of the resulting measurements 
across countries. In the interest of working with a measurement which allows us to draw the most 
valid comparative inferences about political trust around the world, I now delve into this empirical 




1.3 How do we measure trust? 
If we define political trust as an expectation of political performance in accordance with 
people’s normative beliefs, we invite the question, what are their normative beliefs? What kinds 
of ideas underpin one’s relationship with her government? We do not get a clear answer to this 
question in the empirical literature on political trust. Beyond the many survey-based studies that 
view political trust as a proxy for legitimacy, much of the literature circumvents conceptually strict 
accounts of political trust. Easton’s (1975, 436) often-cited definition of political support is a “way 
in which a person evaluatively orients himself to some object through either his attitudes or his 
behaviour.” Specific support is a form of “response to the authorities” and diffuse support consists 
of a “reservoir of favourable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs 
to which they are opposed…” (ibid., 437). Nothing is said about which outputs are at stake. 
Hetherington (1998, 791) also demands little of the concept and reiterates the normative 
conception of trust I outlined above: political trust is “a basic evaluative orientation toward the 
government founded on how well the government is operating according to people’s normative 
expectations.” At its most basic interpretation, political trust is a form of “mass support for the 
political system,” “faith in the political process,” “confidence in political institutions,” “popular 
satisfaction” with public services, “allegiance to the political system” and “approval” of 
politicians’ actions without further conceptual elaboration (Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Cho and 
Kirwin 2007; Citrin 1974; Clausen et al. 2011; Lavallée 2008; Wroe et al. 2013; Yang and Tang 
2010).  
Our limited understanding of what constitutes a trustworthy institution for respondents has 
slowly become the center of some contention in the survey literature. Rose’s (1991, 448) now 
classic text on forms of comparative analysis remains relevant for the present research problem: 
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“to amass materials without regard to concepts is to produce empirical data that will sink under its 
own weight, lacking ideas that give it meaning.” Overwhelmingly, it appears that this advice has 
been sidelined, resulting in somewhat of a “going back to the theory” movement. The lack of any 
“clear account of what is meant by trust in the first place” in the empirical literature says very little, 
“if anything,” about “the merits of one theoretical concept of trust versus the merits of another” 
(Nannestad 2008, 415-16). Normative accounts about the importance of trust for democracy 
inappropriately precede proper definition and measurement (Bovens and Wille 2012, 48; Hooghe 
2011, 270). Even before the bulk of cross national research on the topic appeared, Weatherford 
(1992, 152) argued against “measurement-driven research,” noting that the debate about the 
meaning of political trust and legitimacy  
begins with the measures and tries to fit theoretical inferences to them, rather 
than reverse, and it promotes the question of policies-versus incumbents by 
construing legitimacy in terms of public approval for governmental outputs, 
rather than the more theoretically central issues of how citizens evaluate the 
system’s procedural efficiency or distributive fairness. 
 
This intuition has returned more forcefully in the past decade. Thicker definitions of trust, it is 
argued, are necessary for subsequent measurement and empirical analysis. Many recent proposals 
follow conceptions of trust closer to Pettit’s idea of republican virtue, attempting to distill it into 
clear measures of trustworthiness. Articulating a theoretically sound concept of trust for empirical 
applications, for instance, Levi and Stoker (2000, 498) recommend Miller and Listhaug’s (1990) 
definition of trust as something that 
reflects evaluations of whether or not political authorities and institutions are 
performing in accordance with normative expectations held by the public. Citizen 
expectations of how government should operate include, among other criteria, that 
it be fair, equitable, honest, efficient, and responsive to society’s needs. In brief, 
an expression of trust in government (or synonymously political confidence and 
support) is a summary judgment that the system is responsive and will do what is 




Alternatively, Levi and Stoker (2000, 499) see a second approach to defining trustworthiness as a 
function of encapsulated trust in Hardin’s conception (how much one expects the institution to act 
in her interests). To apply this empirically in survey research,  
one would first stipulate an objective account of interests, and then design survey 
questions that asked people whether they believed an actor was serving, or not 
obstructing, those interests. If, for example, one stipulated that people want (a) to 
be told the truth, (b) to be autonomous, (c) to be treated fairly, (d) to accumulate 
wealth, and (e) to live free from fear, then one would need to gauge whether a given 
political actor or institution was seen as protecting or harming those interests (my 
italics). 
 
Similarly, Kim’s (2005, 622) model of institutional trustworthiness contains five main criteria 
which might be considered an “objective account” for empirical testing: 
1) Credible commitments (“Do institutional actors honor their commitments?”) 
2) Benevolence (“Do they want to do good to citizens?”) 
3) Honesty (“Are representatives of institutions telling the truth?”) 
4) Competency (“Do institutional office holders have the necessary knowledge and 
  skills?”) 
5) Fairness (“To what extent are they dealing with everybody in an equal    
  manner?”) 
 
Along slightly different lines, Fisher et al. (2010) argue that different political institutions elicit 
different types of trust judgments which can be operationalized along strategic, moral and 
deliberative dimensions. Strategic trust is a rational judgment about the trustworthiness of 
individual actors, moral trust refers to the truster’s belief that most others can be trusted (regardless 
of individual characteristics), and deliberative trust is based on trusted parties’ prioritization of 
common consensus and mutually beneficial outcomes above individual interests. To be considered 
trustworthy, political structures “should be aimed at full, equal, informed, and un-coerced 
participation in the rule- and regulation-making process by individuals who are guaranteed the 
freedoms and opportunities necessary to achieve this end” (ibid., 15, my italics).  Here, legitimacy 
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requires channels for and commitment to rational discourse. At the core of the argument, standard 
trust in government survey questions fail to incorporate this conceptual multidimensionality. 
 Although it might be useful to flesh out what kinds of criteria people have in mind when 
evaluating political institutions, the above attempts do not accomplish this because they present 
theories about what trust ought to do or what it should entail rather than what it actually entails. 
Despite their differences, each approach emphasizes a theoretically driven approach to empirical 
analysis: prior to conducting survey-based research, one must specify that citizens expect X, Y 
and Z of their government and their government must in turn exhibit X, Y, Z characteristics or 
perform X, Y, or Z services. These specifications are a-contextual, universally applicable and even 
objective. The thrust of this “going back to the theory” argument is that after years of neglectful 
thinking about concepts, empirical researchers must re-endow measures of political trust with 
meaning before engaging in causal or normative inference.  
 I would argue that identifying the criteria of trust is an important and necessary challenge, 
but doing so requires empirical work. While we as researchers might believe that people wish to 
accumulate wealth or to be told the truth when evaluating political institutions, these are not facts 
but hypotheses in need of testing. To take Fisher et al.’s conceptualization of legitimacy as an 
example, a commitment to rational discourse might be a desirable element of political legitimacy 
in theory, but its absence in authoritarian regimes might lead us to conclude that such governments 
are altogether illegitimate. If we consider anthropological work on political legitimacy in China 
(Li 2004) and Azerbaijan (Barrett 2015), we will find that even authoritarian regimes elicit 
compliance and genuine admiration from ordinary people for reasons that have nothing to do with 
their capacity for rational discourse about political life. The validity of our empirical measures 
requires that they capture what they mean to measure in the real world. Conceptual complexity 
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alone does not qualify a measurement model for empirical applications. If the model is untested 
for content validity in the empirical context where it will be subsequently analyzed, no amount of 
a-priori theoretical richness can justify its empirical usefulness. It should come as no surprise, 
indeed, that adding complexity can do more harm than good, especially when the measures are 
meant to be compared in heterogeneous environments.  
Gilley’s (2006) widely cited attempt to create a generalizable measurement model of 
legitimacy in 72 countries demonstrates some important limitations of “going back to the theory” 
to aid empirical work. I have argued earlier that measures of political trust are not proxies for 
political legitimacy despite popular arguments for this interpretation. Nevertheless, Gilley’s study 
is an important example of the problems of measurement validity and equivalence that one can 
easily encounter when measuring political trust in any of the ways recommended by the above 
authors. I will use his study merely as a means of illuminating the tension between theory and 
empirics that we often face when doing comparative work.  
Gilley’s proposed measurement of political legitimacy is based on three conceptual 
subtypes of legitimacy including citizens’ views of legality (measuring the extent to which political 
institutions exercise power in a way that accords with citizens’ interpretation of rules and laws), 
views of justification (measuring the “moral congruence” of actions by political institutions and 
citizen expectations) and acts of consent (observable behavior by citizens demonstrating the state’s 
right to exercise its authority). For all three subtypes, Gilley notes that “we are concerned with 
rightfulness ‘as believed’ by citizens rather than rightfulness ‘as claimed’ by rulers” (ibid., 502). 
As such, the measurement depends on citizens’ normative evaluations of political institutions. 
Three indicators are chosen for each subtype and the nine total indicators are aggregated into a 1-
10 scale.  
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This choice of indicators makes for a troublesome cross-country comparison. “Views of 
justification” are measured in part by World Values Survey (WVS) questions about people’s 
satisfaction with democratic development, evaluations of the current political system and 
satisfaction with the operation of democracy in their country. Voter turnout is used as a measure 
of “acts of consent.” Off the bat, these measures assume the presence of democratic institutions 
and functional electoral systems in 72 countries.  
Mishler and Rose (2001) demonstrate that assessments of legitimacy or system support 
based on the above WVS questions on democracy are markedly different from those based on a 
question simply gaging evaluations of the political system (without reference to the sort of political 
system). Based on the WVS question on democratic satisfaction in the 1995-1997 wave, Mishler 
and Rose (2001, 306) report the fascinating discrepancy that 25 percent of United States 
respondents are satisfied with democracy, while that number is 77 percent in Azerbaijan (where, 
among various abuses of political rights, the president gained full control over the government, 
legislature and judiciary in the 1995 constitution). Gilley is somewhat perplexed that his 
aggregated legitimacy index ranks Azerbaijan as the tenth most “legitimate” country out of 72, 
placing it between the United States and Germany. China also ranks impressively at 13, above 
established democracies like Britain (18), New Zealand (23) and France (33). Gilley calls 
Azerbaijan a “failed post-Soviet democracy,” a title which likely reflects an idealized view of post-
communist transitions as heading towards democracy rather than the more realistic interpretation 
of authoritarian consolidation with cosmetic democratic features (Levitsky and Way 2015). 
Whether or not this influenced Gilley’s decision to use measures of satisfaction with democracy, 
we can see that such “idealist” measures (in the words of Mishler and Rose) lack empirical 
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referents in several countries in his sample, which almost certainly undermines the measurement 
validity he wishes to establish.  
This questionable validity of legitimacy measures in separate countries makes them 
difficult to compare. Gilley expressly argues that legitimacy is “normative by conceptual 
definition” (ibid., 502). At the same time, his universal legitimacy scale divorces itself from that 
local normative context even though it inherently depends on it. This disconnect between measure 
and reality obscures the offered cross-country comparison. If we take Beetham’s definition of 
legitimacy seriously, it would be necessary to make explicit the norms on which citizens’ 
expectations of political institutions are built. Measures of satisfaction with democracy or violent 
civil protests do not capture those norms.    
 Bo Rothstein’s (2009) work on political legitimacy is another example of the possible 
dangers of making theoretical assumptions in measurement building. Rothstein argues that the 
mere possibility of political representation (i.e. only holding elections) is insufficient to make the 
exercise of power legitimate. Instead, political legitimacy depends on the “quality of government,” 
which he defines as “procedural fairness based on impartiality.” It therefore follows that the 
“absence of corruption, discrimination, and similar violations of the principle of impartiality in 
exercising political power” will serve to “create political legitimacy” (ibid., 325). Linde (2011) 
follows Rothstein in his study of political legitimacy, arguing that “to be considered fair, the public 
administration must treat individuals impartially in the allocation of goods and services,” noting 
that “although not a coherent body of research, most studies engaged with the ‘quality of 
government’ have one thing in common: They regard corruption as one of the most, if not the 
most, serious challenge to high quality government” (ibid., 413).  
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The problem with this approach is that it is based on what scholars, not survey respondents, 
believe to be fair institutional performance. While citing one paper which demonstrates that 
corruption perceptions corrode political trust in Latin America as evidence, Rothstein does not 
convince us that we would observe losses of legitimacy given such partiality. Indeed, there are 
plenty of empirical cases in which the counterfactual is invalid: administrative corruption, the 
forceful payment of bribes, the necessity of using networks to obtain public services and the 
general misuse of public office for private gain fail to corrode political legitimacy and incumbent 
approval across the regime spectrum (Chang 2013; Golden 2006; Manzetti and Wilson 2006; 
Rundquist et al. 1977; Fernández-Vázquez et al. 2014; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013; 
Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). If we were to take Rothstein’s definition of legitimacy 
seriously, we might conclude off the bat that governments in these empirical cases are not 
legitimate without needing to consult how citizens actually relate to their political institutions. 
Measures of legitimacy incorporating Rothstein’s conception of procedural fairness would simply 
not correspond to the reality they purport to describe. Although from a theoretical standpoint one 
might believe that people do not favor corruption, this is an empirical hypothesis that must be 
tested. It cannot be assumed to be part of the criteria people use when evaluating political 
institutions. And if it is part of what goes into people’s institutional trust and conformity to political 
authority, we cannot assume that people respond to corruption in the negative way we as 
investigators think they should. 
It follows that Rothstein’s (2009, 326) argument that “political legitimacy ought to be the 
ultimate goal for any system of governance” is normatively flawed. Some political systems gain 
support on the basis of less liberal conceptions of fairness than what he suggests. If it turns out that 
citizens regularly benefit from corruption and reward politicians for sharing spoils, should the 
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political legitimacy that results from such practices be the ultimate goal for that system of 
governance? Indeed, Rothstein’s normative prescription is premature without an empirical inquiry 
into the underpinnings of political trust and legitimacy.     
But it is worth noting that Rothstein is not alone in his normative suggestion. The urgency 
to maximize political trust or legitimacy prior to empirical inquiry has a long and thriving legacy 
dating back to the “crisis” of democracy literature from the 1960s and 70s. Easton (1965), 
Luhmann (1979) and Parsons (1961) feature prominently in works cited lists of many recent 
empirical investigations of political trust, where authors anticipate scenarios in which states 
respond to low trust levels with ratcheting levels of coercion. In their study of sources of support 
for European integration, for instance, Arnold et al. (2012, 3) start their paper with “Trust in 
political institutions is one of the key elements allowing representative democracies to work.” 
Yang and Tang’s (2010, 415) first sentence in their study of the sources of institutional trust in 
China is similar: “Trust in political institutions is important for the successful functioning of 
democracy.” Describing low levels of trust across post-communist societies in Eastern Europe, 
Lovell (2001, 35) suggests that “Enhancing trust is a prime responsibility of leadership in 
postcommunism – it is, in an importance sense, a definition of leadership…Trust can be built by 
exemplary, but not necessarily heroic, behavior, especially on the part of publicly prominent role 
models such as politicians.” Bowser (2011, 17) echoes the approach: “If the countries of the FSU 
[Former Soviet Union] are to proceed to genuinely representative and accountable democratic 
regimes they must seek to increase public support for the state.”     
Such statements are often made in introductions as justifications for studying political trust. 
Yet political trust can be just as interesting for its role in bolstering authoritarian and kleptocratic 
regimes, and for its potentially harmful place in world affairs. Although it is certainly plausible 
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that greater political trust is a good thing for democracy or political stability, we have reason to be 
suspicious about accounts which claim that political trust is equally important or beneficial in all 
empirical settings. Scholars’ sophisticated accounts of trust tend to invade the difficult job of 
understanding what actually underpins that trustworthiness for people on the ground and 
introduces the danger of making misleading claims about its substantive desirability. The 
normative frame invades the positive, much to the detriment of our understanding of how 
governments retain popularity in the presence of corruption, extortion, repression and other forms 
of institutional dysfunction that undermine citizens’ wellbeing and ability to lead a good life.  
Methodologically, uncovering local knowledge about what constitutes institutional 
trustworthiness or legitimacy can, in some views, prove to be incompatible with large N 
comparative research designs. My argument might be broadly interpreted as consistent with 
Hayek’s (1952, 51) critique of what he calls scientism, an attempt to reproduce natural science 
methodology in the social sciences:  
Connected with the tendency to treat the objects of human activity in terms of their 
“real” attributes instead of as what they appear to the acting people is the propensity 
to conceive of the student of society as endowed with a kind of super-mind, with 
some sort of absolute knowledge, which makes it unnecessary for him to start from 
what is known by the people whose actions he studies. 
 
Hayek’s critique is perhaps not perfectly transferable into the current discussion because he was 
specifically addressing methodological tendencies within the economics profession of the 
twentieth century to reduce social science data to aggregate statistics, static quantities or precise 
predictions. Nevertheless, I would argue that his broad message about the importance of 
understanding the world as it appears to human beings is relevant to modern day large N public 
opinion research. Perhaps most interestingly, this useful methodological warning comes from an 
economist, even though resistance to the “scientistic” attitude, particularly with regards to political 
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trust and legitimacy, is most forceful in anthropology and critical theory, fields which emphasize 
the importance of the discursive construction of social phenomena.  
In his now classic ethnographic work on discourses of corruption and the “imagined state,” 
Gupta (1995, 393) calls for “vigilance toward the imperialism of the Western conceptual 
apparatus.” He argues that instead of premising empirical analysis on concepts of state and civil 
society “that were forged on the anvil of European history,” one must first understand the 
historically specific discursive processes that make up the world view of the studied population. 
Complex processes that mediate the social construction of any grouping or class make it far from 
obvious that ideas like “civil society,” the “state” or “public” and “private” can be easily 
dichotomized or quantified. A comparative analysis of “state” legitimacy rests on the crude 
assumption that the state is a “cohesive and unitary whole” rather than a historically and culturally 
specific idea (ibid., 392). Moreover, processes of constructing reality do not fit neatly into the 
boundaries of a nation-state, making the danger of general quantitative measurement more 
profound: not only are survey comparativists attempting to measure social phenomena which by 
the nature of their social construction do not lend themselves to neat categorization, but any 
preliminary categories will not correspond to cross-national boundaries which comparativists are 
privy to choose for large N comparison.   
This perspective rests at the opposite end of the methodological debate on measurement. 
While authors like Levi and Stoker recommend listing specific elements of institutional 
trustworthiness in our accounts of political trust, authors like Gupta might be more likely to argue 
that no amount of conceptual sophistication intended for universal large N applications will reflect 
the reality it means to capture. Przeworski and Teune (1966, 553) discussed this dilemma at some 
length five decades ago. For scholars favorable to Gupta’s constructivist approach, “abstracting 
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particular ‘traits’ from their particular structural-functional setting is not possible and cross-
national measurement cannot have validity” (ibid.). According to conceptual approaches in some 
of the political trust literature, “single, identical indicators of various cultural traits…have cross-
national validity and meaning, and thus comparisons can be made in terms of these single 
standards, external to each of the cultures involved...” (ibid.). While it is impossible to fully satisfy 
both ideals, I argue that it is important to find balance between them.  
In seeking this balance, I do not believe that the core premises in the divide between 
constructivists and positivists can be reconciled. By adhering to a position that social reality cannot 
be understood outside of its discursive construction, it becomes impossible to make generalizable 
inferences about complex social phenomena from a sample to a wider population, where other 
discourses thrive and form different understandings of the studied subject. I concede that objective 
comparisons of social phenomena are possible, however, and that balance should be sought 
between universal and context-specific elements of measurement. A highly universal and 
comparable set of measures across countries will likely say very little about what political trust 
means separately in each country. A highly detailed concept of trust which captures local 
knowledge will be difficult to make universal and comparable across countries. Although all 
measurement models will be highly imperfect in the way they correspond to reality, some will be 
more useful than others in facilitating meaningful inference about how a concept operates in 
different environments.  
Which measurement approaches are more useful? I do not believe there are hard and fast 
rules, but would follow Mishler and Rose (2001) in advocating for using realist over idealist 
measures in the comparative study of political trust. Realist survey questions, in their view, “avoid 
abstract, ambiguous, and idealistic labels such as democracy, asking citizens to evaluate regimes 
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as they have personally experienced them” (ibid., 307). At the time that they were writing, public 
opinion research was rapidly spreading around the world. Mishler and Rose were pushing back 
against a tradition of measuring political support in terms of support or satisfaction with 
democracy, measures which were particularly lacking in meaning for survey respondents in non-
democracies. To help ameliorate the problem, they proposed measuring people’s evaluations of 
current institutional performance relative to the past. I believe that even this retrospective 
evaluation can create problems for cross-national comparability because different historical 
legacies will add noise to current evaluations, particularly in countries which have experienced 
political transitions or upheavals in previous years. But the authors’ general recommendation for 
realist measurement is correct. The less assumptions about people’s normative considerations are 
attached to measurements of political trust, the better. Contrary to advocates of “going back to the 
theory,” I would argue that standard, Likert-scale questions about the extent of one’s trust in 
government might not be ideal, but at least they are not idealistic, and they can be useful for cross-
national comparison. This is not to abandon sophisticated theories about the foundations of trust, 
but to urge that they be tested. 
In my view, the drive to fill the gap between concepts and measures with more 
sophisticated concepts has mistaken an empirical problem for a conceptual one. Levi and Stoker 
(2000, 500) argued that macro-level political trust research “requires, first, establishing the 
attributes of a trustworthy government and of political actors” while micro-level researchers, 
“rather than leaving open the question of what figures into trust judgments, must stipulate the 
attributes that, according to their definition, renders an actor trustworthy, and they must tap 
people’s perceptions of these attributes.” But in doing so, researchers are prone to produce idealist 
measures which lack empirical validity and cross-national equivalence. What constitutes 
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institutional trustworthiness for people is ultimately an empirical question, not a conceptual one. 
While inadequate attention to concept building can cause data to sink under their own weight, as 
Rose (1991) argues, it is also true that the failure to account for analytical decisions in concept 
building can lead researchers to erect “theoretical skyscrapers on foundations of empirical jello” 
(Schriesheim et al. 2001, cited in Antonakis 2010, 1114). 
 
1.4 Discussion 
 When we ask someone to rate her trust in government, we are measuring her expectation 
that political authorities will perform in accordance with her desires and normative understandings 
of good performance. We cannot ascertain the content of these understandings without empirical 
inquiry. Theories about what constitutes trustworthiness to citizens, as well as the causes and 
consequences of political trust can only be discovered through a concerted application of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies. Unfortunately, many quantitative empirical 
approaches depend on limited survey data. In an ideal scenario, we could design survey questions 
which inquire into the precise expectations citizens have of their institutions as Levi and Stoker 
suggest, and test 1) whether people do, for example, wish to accumulate wealth or to be told the 
truth, and 2) whether these conceptions are similar across diverse populations. Many surveys, 
however, lack such detailed indictors, leaving us with standard Likert-scale trust in government 
survey questions. I have argued that these measures are acceptable in so far as they make no 
assumptions about their normative empirical content. Using them comes at the expense of 
obtaining rich local knowledge about political trustworthiness in different settings, but it does not 
preclude meaningful comparative work.      
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 As I show in the next chapter, responses to standard trust in government survey questions 
can tell us a great deal about how societies under different regime conditions relate differently to 
different political institutions.  In chapters three and four, I challenge Rothstein’s conception of 
political legitimacy as procedural fairness by investigating cases in the former Soviet space where 
governments retain high levels of political trust despite rampant corruption. In studying this link, 
it is impossible (and not my motive) to identify all possible normative contributions to political 
trust, but it is possible to identify conditions under which people support political institutions for 
self-interested reasons, and when other, possibly more principled expectations and notions of 
political accountability come into play. And although the scope of this dissertation is limited in its 
exploration of political legitimacy, I discuss the relationship between incumbent support and 




2 Chapter 2. Can we Trust Measures of Political Trust? Assessing 
Measurement Equivalence in Diverse Regime Types 
 
2.1 Introduction1 
  Since the 1960s and 70s, theorists have claimed that political trust is crucial to the 
function of democracy and political order. Rosanvallon (2008, 48-49) describes trust as an 
“invisible institution” or “assumed stock of information”, an essential “property of a relationship 
between…governors and governed” in which a “politician’s reputation becomes his certificate of 
warranty.” Trust in political institutions allows elected officials to provision public goods to their 
constituents without resorting to repression or coercion (Parsons 1961, 53; Luhmann 1979, 56). 
Declines in political trust across advanced democracies in the postwar era have been interpreted 
as a deterioration of state legitimacy (Easton 1975; Luhmann 1979) and even a “crisis of 
democracy” (Huntington, Crozier and Watanuki 1975). Recent research shows that low political 
trust levels are associated with tax fraud and low compliance with the law (Hooghe and Marien 
2010) as well as low generalized trust and social capital (Rothstein 2003; Schyns and Koop 
2010).  
 Despite a long standing consensus about the importance of political trust, there is little 
consensus about its appropriate definition or measurement in cross-national research. Researchers 
continue to rely on sum scores or averages of standard “trust in government” survey questions 
without fully understanding what the concept means, or whether these measures tap into 
comparable ideas across the countries in their sample. Precisely because of the normative and 
subjective content of political trust, what constitutes a trustworthy institution is unlikely to be the 
                                                          
1 Supplementary materials for this chapter are available in Appendix A. An abridged version of this chapter was 
published in Social Indicators Research in 2016: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11205-016-1400-8  
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same for citizens in different cultural and regime contexts. Moreover, cross-national research in 
more diverse environments enhances the potential for measurement error resulting from the data 
collection process with possibly detrimental consequences for regression analysis.  Prior to 
comparing the means or correlates of political trust survey indicators, it is important to check that 
the indicators deliver similar and comparable understandings of political trust across populations. 
Little progress has been made in this direction even though our ability to accurately theorize about 
the causes and consequences of political trust depends on these empirical considerations. 
 To account for this weakness in the comparative literature, I aim to answer two questions 
about the measurement of political trust in 35 European and former Soviet countries using the 
2010 Life in Transition II Survey (LITS II). First, do standard “trust in government” survey 
indicators represent a single, comprehensive attitude of political trust? Second, are different 
measurement models of political trust equivalent in all countries? In other words, do measures of 
political trust travel successfully on the survey instrument across borders? I will investigate these 
questions using multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (Jöreskog 1971). Unlike most studies 
of the measurement equivalence of political trust, the results of this study will help us determine 
our ability to compare the means and correlates of the construct across both democracies and non-
democracies.   
 
2.2 Empirical Considerations  
 Data limitations are inevitable in the measurement of political trust. Most surveys do not 
contain indicators which capture elements of institutional trustworthiness for a given population. 
As a result, scholars typically produce sum scores or averages of survey indicators measuring trust 
in a variety of political institutions on a Likert scale (from strong distrust to strong trust). Usually, 
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little to no rationale accompanies these item choices. To consider just a few examples from highly 
cited studies, Mishler and Rose (2001) examine the sources of political trust in ten post-communist 
societies surveyed in the New Democracies Barometer by averaging trust in the parliament, prime 
minister or president, courts, police, parties and military. Chang and Chu (2006) and Chang (2013) 
use the East Asian Barometer to estimate the effect of corruption on political trust in six Asian 
countries by averaging trust in the president/prime minister, courts, national government, political 
parties, parliament, civil service, military, police and local government. To assess the importance 
of political capacity for political trust in environments with different levels of violence, Hutchison 
and Johnson (2011) construct an additive index of trust in the executive, courts, police, armed 
forces, electoral commissions and government-run media for 16 countries surveyed in the 
Afrobarometer. Clausen et al. (2011) use the Gallup World Poll to study political trust and 
corruption in 103 countries, obtaining an index of confidence in public institutions by summing 
responses to a question on confidence in the military, judicial system and courts, national 
government and honesty of elections. Similar measurement approaches are taken in cross-national 
research projects on political trust in Latin America (Seligson 2002; Stoyan et al. 2014), Asia 
(Wong et al. 2011), Sub-Saharan Africa (Cho and Kirwin 2007; Lavallée et al. 2008) and other 
global samples (Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012).  
 This prolific “kitchen sink” measurement approach is a problem if our goal is to draw 
meaningful inferences about political trust across diverse societies. Comparing the correlates of 
averaged or summed indicators across countries assumes that these indicators are 1) reliable, 
unidimensional measures of political trust in each country and 2) mean the same thing to 
respondents in each country. Could we assume, for instance, that citizens on the democratic and 
autocratic parts of the regime spectrum have similar understandings of what it means for an 
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election to be honest? Can we be sure that fear to report true beliefs about the executive is not 
biasing the responses of a person affected by a violent civil war? Do citizens of East Asian 
countries really evaluate the president and police in similar ways? Perhaps petty corruption might 
reduce trust in the police but not in a charismatic president.  
 While testing for the validity and equivalence of empirical measures is common practice 
in psychology and management studies, it is less recognized in political science (Adcock and 
Collier 2001, 536; Ansolabehere et al. 2008, 228). Measurement error in survey research can result 
from inherently different understandings of survey questions across different populations, as well 
as from method effects specific to the survey instrument. Survey implementation, translation, and 
question order can influence nonresponse patterns, uses of extreme response categories and 
socially desirable responses by population (Davidov et al. 2014, 59-62; Podsakoff et al. 2012, 544). 
In applied research, cross-cultural comparisons of attitudes toward democracy, levels of 
postmaterialism and left-right political ideology, for instance, do not pass the test of measurement 
equivalence (Alemán and Woods 2015; Davidov et al. 2014). Delhey et al. (2011) find significant 
cross-national variation in the way respondents interpret “generalized trust” in the World Values 
Survey by estimating their “trust radius,” or the width of one’s notion of trust in “most” people. 
They find that the trust radius is much smaller for people in countries with Confucian influence 
than for those in countries with a Protestant heritage and modern economy, noting that such 
findings “throw sufficient doubt on the cross-national validity of the standard trust question” (ibid., 
793).  
For the most part, these examples of non-equivalence are the result of construct biases, or 
differences in people’s understandings of the survey question at the level of the construct. In other 
words, responses to a question intended to measure left-right orientation, democratic preference, 
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postmaterialism or social trust reflect different notions of what these constructs mean in different 
populations. This notional variation poses problems for measurement because individuals in 
different populations with the same substantive position on the construct will end up scoring 
different items on the scale. Individuals in China and the US may score systematically differently 
on questions of generalized trust not because one population is actually less trusting than the other, 
but because one population has a different understanding of what counts as the generalized “other.”  
It is in this sense that the survey instrument becomes cross-culturally incomparable or 
inequivalent. 
 Measurement equivalence testing procedures are only recently appearing in survey-based 
political trust research. Hooghe (2011) uses factor analysis to show that British citizens do not 
distinguish between MPs, governing parties, opposition parties or the head of state regardless of 
political sophistication or education. Suh et al. (2012, 516) demonstrate in a latent class analysis 
that trust in government is part of a broader set of attitudes towards public and private institutions 
like companies and civil associations in South Korea. A number of studies implement a multiple 
group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) of political trust models in the European Social 
Survey (ESS), all finding relatively strong evidence for the equivalence of political trust across 
subsets of countries and time points. The authors’ choices of indicators, however, are not entirely 
theoretically consistent.  
 Allum et al. (2011, 42), for instance, use only trust in the parliament and politicians, arguing 
that a prior confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) showed that trust in the legal system, police, 
European parliament and UN constituted a separate dimension of trust. Coromina and Davidov 
(2013, 41), however, choose trust in the parliament, legal system and politicians using the same 
survey. They do not justify this precise combination of indicators even though they acknowledge 
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that legal institutions like courts are often conceptualized separately from strictly political 
institutions because they are meant to be impartial and focused on enforcing the rule of law 
(Jackson et al. 2011; Linde 2012; Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Marien (2011) chooses the broadest 
set of indicators from the ESS, including trust in the parliament, politicians, political parties, legal 
system and police, detecting an error correlation between trust in the police and legal system in 
Eastern Europe.  This finds some confirmation in Schaap and Scheepers’ (2014) assessment of the 
measurement equivalence of trust in police in 27 European countries. André (2014) also uses a 
broad range of indicators in the ESS to test for the equivalence of political trust between EU natives 
and migrants, but introduces three correlated errors to illustrate the multidimensionality of the 
construct as distinctively political (measured by trust in politicians, parliament and political 
parties), order/neutral (trust in the legal system and police) and international (trust in the EU 
parliament and United Nations). 
 Although these papers have different theoretical purposes, it is striking how many different 
models of political trust can fit mostly the same data in a single region of the world. A cross-regime 
survey will likely invite even more variation in indicator selection and increase the potential for 
measurement error across countries. There is, however, no substitute for conscientious 
measurement modeling in regression analysis. Feeding unreliable and non-equivalent measures 
into a pooled regression can undermine the validity of substantive results. Reeskens and Hooghe 
(2008, 527) and Coromina and Davidov (2013, 48) show that using country means without 
accounting for measurement error and equivalence results in incorrect country rankings on social 
and political trust. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001, 70) go as far as to argue that “subjective 
variables cannot reasonably be used as dependent variables, given that the measurement error 
likely correlates in a very causal way with the explanatory variables.” If a sum score of political 
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trust is used as a dependent variable, for example, predictors might not ultimately be explaining 
variation in political trust scores, but rather the way those scores are over or under-reported. 
Westfall and Yarkoni (2016, 12) and Van der Veld and Saris (2009, 38) demonstrate that multiple 
regression capitalizes on measurement error by incorrectly apportioning the amount of explained 
variance in the dependent variable between different error-laden predictors. Both authors 
recommend structural equation modeling (SEM) to control for measurement error and thus more 
accurately determine each predictor’s effect on the outcome.  
 Ultimately, though political trust is considered an important object of study, it currently 
rests on a weak theoretical and empirical foundation. Neglecting the criteria for empirical 
measurement can undermine our ability to draw meaningful and accurate inferences about 
substantive theories using regression analysis. While this issue is gaining traction in political trust 
research, most tests of measurement equivalence remain limited to Europe and specifically to the 
European Social Survey. Techniques like MGCFA have not yet enriched measurement modeling 
in developing and authoritarian countries where survey research has proliferated in the last decade. 
To help overcome this weakness, I will put to test the ability of different measurement models of 
political trust to meet the requirements of validity and equivalence across different cultures and 
regime types.  
 
2.3 Case Selection and Data 
 Considerable region-specific research on political trust outside of Europe and the United 
States has covered parts of Asia, Africa, Latin America, and selections of contemporary and 
developing democracies. Political trust in parts of the former Soviet space has received some 
empirical attention (Luhiste 2005; Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001; Wallace and Latcheva 2006), 
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although these regional samples have neglected countries in the Southern Caucasus and Central 
Asia mainly due to a lack of data. 
 In this study I use the Life in Transition Survey II (LITS II) produced by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The cross-sectional 
sample from late 2010 surveys almost 39,000 households in thirty-five countries to assess public 
attitudes on a range of social, political and economic variables. This sample contains all former 
Soviet countries, the Balkans, Eastern and Central Europe, and some of Western Europe.2 Two –
stage clustered, stratified sampling was employed across regions in each country.3 38,379 response 
observations (with at least 895 per country) are used in this analysis due to missing values on all 
variables in 485 observations. Respondents were asked “To what extent do you trust the following 
institutions?” (including the presidency/monarchy, government/cabinet of ministers, regional 
government, local government, parliament, courts, political parties, armed forces, police) using a 
1-5 Likert scale (from complete distrust to complete trust). 
 Helpfully, this survey includes Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, allowing for 
systematic comparison between significantly different cultures and regime types. The inclusion of 
these rarely-explored regions introduces striking variation on trust perceptions into the sample. 
Looking only at the single ‘trust in government’ indicator without controlling for measurement 
error, the most authoritarian countries appear to be the most trusting of government with the 
exception of Sweden (Uzbekistan exhibiting the most trust, followed by Tajikistan, Sweden, 
                                                          
2 Here is the full list of countries with each sample size in parentheses: Albania (1029), Armenia (948), Azerbaijan 
(988), Belarus (895), Bosnia (1075), Bulgaria (1007), Croatia (997), Czech Republic (1006), Estonia (989), France 
(1008), Georgia (959), Germany (1032), Great Britain (1447), Hungary (1028), Italy (1046), Kazakhstan (943), 
Kyrgyzstan (992), Latvia (995), Lithuania (1003), Macedonia (1058), Moldova (1023), Mongolia (980), Poland 
(1587), Romania (1068), Russia (1549), Serbia (1506), Slovakia (995), Slovenia (984), Sweden (899), Tajikistan 
(996), Turkey (996), Ukraine (1547), Uzbekistan (1417), Kosovo (1081), Montenegro (966). 




Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Belarus, Georgia, Montenegro and Russia). On this basis it could 
be argued that subjecting these indicators to cross-national comparison inappropriately assumes 
that the institutions in question have sufficiently similar roles and functions. After all, parliaments 
and political parties can be considered fundamentally dysfunctional in autocracies like Uzbekistan, 
and thus incomparable to the same institutions in Sweden.  
 While it is true that a host of political institutions are functionally dissimilar in democracies 
and autocracies, the parameter on which comparisons are drawn in the present case (as in much of 
the political trust research) is based on perceptions rather than observable attributes of institutions. 
In testing the validity of a perception-based measure, we must ensure that we are working with 
approximately similar associations of political trust among respondents in multiple locations. If, 
say, the parliament proves to be different enough in two countries so as to inspire inherently 
different understandings of its purposes and functions, this deviation can be detected by 
measurement equivalence testing. Likewise, biases in response arising from fear to reveal genuine 
opinions or misinterpretations based on faulty question translations or interview techniques may 
also lead to statistical nonequivalence. A comparison between countries on the indicator would be 
deemed un-interpretable in these cases. If, however, despite significant differences in institutional 
functionality attitudes across countries refer to the same approximate idea, we can proceed with 
comparisons on the perception-based measures even in diverse regime contexts.  
 
2.4  Analytical Strategy  
 I use Multiple Group Confirmatory Factor Analysis (MGCFA), a powerful statistical tool 
in the family of structural equation modeling commonly used to assess the measurement 
equivalence of a latent construct across populations. MGCFA is typically employed after valid 
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measurement models have been specified in all groups (in this case, countries) either via 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) or a strong theoretical foundation, and tested for appropriate 
“goodness of fit” to survey response data via confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). More 
specifically, the purpose of EFA is to explore inter-correlations among a set of indicators to 
generate the smallest number of unique factors that can best explain these correlations (Brown 
2006, 20). In CFA, rather than simply exploring data for sets of patterns, the researcher uses 
theoretical reasoning to make a-priori specifications of the measurement model, constraining 
specific indicators to load on specific factors. This procedure tests the validity of the researcher’s 
measurement model by showing how much the model specification adheres to covariance patterns 
in the survey data.   
 Measurement equivalence is used interchangeably with the statistical term “invariance,” 
which refers to “whether or not, under different conditions of observing and studying phenomena, 
measurement operations yield measures of the same attribute” (Horn and McArdle 1992, 117; 
Steenkamp and Baumgartner 1998, 78). Conventionally, three stages of invariance must be 
achieved before the comparison of means can occur. When testing for configural invariance, we 
want to understand whether the same survey indictors measure the same latent construct in all 
groups. Reaching this level means that the same basic meaning and structure of political trust exists 
in all countries. Metric invariance refers to the equality of factor loadings on the construct across 
groups. A unit change in the latent factor of political trust will affect scores on political trust survey 
questions by the same magnitude across countries. Reaching this level of invariance is sufficient 
for meaningful cross-cultural comparisons of covariances and unstandardized regression 
coefficients. That is, we can be confident that changes in political trust scores arise from real 
differences in the underlying construct rather than nuisance variables or method effects (Byrne et 
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al. 1989). Finally, scalar invariance refers to the equality of intercepts across groups. In this case, 
differences in indicator means result from differences in latent factor means (Steenkamp and 
Baumgartner 1998, 80). Although this level of invariance is typically required to meaningfully 
compare factor means across groups, partial scalar invariance is generally considered sufficient 
if at least two indicators per factor have invariant loadings and intercepts in each group (Byrne et 
al. 1989; Byrne 2012, 198; Brown 2006, 81-2). While respondents might understand survey 
questions similarly (given metric invariance), it may still be problematic to compare means if the 
model fails to achieve partial scalar invariance. 
 I follow the literature in assuming that political trust indicators reflect a broader attitude 
toward political institutions; they do not generate it like education, income and occupation 
generate the concept of socioeconomic status. Indicators like trust in the parliament, political 
parties and prime minister have been shown to be highly correlated and interchangeable in the 
CFA and MGCFA literature, which is the opposite of what one would expect of a formative or 
‘generating’ approach to index construction. In the latter approach, items should have a distinct 
influence on the measured construct in a way that it would lose substantive meaning without each 
item. High inter-correlations among items would signal redundancy and multicollinearity rather 
than reliable internal consistency (Diamantopoulos and Siguaw 2006, 267). It would be hard to 
argue that any single political trust indicator adds a distinct or essential contribution to a person’s 
broader political orientation. More realistically, political culture inside a country affects how one 
relates to a number of political institutions (Marien 2012, 17).  
Perhaps most importantly, trust items in a single index can co-vary in different ways in 
different populations. As previously noted, notional differences or method effects can lead 
respondents to mark different responses on the survey scale even when they otherwise have the 
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same position. At the level of the construct, some items in the index may form part of what 
respondents believe constitutes political trust in some countries, but not in others. A formative 
approach to index construction would also prevent us from detecting this potential 
multidimensionality of political trust across populations, leading to possibly erroneous conclusions 
about the cross-cultural comparability of the index. For both these reasons, I take a reflective 
approach to measurement in this investigation: the arrow of influence in the measurement models 
below moves from the latent, unobserved dimension of political trust to one’s position on the 
observed indicators.  
 
2.5 Constructing Four Measurement Models   
 Due to the sheer number of survey items used in the literature without a theoretical 
rationale, I consider different plausible measurement models of political trust. I begin with a simple 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) in each country using a broad range of commonly used 
indicators. From these solutions and some theoretical consideration, I construct four measurement 
models of political trust and subject them to tests of measurement validity and equivalence. While 
the EFA solutions are no substitute for theory, they strongly suggest that indicators as diverse as 
trust in the government, parliament, parties, police, armed forces and courts do not form a 
unidimensional model of political trust in most countries.4  
 Firstly, EFA output for approximately half of the countries suggests that a separate factor 
accounts for trust in regional and local political institutions, indicating that many citizens 
differentiate between local and federal levels of government. To test for this possibility, I construct 
Model 1 by specifying trust in the government, parliament, political parties, regional and local 
                                                          
4 The EFA solutions are available in the online appendix.  
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government to load on a “political trust” latent variable, adding an error correlation between trust 
in the regional and local government. While the survey is unclear about what “regional” and 
“local” politics entail, it is likely that many respondents associate “regional” politics with the 
rayon, a Soviet-era administrative division of government slightly below the federal level which 
many (though not all) states retained after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The local level will 
likely correspond to city and town districts closer to the individual. Some variation might be 
expected between countries which inherited this structure from the Soviet Union and those which 
did not in Eastern or Central Europe. In Bulgaria, for instance, the rayon refers to a city-level rather 
than national government subdivision. If this model specification produces good fit to the data in 
most countries, we might conclude that local and regional political trust responses co-vary together 
in ways that cannot be accounted for by the political trust factor. At the same time, regional 
political trust might be more associated with federal-level political trust in former Soviet countries.  
 Secondly, EFA solutions show that citizens trust the police and armed forces in a different 
way than they trust political institutions like the government and parliament. Despite the lack of 
theory to support this dimension of political trust, the police and armed forces indicators form 
salient loadings on a separate factor in most countries in the sample. One possibility is that these 
institutions are the only ones which can legally exercise force to protect citizens. At least in 
principle, they may represent deeper notions of order that go beyond the tides of party politics, 
eliciting notions of patriotism or legitimacy which the parliament or government do not. To test 
for this “protective” dimensionality, I specify trust in the government, parliament, political parties, 
armed forces and police to load on a single factor, adding an error correlation between the latter 
two indicators. If this specification produces a good fit to the data in most countries, we can 
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conclude that respondents think about the police and armed forces differently than they think about 
political institutions.  
 Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, many authors argue that people evaluate the courts and police 
differently from the government or parliament because they are meant to be impartial and devoted 
to the maintenance of the rule of law and criminal justice. My EFA solutions do not consistently 
support this argument partly because trust in the courts loads on factors accounting for trust in 
political institutions like the government and parliament in authoritarian former Soviet states. It is 
likely that people living under politically repressive regimes might not believe that judicial and 
political institutions are independent of each other. I test whether this is the case by specifying 
trust in the government, parliament, political parties, courts and police to load on one ‘political 
trust’ factor with an error correlation between the courts and police. This specification may 
produce poorer fit in more politically repressive contexts.   
 Because indicators involving courts, armed forces, police and regional government are 
subject to error correlations and separate dimensions of political trust, they are likely to cause 
problems for cross-national equivalence. In the interest of capturing the largest amount of countries 
for an appropriate cross-national regression or mean comparison, in Model 4 I specify a simple 
political trust factor measured by trust in the government, parliament, political parties and local 
government. This model is closest to other CFA models of political trust using the European Social 
Survey and should produce the best fit to the data in most countries.  
 For ease of interpretation, I have included path diagrams of each measurement model in 
Figure 2.1. To check for the robustness of these models to alternative specifications, I compare 
each model to a bi-dimensional model in which the two items originally specified to have 
correlated errors are reflected by a separate factor. I also compare Model 4 to one excluding trust 
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in the local government, keeping the factor strictly limited to federal-level political institutions. 
Across all models, I exclude the ‘trust in the presidency/monarchy’ indicator. British respondents 
would have been evaluating trust in the Queen, French respondents the French President and 
Belarusians an autocratic leader in power since 1994. A cross country comparison on such an 
indicator would be de-facto uninterpretable based on its heterogeneous content. This point finds 
confirmation in the EFA output, which does not show consistent factor loading patterns of the 
indicator across countries.   
 I begin with separate country CFAs and follow up with invariance testing on each model 
using Mplus 7. I run each model using Maximum Likelihood estimation, which takes into account 
all available data. When evaluating factor loadings, I consider a salient, standardized loading to be 
higher than 0.30 (Brown 2006). To assess each model’s goodness of fit, I use several global fit 
statistics, including the chi square statistic, the RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation), 
the CFI (comparative fit index) and the SRMR (standardized root mean square residual). To reach 
acceptable fit, CFI should be greater than 0.95, SRMR below 0.10 and RMSEA below 0.08 
(Schermelleh-Engel et al. 2003). I evaluate local model fit by considering expected parameter 
changes (EPC), modification indices (MIs) and the power of the MI test using the JRule for Mplus 
package (Oberski 2009).5 This latter procedure is particularly important because traditional fit 
indices can prove very sensitive to sample sizes and other characteristics of models which make it 
easy to over- or under-estimate the sizes of model misspecifications. Following Saris et al.’s (2009, 
562) recommendation, we can conclude, for instance, that there is no “substantively relevant” 
misspecification (i.e. a discrepancy between the model and fitted data) if the MI is significant but 
the power of the MI test is low. 
                                                          
5 I set EPC values higher than 0.15 for unstandardized factor loadings and 0.20 for intercepts as cutoff criteria to 






















Since I use ML estimation on large sample sizes in each country, I do not use the chi-square 
difference test to assess the extent of the degradation of model fit between different levels of 
invariance. The full output, including standardized factor loadings and fit statistics for each country 
in each model, is available in the online appendix. 
2.6 Results  
2.6.1 Model 1  
 In Model 1, trust in the government, parliament, political parties, local and regional 
government load on one factor with an error correlation between the latter two indicators. Due to 
missing information on the regional trust indicator, Great Britain, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro and Slovenia were not included in the analysis. Off the bat, there appears 
to be interesting variation in the way the model behaves across the surveyed territory. I ordered 








2 Figure 2.2 Regional and Local Political Trust Error Correlation  
 
 
 In the bulk of the former Soviet countries alongside Bosnia and Turkey, the extent to which 
regional and local political trust have a special relationship that cannot be accounted for by the 
political trust factor is relatively small, but gets progressively bigger in Western and  
Eastern Europe.  Azerbaijan has the smallest error correlation (0.199), while Croatia has the largest 
(0.707). This means that local and regional political trust is decisively more related to trust in 
central political institutions in the former Soviet states than it is in Eastern and Western Europe. It 
is likely that regional and local political trust can load directly on a political trust factor without an 
error correlation in Azerbaijan, while in Croatia and select Eastern European countries, regional 
and local political trust might be modeled by a separate factor entirely. This could be due to 
different understandings of what constitutes “regional” politics or it could signify that citizens in 




 As expected, the same structure of the model is not present in several countries, preventing 
the model from reaching configural invariance across 28 countries. I use JRule to assist in detecting 
countries with the highest misspecifications. Several countries demonstrated more than one 
misspecification (for instance significant MIs recommend double error correlations between trust 
in the government and regional government, or political parties and parliament) which I chose not 
to correct for lack of a theoretical rationale. After removing Albania, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Bulgaria and Estonia on these grounds, the model was able to achieve borderline 
configural invariance in 21 countries (chi sq=756.971, DF=84, RMSEA=.086, CFI=.990, 
SRMR=.014). These 21 countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Poland, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Sweden, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Though RMSEA is a bit higher than 
desired, JRule shows no misspecifications.  
 The model reached metric invariance with mostly acceptable fit statistics. After I freely 
estimated loadings for trust in political parties in Belarus, Uzbekistan and Georgia, trust in 
government in Azerbaijan and trust in local government and parliament in France, the model 
achieved partial metric invariance (chi sq=1244.946, DF=158, RMSEA=.079, CFI=.985, 
SRMR=.059). As expected, model fit deteriorated in the scalar invariance test. After I relaxed 
equality constraints on intercepts for trust in the government, local government and political parties 
in all countries and released one more factor loading constraint in four countries, the model 
achieved borderline acceptable partial scalar invariance (chi sq=1910.107, DF=174, 
RMSEA=.096, CFI=.975, SRMR=.074). Standardized factor loadings are substantial and 
significant in all countries. I have reported unstandardized factor loadings on the partial scalar 
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model in Table 5. It is possible to compare correlates of political trust across countries using this 
latent factor. Even mean comparisons are possible with some caution (Table 2.1). 
 I compared this model to a bi-dimensional model in which trust in the government, 
parliament and political parties is reflected by one factor and trust in the regional and local 
government is reflected by a second factor. It is reasonable to test the validity of this model 
particularly because several countries in the sample have a very high error correlation between the 
two dimensions. This model also reaches borderline partial scalar invariance with slightly better 
fit statistics across the same 21 countries (chi sq=1878.912, DF=184, RMSEA=.092, CFI= .976, 
SRMR=.057). Comparisons of correlates and cautious comparisons of means are also possible 
using this bi-dimensional measurement model of political trust.  
 
1 Table 2.1 Model 1: Error Correlation between Regional and Local Government (21 Countries) 
 Chi   Square   DF RMSEA   CFI SRMR 
Configural 756.971 84 0.086 0.990 0.014 
Metric  1456.574 164 0.085 0.982 0.073 
Partial Metric 1244.946 158 0.079 0.985 0.059 
Scalar 3709.260 238 0.116 0.951 0.107 
Partial Scalar 1910.107 174 0.096 0.975 0.074 
      
Compare: Bi-dimensional model (regional and local trust reflect separate factor, 21 
countries) 
Configural  756.968 84 0.086 0.990 0.014 
Metric 1123.686 144 0.079 0.986 0.048 
Scalar 2394.798 204 0.099 0.969 0.059 
Partial Scalar 1878.912 184 0.092 0.976 0.057 
 
Note. Data Source: EBRD and World Bank. All available data are used in ML estimation. DF= 
degrees of freedom, RMSEA= root mean square error of approximation; CFI= comparative fit 





2.6.2 Model 2 
 In Model 2, trust in the government, parliament, political parties, armed forces and police 
load on one factor with an error correlation between the latter two indicators. In this “protective” 
trust model, I test whether respondents distinguish between strictly political institutions and 
institutions which can use force to offer protection. Using JRule, I identified countries with 
multiple misspecifications (Belarus, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan and Estonia) 
and removed them before the model could reach configural invariance with 29 countries (chi sq= 
692.945, DF=116; RMSEA=.067, CFI=.991, SRMR=.020). These 29 countries are Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, Tajikistan, Turkey, 
Great Britain and Ukraine. 
 When testing for metric invariance, I released factor loading constraints on trust in the 
police in Sweden, Azerbaijan and Armenia, armed forces in Sweden and Britain, government in 
Sweden and Kosovo, and political parties in Georgia and Kosovo. The model reached partial 
metric invariance with good fit statistics (chi sq=1242.068, DF=215, RMSEA=.066, CFI=.984, 
SRMR=.058). In the scalar invariant model, I released equality constraints on intercepts on trust 
in the police, government and armed forces in all countries, which resulted in acceptable partial 
scalar invariance (chi sq=1886.738, DF=243, RMSEA=.078, CFI=.974, SRMR=.062). As a result, 
it is possible to compare the correlates and means of political trust across 29 countries using this 
latent factor (Table 2.2). The unstandardized factor loadings on the partial scalar invariant model 




2 Table 2.2 Model 2: Error Correlation between Armed Forces and Police (29 Countries) 
 Chi   Square   DF RMSEA   CFI SRMR 
Configural 692.945 116 0.067 0.991 0.020 
Metric 1658.009 224 0.076 0.977 0.076 
Partial Metric 1242.068 215 0.066 0.984 0.058 
Scalar 7821.219 327 0.144 0.880 0.167 
Partial Scalar  1886.738 243 0.078 0.974 0.062 
      
Compare: Bi-dimensional model (armed forces and police reflect separate factor, 29 
countries) 
Configural  692.945 116 0.067 0.991 0.020 
Metric 1227.474 200 0.068 0.984 0.048 
Scalar 4735.337 284 0.119 0.929 0.085 
Partial Scalar 3967.392 256 0.115 0.941 0.079 
 
Note. Data Source: EBRD and World Bank. All available data are used in ML estimation. DF= 
degrees of freedom, RMSEA= root mean square error of approximation; CFI= comparative fit 
index; SRMR=standardized root mean square residual. 
 
 
 A bi-dimensional model in which trust in the armed forces and police is reflected by a 
separate factor reaches metric invariance with better fit statistics than the unidimensional model, 
but it does not quite reach partial scalar invariance in the same countries (chi sq=3967.392, 
DF=256, RMSEA=.115, CFI=.941, SRMR=.079) because I was unable to release equality 
constraints on a factor with two indicators. As a result, one can use the bi-dimensional model to 
compare correlates, but not means across countries. If we line up the countries in order of the factor 
correlation in this bi-dimensional model, we can visualize some of the regional variation in this 
measurement model. In Figure 2.3, we can see that Italy has the weakest factor correlation (0.327) 
and Uzbekistan the largest (0.809). 
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3 Figure 2.3 Political and Protective Trust Factor Correlation  
 
  
 Again, there appears to be clustering by regime type. The weakest factor correlations 
appear in Eastern and Western Europe and the strongest in the former Soviet states. This means 
that trust in the police and armed forces has relatively little in common with trust in political 
institutions in the European part of the sample, and quite a lot in the former Soviet states. 
Importantly, factor correlations on the former Soviet side inching close to 0.80 show that there is 
a lack of discriminant validity between the factors. That is, trust in the police and armed forces are 
appropriate measures of political trust in these countries. Specifying an error correlation or two-
factor model was likely part of the reason countries on this tail of the sample had poor fit statistics 
and had to be excluded from invariance testing in the first place.  
2.6.3 Model 3  
 In Model 3, trust in the government, parliament, political parties, courts and police load on 
one factor with an error correlation between the latter two indicators. Here, I test whether 
respondents conceive “order” or “neutral” institutions to be separate from political institutions. As 
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in the previous models, the model would not reach configural invariance until I removed the 
countries with the most problematic misspecifications in JRule, where significant MIs recommend 
error correlations between trust in courts and political parties and between trust in parliament and 
government in Belarus, Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Uzbekistan and Macedonia. The model 
still did not achieve configural invariance after removing these countries so I chose to remove 
countries with the next highest misspecifications in JRule suggesting complicated error 
correlations (Turkey, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Czech Republic and Ukraine). Unfortunately, 
the bulk of the excluded countries are former Soviet autocracies, making this model less 
comparable across regime types.  
 The amount of misspecification confirms the inconsistent loadings of trust in the courts in 
the initial EFA solutions: in most former Soviet states, parliaments and courts appear to be under 
the sway of central political institutions. This also appears in the standardized factor loadings 
(available in the online appendix). The five countries with the highest loadings for trust in courts 
are Azerbaijan (0.863), Armenia (0.851), Tajikistan (0.840), Montenegro (0.832) and Kosovo 
(0.780) while the ones with the lowest loadings are Sweden (0.442), Great Britain (0.446), Latvia 
(0.463), Italy (0.501) and Lithuania (0.528). Almost exactly the same pattern can be found 
regarding loadings for trust in the police. The five countries with the highest loadings are 
Azerbaijan (0.722), Montenegro (0.677), Uzbekistan (0.649), Tajikistan (0.646) and Kazakhstan 
(0.641) while the countries with the lowest loadings are Italy (0.290), Great Britain (0.309), 
Sweden (0.343), Lithuania (0.355) and Latvia (0.355). Respondents in former Soviet states and 
autocracies tend to associate courts and police with political institutions whereas respondents in 
Western Europe and the Baltics do not. 
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 With 23 countries, the model reached acceptable fit statistics for configural invariance (chi 
sq=680.399, DF=92, RMSEA=.077, CFI=.987, SRMR=.020). The final 23 countries are Albania, 
Armenia, Croatia, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Mongolia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Tajikistan and Great Britain.  
  The model did not reach metric invariance, so I used JRule to identify the most problematic 
items. After releasing factor loading constraints on trust in the government in Kyrgyzstan and 
Sweden as well as trust in the police and courts in all countries, the model reached partial metric 
invariance (chi sq=915.343, DF=134, RMSEA=.073, CFI=.983, SRMR=.042). The scalar 
invariance test produced very poor fit statistics. Although I released intercept equality constraints 
on trust in the police, government and political parties for all countries, the model failed to meet 
partial scalar invariance (chi sq= 2491.689, DF=156, RMSEA=.117, CFI=.950, SRMR=.112). The 
bi-dimensional model in which trust in the courts and police are reflected by a separate factor 
performed better on metric invariance than the unidimensional model but also failed to meet partial 
scalar invariance.  
  
3 Table 2.3 Model 3: Error Correlation between Courts and Police (23 Countries) 
 Chi   Square   DF RMSEA   CFI SRMR 
Configural  680.399 92 0.077 0.987 0.020 
Metric 1580.448 180 0.084 0.970 0.082 
Partial Metric 915.343 134 0.073 0.983 0.042 
Scalar 4216.209 222 0.128 0.915 0.234 
Partial Scalar  2491.689 156 0.117 0.950 0.112 
      
Compare: Bi-dimensional model (courts and police reflect separate factor, 23 countries) 
Configural  680.397 92 0.077 0.987 0.020 
Metric 1086.635 158 0.073 0.980 0.051 
Scalar 3680.730 224 0.119 0.926 0.087 




Note. Data Source: EBRD and World Bank. All available data are used in ML estimation. DF= 
degrees of freedom, RMSEA= root mean square error of approximation; CFI= comparative fit index; 
SRMR=standardized root mean square residual. 
 
 
 On this basis we can use both models to compare the correlates of political trust across 23 
countries, but not means (Table 2.3). The size of the error correlation across countries does not 
show clear geographical patterns, although, as expected, many former Soviet autocracies have to 
be excluded from invariance testing because the courts and police tend to load on federal-level 
political institutions. Interestingly, although this model has the most theoretical support in the 
literature for representing “order” or “neutral” institutions, it produces the poorest fit to the data 
within and across countries out of the four models mainly because the courts and police are not 
neutral or independent of political sway in a good part of the sample, contributing to disorder and 
undermining the rule of law rather than the reverse.  
2.6.4 Model 4 
 In Model 4, trust indicators in the government, parliament, political parties, and local 
government load on a single ‘political trust’ factor. This specification achieved configural 
invariance for all 35 countries (chi sq=453.666, DF=70, RMSEA=.071, CFI=.994, SRMR=.013). 
Model fit deteriorated under the test for metric invariance, but after I released the problematic 
factor loading constraint on trust in the local government, the model achieved partial metric 
invariance (chi sq=905.601, DF=138, RMSEA=.072, CFI=.989, SRMR=.048). When testing for 
scalar invariance, I freed intercept equality constraints on trust in the local government and 
political parties in all countries, but the model barely failed to meet partial scalar invariance (chi 
sq=1777.389, DF=172, RMSEA=.093, CFI=.976, SRMR=.058). Though this can be considered a 
borderline case, JRule shows that significant misspecifications remain in nine countries. Any mean 
comparisons using this latent factor should be treated with caution. 
64 
 
4 Table 2.4 Model 4: Simple (35 Countries) 
 Chi   Square   DF RMSEA   CFI SRMR 
Configural  453.666 70 0.071 0.994 0.013 
Metric  1522.867 172 0.085 0.980 0.076 
Partial Metric 905.601 138 0.072 0.989 0.048 
Scalar 3973.355 240 0.120 0.945 0.090 
Partial Scalar  1777.389 172 0.093 0.976 0.058 
      
Compare: Simple model without trust in local government, 35 countries  
Configural  0.001 0 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Metric 432.608 68 0.070 0.992 0.052 
Scalar  2274.023 136 0.120 0.953 0.075 
Partial Scalar 1293.938 102 0.104 0.974 0.058 
 
Note. Data Source: EBRD and World Bank. All available data are used in ML estimation. DF= 
degrees of freedom, RMSEA= root mean square error of approximation; CFI= comparative fit 
index; SRMR=standardized root mean square residual. 
 
 A comparative model with only three indicators (excluding trust in local government) also 
failed to meet partial scalar invariance (chi sq=1293.938, DF=102, RMSEA=.104, CFI=.974, 
SRMR=.058). As expected, a simple model of political trust without multidimensional indicators 
was able to reach partial metric invariance across all countries, proving the most conducive of all 
models to a cross-national pooled regression analysis using this survey. Comparing means of 
political trust using either of these simple models, however, may be problematic due to the lack of 
partial scalar invariance. Invariant unstandardized factor loadings for this model are available in 
Table 2.5.  
5 Table 2.5 Unstandardized Factor Loadings on Partial Metric and Scalar Invariant Models 
Item Model 1  
Partial Scalar 
21 countries 
Model 2  
Partial Scalar 29 
countries 
Model 3  
Partial Metric 23 
countries 
Model 4  
Partial Metric 35 
countries 
Trust in Government 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 1.000 (0.000) 
Trust in Parliament 0.981 (0.006) 1.025 (0.007) 1.063 (0.008) 1.024 (0.006) 
Trust in Political Parties 0.774 (0.007) 0.780 (0.006) 0.803 (0.008) 0.781 (0.006) 
Trust in Local Gov. 0.848 (0.007)   0.745 (0.036) 
Trust in Regional Gov. 0.898 (0.006)    
Trust in Courts   0.831 (0.034)  
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Trust in Police  0.566 (0.007) 0.514 (0.040)  
Trust in Armed Forces   0.525 (0.007)   
 
Note: All available data are used in ML estimation. Loadings are all significant (p<0.01) 
 
 Because the four-indicator simple model managed to reach partial metric invariance for all 
35 countries in the sample, I have also included unstandardized factor loadings per country for this 
model in Table 2.6. A perusal of these results helps illustrate why trust in the local government 
proved to be the most problematic indicator during invariance testing. The five countries with the 
highest loadings for trust in local government are Tajikistan (1.231), Kyrgyzstan (1.164), 
Azerbaijan (1.127), Uzbekistan (1.054) and Russia (1.031), while the countries with the lowest are 
France (.511), Estonia (.512), the Czech Republic (.605), Latvia (.628), Slovakia (.650) and 
Lithuania (.672). Unsurprisingly, we see that respondents from countries in Central Europe and 
the Baltics distinguish between local and federal levels of government, while those in former 
Soviet autocracies do not. This is consistent with the results in Models 1 and 3.  
6 Table 2.6 Unstandardized Factor Loadings Per Country, Model 4 
Country 
Trust in  
Government 
Trust in  
Parliament 
Trust in  
Political  
Parties 
Trust in  
Local  
Government 
Albania 1.000 (0.000) 1.091 (0.046) 0.819 (0.041) 0.770 (0.041) 
Armenia 1.000 (0.000) 1.002 (0.027) 0.791 (0.031) 0.887 (0.032) 
Azerbaijan 1.000 (0.000) 1.168 (0.038) 0.948 (0.038) 1.127 (0.045) 
Belarus 1.000 (0.000) 0.957 (0.026) 0.606 (0.036) 0.954 (0.028) 
Bosnia 1.000 (0.000) 1.035 (0.022) 0.784 (0.026) 0.994 (0.025) 
Bulgaria 1.000 (0.000) 0.978 (0.040) 0.802 (0.037) 0.824 (0.046) 
Croatia 1.000 (0.000) 1.030 (0.034) 0.809 (0.033) 0.849 (0.042) 
Czech Rep 1.000 (0.000) 1.072 (0.041) 0.817 (0.036) 0.605 (0.042) 
Estonia 1.000 (0.000) 1.231 (0.084) 0.643 (0.052) 0.512 (0.050) 
France 1.000 (0.000) 1.009 (0.059) 0.660 (0.042) 0.511 (0.047) 
Georgia 1.000 (0.000) 1.005 (0.024) 0.567 (0.032) 0.973 (0.026) 
Germany 1.000 (0.000) 1.002 (0.033) 0.703 (0.032) 0.791 (0.031) 
Gr. Britain 1.000 (0.000) 1.021 (0.030) 0.711 (0.026) 0.783 (0.030) 
Hungary 1.000 (0.000) 0.963 (0.031) 0.673 (0.028) 0.774 (0.032) 







 What would have happened if we were to rank countries by their raw means or sum scores 
instead? The simple model (model 4) did not quite reach partial scalar invariance, so a comparison 
of latent means using this model should be conducted with caution. Nevertheless, in a simple 
demonstration, we can observe that country rankings using latent means from a model close to 
partial scalar invariance are slightly different than rankings based on a simple mean of trust in the 
government, parliament, political parties and local government (Table 2.7).   
 The top and bottom of the list remain relatively similar (the five least politically trusting 
countries being Romania, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia and Serbia, and the five most politically trust 
being Belarus, Kazakhstan, Sweden, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), although several countries shift 
one or two spots. When using latent means, Macedonia and Armenia move up in their average 
trust ranking by three spots and Russia by five spots. In other words, after “controlling” for 
measurement error, these countries are actually more trusting of political institutions than we 
Kazakhstan 1.000 (0.000) 0.951 (0.026) 0.759 (0.032) 0.863 (0.027) 
Kosovo 1.000 (0.000) 1.172 (0.039) 1.054 (0.041) 0.976 (0.037) 
Kyrgyzstan 1.000 (0.000) 1.131 (0.078) 0.966 (0.073) 1.164 (0.072) 
Latvia 1.000 (0.000) 1.043 (0.055) 0.718 (0.044) 0.628 (0.053) 
Lithuania 1.000 (0.000) 0.993 (0.052) 0.755 (0.045) 0.672 (0.050) 
Macedonia 1.000 (0.000) 0.993 (0.037) 0.750 (0.035) 0.937 (0.038) 
Moldova 1.000 (0.000) 0.969 (0.022) 0.815 (0.026) 0.774 (0.028) 
Mongolia 1.000 (0.000) 1.035 (0.050) 0.868 (0.047) 0.833 (0.047) 
Montenegro 1.000 (0.000) 0.862 (0.022) 0.655 (0.027) 0.854 (0.024) 
Poland 1.000 (0.000) 1.056 (0.030) 0.814 (0.029) 0.831 (0.028) 
Romania 1.000 (0.000) 1.142 (0.046) 0.757 (0.040) 0.912 (0.055) 
Russia 1.000 (0.000) 1.126 (0.036) 0.819 (0.033) 1.031 (0.036) 
Serbia 1.000 (0.000) 1.062 (0.028) 0.804 (0.026) 0.892 (0.031) 
Slovakia 1.000 (0.000) 1.021 (0.034) 0.838 (0.034) 0.650 (0.036) 
Sweden 1.000 (0.000) 0.901 (0.049) 0.698 (0.043) 0.780 (0.045) 
Tajikistan 1.000 (0.000) 1.243 (0.044) 1.067 (0.055) 1.231 (0.045) 
Turkey 1.000 (0.000) 0.963 (0.039) 0.640 (0.040) 0.866 (0.036) 
Ukraine 1.000 (0.000) 0.969 (0.027) 0.737 (0.026) 0.764 (0.030) 
Uzbekistan 1.000 (0.000) 1.050 (0.019) 0.998 (0.032) 1.054 (0.021) 
 
Note:  Note: All loadings are significant (p<0.01) 
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would have concluded by simply averaging the indicators. Beside this, the general consistency 
between the rankings is not too surprising because model 4 contains the least problematic 
indicators. With the indicators that we have, there is no alarming reason to preclude countries as 
different as Sweden and Uzbekistan from a comparative study of political trust. We have seen, 
however, that more complex measurement models are prone to more measurement error which 
can induce bias in mean comparisons and pooled regressions. The sources of error, if systematic, 
should not be assumed unproblematic prior to a study.   
 
7 Table 2.7 Raw versus Latent Means (Model 4) 









Croatia 23.680 Croatia -0.677*** 
Serbia 27.197 Lithuania -0.534*** 
Lithuania 29.017 Latvia -0.512*** 
Latvia 29.403 Serbia -0.463*** 
Bosnia  30.664 Bosnia -0.346*** 
Bulgaria 32.184 Italy -0.296*** 
Italy 32.345 Ukraine -0.296*** 
Macedonia 33.306 Bulgaria -0.295*** 
Ukraine 33.576 Slovenia -0.292*** 
Moldova 34.389 Moldova -0.241*** 
Slovenia 34.890 Macedonia -0.226*** 
Great Britain 35.515 Czech Republic -0.207*** 
Armenia  37.202 Great Britain -0.179*** 
Czech Republic 37.294 Slovakia -0.120*** 
Slovakia 37.880 Kosovo -0.083* 
Kosovo 38.867 Armenia -0.060 
Albania 39.289 Kyrgyzstan -0.049 
Kyrgyzstan 39.531 France -0.025 
France 40.413 Albania 0.000 
Russia 42.072 Poland 0.189*** 
Mongolia 43.031 Mongolia 0.202*** 
Poland 44.425 Germany 0.204*** 
Germany 44.946 Estonia 0.245*** 
Hungary 45.536 Hungary 0.270*** 
Estonia 47.503 Russia 0.345*** 
Georgia 50.620 Montenegro 0.519*** 
Montenegro 50.650 Georgia 0.585*** 
Azerbaijan  53.261 Azerbaijan 0.725*** 
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Belarus 54.006 Turkey 0.781*** 
Turkey 57.5 Belarus 0.787*** 
Kazakhstan  58.242 Kazakhstan 0.917*** 
Sweden 60.713 Sweden 0.981*** 
Tajikistan 73.393 Tajikistan 1.569*** 




 Despite growth in comparative political trust research in the last two decades, scholars have 
paid insufficient attention to the measurement validity and cross-national equivalence of the 
concept. The most common approach to measurement has consisted of taking averages or sum 
scores of diverse sets of indicators without theoretical justification. In this paper I showed that this 
common “kitchen sink” approach to measurement is inappropriate by investigating the 
measurement equivalence of political trust across thirty-five countries in Europe and the former 
Soviet space using the 2010 Life in Transition II Survey. Although issues in cross-national 
measurement are gaining attention in political trust research, this is the first study to examine the 
measurement validity and equivalence of political trust across diverse regime types. 
 I tested four models of political trust, finding that trust perceptions in political institutions 
like the government, parliament and political parties tend to differ from 1) trust in regional and 
local political institutions, 2) trust in protective institutions like the armed forces and police and 3) 
trust in order institutions like the courts and police. Measurement models with error correlations 
along these dimensions of political trust all reached at least partial metric invariance across most 
countries in the survey. This means that respondents in diverse cultures and regime types 
understand subsets of survey questions similarly, which allows us to compare the correlates of the 
latent factors from each model without losing substantive meaning. Coefficient estimates in a 
pooled regression analysis will not suffer from measurement-induced bias if these models of 
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political trust are specified correctly and used within the structural equations framework to control 
for measurement error. It will not be enough to use sum scores or averages of each model’s 
combination of indicators.  
 While this outcome allows us a fair degree of optimism about the comparability of the 
measurement models, the only model which was comparable across all thirty-five countries was 
based on just four indicators (trust in the government, parliament, political parties and local 
government). A handful of countries, usually former Soviet autocracies, had to be excluded from 
invariance testing in the other models. Some variation in error correlations proved to be non-trivial 
across regime types. I found that trust in local and federal-level political institutions has relatively 
little in common in Eastern Europe, mildly more in Western Europe, and significantly more in the 
former Soviet space. Political trust also tends to be unrelated to trust in the police and armed forces 
across Europe, but strongly related in the former Soviet space, suggesting the effects of corruption 
and stronger central controls over these institutions. Likewise, citizens of former Soviet countries 
do not always perceive courts to be independent of political influence.  
 Two models achieved partial scalar invariance, allowing for mean comparisons on the 
latent factor across subsets of countries. The thirty-five country simple model of political trust, 
however, barely failed to reach partial scalar invariance according to conventional fit statistics. 
While this may appear disappointing for the prospects of cross-regime mean comparison, some 
advances in latent variable modeling provide reason for optimism. Oberski (2014) shows that a 
lack of invariance might not necessarily invalidate group comparisons and introduces the EPC-
interest statistic to assess the substantive relevance of invariance misspecifications. A number of 
studies discuss the possibility of Bayesian techniques to establish approximate measurement 
invariance where traditional fit statistics appear to be overly strict (Muthén and Asparouhov 2012; 
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Davidov et al. 2015; van de Schoot et al. 2013; Zercher et al. 2015). Using these tools in cross-
regime surveys to improve invariance testing can be a fruitful direction for future research.  
 
2.7.1 Responding to Inglehart and Welzel’s Critique 
 Before concluding this section I wish to address a recent critique of MGCFA which 
purports to overturn the entire paradigm of measurement equivalence testing. After Alemán and 
Woods (2015) used MGCFA to demonstrate the lack of cross-national equivalence in Inglehart 
and Welzel’s measurements of emancipative and secular value orientations in the World Values 
Survey, Inglehart and Welzel (2016) made a biting response, urging readers to consider a 
fundamental paradigm shift in the way we study measurement equivalence. Their critique, in my 
view, misses the point of the existing paradigm in several ways.  
 At the heart of their argument, Inglehart and Welzel claim that “a construct’s measurement 
features at the individual level provide no information whatsoever about the same construct’s 
validity at the country level,” demonstrating that inter-item correlations can be low among 
individuals but high between countries due to “background noise…that partially obscures true 
correlations.” In other words, within-country variability in attitudinal measures in no way 
invalidates the aggregation and cross-country comparisons of emancipative values. Since 
individual level variation in the World Values Survey measures is randomly distributed, they 
argue, aggregation cancels out this noise. Indeed, there is a substantive rationale for ignoring 
individual-level convergence patterns: the purpose of measuring emancipative values is “not to 
measure internally convergent personality traits” but to capture a “culture-type phenomenon that 
only surfaces in the aggregate and, hence, does not exist at the individual level” (ibid., 4). The 
authors argue that “comparability properly understood boils down to external linkages, not internal 
71 
 
convergence. And external linkages is entirely a matter of a construct’s association with its 
expected correlates” (ibid., 10). So if we find that emancipative values correlate with other aspects 
of reality like democracy, we need not worry about the measurement equivalence of the construct 
across countries. “Only” if the lack of internal consistency in the measures “obscures the external 
linkages… could one infer incomparability from variability in coherence” (ibid.).  
 There are several problems with this argument. First, while the authors advocate for a new 
paradigm in measurement equivalence, they do not discuss the existing one. Contrary to their 
diagnosis, measurement equivalence is not about the variability of attitudes at the individual level, 
and even less so about personality traits. In the way that we currently use the term “equivalence,” 
we wish to establish that two people in different countries holding the same position on the 
construct will score the same thing on the survey. Different scores from people holding the same 
position can arise from different understandings of the construct, faulty translations or other 
features of the way the survey was conducted. When such nuisance effects infiltrate the observed 
scores, we are no longer comparing true attitudes across societies. And when it comes to using 
them to explain real world phenomena, biased measures can help over- or under-estimate 
regression coefficients. Nowhere in the article do the authors mention this notion of measurement 
equivalence or address the possibility of such measurement-induced bias. Instead, the authors 
presume that cross-national surveys deliver attitudinal measures which mean precisely what they 
want them to mean. Observed measures can immediately be generalized to the level of the latent 
construct (“emancipative values”) which they are meant to reflect.  
 The authors justify this approach by arguing that “collective mentalities” which “represent 
a culture-type phenomenon” arise only at the aggregate level. While this is true, the authors do not 
recognize that such cultural attitudes can affect the measurement process itself.  As Ariely and 
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Davidov (2011, 272) note in their study of the measurement equivalence of attitudes toward 
democracy, “the very differences in culture that give such cross-national studies their value also 
threaten the achievement of equivalence of scales that are used to measure the concept…” 
Precisely because culture can influence a survey respondent’s understanding of complex 
phenomena like democracy, secularism or emancipation, we must be wary of the survey 
instrument’s metric and scalar invariance properties if we wish to be sure that emancipative values 
refer to the same idea for individuals in two different countries. Because they are inherent to entire 
societies and subgroups, culturally-framed interpretations of survey questions can produce 
systematic, not random measurement errors, and such errors cannot be canceled out through simple 
aggregation.  
 The authors’ argument that measurement equivalence boils down to the construct’s 
association with its expected correlates, or “external linkages,” is hardly a solution. In this view, 
any hodgepodge of summed indicators is cross-nationally valid if it happens to correlate with other 
variables. One need not worry about what the hodgepodge actually means. Spurious correlations 
can be found on the basis of spurious measurement. This is not difficult to accomplish. As long as 
there is a non-zero partial correlation between constructs given a large sample size (which the 
WVS provides), the power to detect a significant correlation between them tends to be large. The 
authors’ demonstration that emancipative values significantly predict “effective democracy” 
scores across 100 countries while controlling for the internal consistency of emancipative value 
indices using Cronbach’s alphas (ibid., 12) only shows us that significant correlations can easily 
be detected, not that the survey delivers comparable scales of emancipative values. Like an 
exploratory factor analysis or principle components analysis, Cronbach’s alpha measures the 
average correlation of a set of items. The procedure can produce high internal consistency scores 
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even if the items are spuriously related. These popular exploratory procedures may be used in the 
preliminary stages of measurement model building, but they are in no way fundamental or even 
necessary for establishing the measurement validity or equivalence of a construct. CFA, unlike 
these procedures, requires that items correspond to a theoretically-sound measurement model, and 
MGCFA tests whether the data correspond equivalently to that model across populations.   
 Even supposing that internal consistency in the exploratory sense was a fundamental 
criterion for measurement validity, the authors claim that the “only” case in which the lack of 
internal consistency in the items will result in cross-national non-equivalence is if the set of 
measures does not in fact produce the “external linkages” we would theoretically expect (ibid., 
10). In other words, only if we do not observe correlations of emancipative values with variables 
like effective democracy or protest activity can we question the measurement validity of 
emancipative values on the basis of their internal consistency. This seems highly speculative. One 
can presume that the authors recognize the possibility that measures are not equivalent across 
populations, but are willing to look into the matter only when the measures don’t produce the 
desired theoretical outcomes. Methodological considerations can be overlooked as long as 
measures taken at face value produce the desired correlations. Even supposing that the correlations 
or “external linkages” they wish to establish are based on perfectly measured variables, upon 
failing to discover a significant correlation the authors would first conclude that there is a problem 
with the measurement of the constructs rather than the theory itself. At what point then, will the 
presence of disconfirming evidence (i.e. a lack of expected external linkages) lead the authors to 
part with the theory? 
 Toward the end of the article the authors finally mention the possibility of construct bias, 
or the idea that people may have different understandings of emancipation across countries. They 
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dismiss this concern in a few sentences: “The WVS directly addresses such down-to-earth topics 
as male dominance, child obedience, and heterosexual norms. It is hard to believe that people have 
no first-hand experience with such fundamental realities of everyday life” (ibid., 17). Simply 
because this possibility is “hard to believe” and because the measures are “down to earth,” there 
is apparently no need to check that different understandings of the concept (much less the data 
collection process) could have had an influence on the way individuals scored on the survey 
questions across more than 100 countries.   
 This misunderstanding becomes most revealing when the authors discuss how 
methodologists in the current paradigm would treat the hypothetical relationship between life 
satisfaction and perceived freedom: “In the eyes of MGCFA, the key question here would be 
whether life satisfaction and perceived freedom represent a single latent variable, something like 
a higher-ordered subjective wellbeing factor. To answer this question, MGCFA examines whether 
the two variables relate to each other in the same way within each group. Thus, the group mean 
becomes the standard of reference while differences between groups are ignored. Doing so 
assumes that the location of group means does not matter when in fact this might make a big 
difference…” (ibid., 17).  
 To dissect this point, it is first worth mentioning that MGCFA is only a statistical tool; it 
has no “eyes” with which to determine how to solve such a question. There is no obvious way to 
approach a question about the relationship between life satisfaction and perceived freedom from 
any methodological point of view without first examining the theoretical nature and significance 
of the puzzle, which the authors do not present. It would appear that from their perspective, 
MGCFA practitioners treat research questions entirely a-theoretically, as a doctor might propose 
a set of surgical tools without examining the site of the patient’s wound. The reality is quite the 
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opposite: MGCFA forces us to check whether our measures indeed correspond empirically in 
different contexts to what we believe they should correspond.  
 Since the authors are unclear about whether the relationship between life satisfaction and 
perceived freedom is an issue of measurement or causality, there is no reason to believe in the 
hypothetical outcomes they outline. Regardless, the authors complete the thought experiment by 
claiming that “MGCFA would draw the conclusion that life satisfaction and perceived freedom do 
not reflect a common well-being dimension because they do not co-vary everywhere in the same 
way relative to the given group mean” (ibid., 18-19). Not only do they fail to provide justification 
for using the method in the first place, but they claim to know what the outcome would be without 
actually running the analysis! 
 Again, the thought experiment is based on another flawed notion of how the technique 
works: “the group mean becomes the standard of reference while differences between groups are 
ignored.” In fact, from the vantage point of the current measurement equivalence paradigm, we 
cannot entertain group mean comparisons until we have established that the chosen measures for 
the construct are at least partially scalar invariant. Contrary to what Inglehart and Welzel argue, 
MGCFA does not eliminate substantive variation in a construct across groups. It tests whether the 
survey instrument delivers comparable measures so that any mean comparisons or regression 
analyses using the construct will be based on true scores rather than biased scores. 
 The authors could have a valid point by arguing that measures of emancipative values are 
formative, not reflective indicators. That is, rather than reflecting a higher order dimension, the 
measures form an additive index that need not be internally correlated. If this is truly the case, 
Alemán and Woods’ (2015) argument and the use of MGCFA would not hold water. But Inglehart 
and Welzel only mention in a passing sentence that “Welzel’s (2013, 60) measure of emancipative 
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values is introduced explicitly as a combinatory construct, not a dimensional one” without 
explaining why (ibid., 8). At the very least, they could have re-introduced the original rationale 
and argued why dropping any indicator would substantively change the meaning of the 
emancipative values construct. It is hard to accept this argument without further justification, 
although if properly defended, this point alone would be enough to challenge Alemán and Woods’ 
study without having to undertake a flawed critique of MGCFA.  
 While the authors believe they are challenging MGCFA or what they call “the new 
booming industry in cross-national survey research” (ibid., 6), they are only misconstruing the 
concept of measurement equivalence and its statistical functions. This neither challenges the 
existing measurement paradigm nor proposes a new one. In saying this I do not mean to reject 
Inglehart and Welzel’s research program on postmaterialist values, which has proven highly 
influential in comparative politics. The way in which emancipative-traditional values map onto 
world regions in a theoretically predictable way is an important finding, and can only be bolstered 
if approached with some thoughtfulness about the cross-national measurement properties of the 
survey instrument. It is not in the interest of science to insist that measures be taken at face value 
as long as they produce desired correlations. The pathway of inference from data collection to the 
causal model, interpretation of results and policy recommendations should be questioned at each 
step, although the quality of the entire process depends overwhelmingly on step one. We should 
not treat survey instruments or data collectors as carriers of perfectly reliable information about 
the social world. In much the same way that we can challenge the ability of randomized control 
trials to deliver causal interpretations of treatment effects, we should question the ability of cross-
national surveys to deliver meaningfully comparable measures in heterogeneous contexts. 




2.7.2 Conclusion  
 In the context of the current study, many interesting questions remain about what political 
trust truly means. While factor analysis illuminates the regional clustering of measurement patterns 
using typical survey questions, it cannot determine the nature and content of the studied beliefs, 
nor the precise reasons for misfit. Indeed, the test of the cross-national validity of political trust in 
this investigation is limited to a test that the various institutional indicators actually measure what 
one would call “political” trust. We know from this study that not all institutions are treated as 
equally “political” by respondents across the regime spectrum, but we can still infer little about 
the higher-level construct validity of the measures if we are interested in the foundations of 
institutional trustworthiness or legitimacy. That is, we do not know whether the measures 
correspond to notions of the normative appropriateness of institutional performance, or whether 
those notions are similar across societies.  
Probing studies or anchoring vignettes (King et al. 2004) can be useful to capture such 
local knowledge about political trustworthiness and detect qualitative reasons for measurement 
inequivalence across societies. If one only has access to traditional Likert-scale political trust 
questions, however, it is important to improve the way we use them in cross-national research. 
Factor analysis, among other latent variable modeling methods, can help in this regard. Although 
political trust is believed to have profound consequences for how we are governed and relate to 
each other, we cannot properly assess its causes and effects without diligently accounting for its 
measurement validity in diverse institutional contexts. Having established the measurement 
equivalence of political trust across the former Soviet space, I will now proceed with a substantive 
analysis of the relationship between political trust and corruption. 
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3 Chapter 3. A Theory of Corruption Tradeoff  
3.1 Introduction 
 Does corruption make us less likely to trust political institutions? Comparative 
investigations of this question have shifted from a resounding “yes” to more uncertain prognoses 
in the last decade. According to conceptions of political legitimacy favorable to Bo Rothstein’s 
(2009) interpretation, corruption and political trust are two sides of the same coin. If legitimacy is 
determined by what he calls “procedural fairness based on impartiality,” deviation from these 
norms is by definition a form of corruption. Such corruption or partiality in public administration 
can be manifested in a number of ways, including the forceful extraction of bribes, discrimination 
or the use of unofficial networks to channel public resources to favored parties. These actions are 
said to break an implicit contract which makes public servants accountable to the electorate. 
Problematically, this widely accepted concept and theory of trust does not always bear out in the 
data. As the study of trust and corruption has expanded to non-European and developing country 
samples, there is increasing evidence that people express support for political institutions even in 
the presence of corruption (Fernández-Vázquez et al. 2014; Manzetti and Wilson 2006; 
Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013). This emerging finding raises interesting questions 
about how governments retain public support in dysfunctional institutional settings, challenging 
long-reigning explanations of the causes and consequences of political trust. 
 In this paper I test the external validity of theories explaining high-trust, high-corruption 
trends in a sample of 30 countries which span the former Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and Central 
Europe. Though poor data availability has largely prevented the comprehensive study of public 
opinion across the entire former Soviet space in the decades following the Soviet collapse, recent 
survey data suggest that citizens in rarely studied parts of Central Asia and the southern Caucasus 
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have extraordinarily high trust in political institutions despite high petty corruption perceptions. In 
select countries in the region, this puzzling trend has coincided with significant economic growth 
stemming from natural resource rents. I hypothesize that people who perceive high corruption in 
such circumstances trust political institutions for similar reasons as their counterparts in Latin 
American clientelist democracies: they trade off concerns about corruption when they are 
materially prospering and their country is growing.  Such an incentive structure, if truly operative, 
can lead to suboptimal conditions for institutional reforms in corrupt systems of governance across 
the regime spectrum. 
 I also recognize that the post-communist space from Central Europe to Central Asia is 
highly institutionally diverse and posit that democratic mechanisms can moderate the way people 
process and react to corruption. My second main hypothesis is that citizens of democracies will 
hold political institutions more accountable for political outcomes than citizens of autocracies, 
resulting in greater penalties on political institutions for petty corruption. While many studies of 
trust and corruption remain limited to culturally homogenous world regions, using this diverse 
regional space can help us further theorize about the ability of governments under different regime 
settings to shield themselves from public corruption grievances.   
 To test these theories, I investigate interactions of petty corruption perceptions with 
economic context and regime settings. To account for measurement equivalence and the 
heterogeneity of corruption effects across countries and subnational regions, I test fixed effects 
OLS models for robustness against alternative specifications including multilevel random 
coefficient and structural equation models. To my surprise, I discover that neither of my 
hypotheses are supported by the data. First, people do not trade off concerns about corruption 
under any conditions of economic flourishing or personal financial satisfaction. Second, citizens 
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of autocracies who perceive high levels of corruption are significantly more distrusting of political 
institutions than those who perceive similar levels of petty corruption in democracies. While a 
theory of corruption tradeoff suggests that governments can supply short term economic gains to 
appease the public, this does not appear to be the case in the former Soviet space. This finding 
recommends an alternative perspective on the stability of authoritarian regimes in the region.     
3.2 Trading Off Corruption Concerns for Material Gains 
 Corruption tends to reduce a person's trust in political institutions across Eastern Europe 
and the Baltic states (Mishler Rose 1997, 2001; Rose et al. 2005; Luhiste 2006), developed 
democracies (Anderson and Tverdova 2003), Latin America (Seligson 2002), East Asia (Chang 
and Chu 2006; Kim and Voorhees 2011), Sub-Saharan Africa (Cho and Kirwin 2007; Lavallée et 
al. 2008) and in a general global sample of 103 countries (Clausen et al. 2012). While these studies 
are distinct in the way corruption is measured, they tend to suggest fairly consistently that paying 
bribes or witnessing the abuse of public office for private gain makes one less likely to trust 
political institutions. If political legitimacy depends on what Rothstein (2009, 323-5) calls 
“procedural fairness” or impartiality in policy implementation, any state which “systematically 
departs” from this ideal in the form of “corruption, discrimination and similar violations...will be 
seen as illegitimate.” A politician's diversion of public funds to favored parties or personal use is 
seen to fundamentally violate her mandate to allocate such funds in the interests of the electorate. 
 For a growing part of the comparative literature on corruption, this theory of trust depends 
on an unduly narrow interpretation of what constitutes good institutional performance to the 
electorate. While Rothstein's conception of political legitimacy as procedural fairness resonates in 
advanced democracies, it does not necessarily apply in other contexts where corruption is seen as 
complementary or even essential to citizens’ expectations of political institutions. Across the 
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developing world, corruption can be regarded as a net benefit or at worst a tolerable nuisance when 
citizens engage in a form of economic voting. Indeed, positive evaluations of the economy are the 
most common predictor of high political trust across a wide range of cultures even after controlling 
for relevant sociopolitical variables (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Askvik and Ishtiaq 2013; 
Catterberg and Moreno 2005; Chang and Chu 2006; Cho and Kirwin 2007; Hetherington 1998; 
Lavallée et al. 2008; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008; Luhiste 2006; Mishler and Rose 1997, 
2001; Yang and Tang 2010).  
 How does economic context influence the way citizens punish political institutions for 
corruption? In among the earliest investigations of economic voting, Rundquist, Strom and Peters 
(1977, 961) argue that clientelism, or a public official's selective exchange of material benefits for 
loyalty, insufficiently explains why people vote for corrupt politicians. Instead, they argue that 
people are willing to trade off concerns about corruption if a corrupt politician holds a position 
about which people feel particularly strongly, which is often tied to expectations of economic 
improvement. They find that voters punish elected officials for corruption more often during 
economic downturns. As comparative survey data flourished almost four decades later, this 
seminal study encouraged scholarship on the notion of corruption tradeoff most visibly in Latin 
America.  
 Manzetti and Wilson’s (2006) analysis of Argentina, for instance, shows that corruption 
perceptions have a negative impact on political trust only when people are unhappy with economic 
conditions. Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) confirm this in their study of economic 
context as a moderator of the relationship between corruption perceptions and presidential 
approval in 19 Latin American countries. In regions experiencing steep losses of income, people 
are more likely to link grand corruption perceptions to the president's performance than in more 
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prosperous regions. Carlin et al. (2015) use time series presidential approval data across 84 
administrations in 18 Latin American countries to show that people tend to downgrade their 
approval during corruption scandals only in times of high unemployment and inflation. Rosas and 
Manzetti (2015) also estimate the moderating effects of country level macroeconomic conditions 
on the tendency for Latin American citizens to link personal bribe victimization to presidential 
performance. While the authors show that victims of bribery disapprove of presidents even in 
conditions of economic growth, they find some evidence that bribe victims are less punitive of 
presidents in conditions of monetary stability and high employment.  
 Muñoz et al. (2016) find similar effects from survey experiments in Catalunya, showing 
that people tolerate grand corruption when politicians present a record of delivering prosperity and 
when the parties in question refuse to accept charges of corruption. Fernández-Vázquez et al. 
(2014) examine the effects of different kinds of corruption scandals on electoral outcomes across 
Spain, finding more evidence for a traditional clientelist model of corruption voting in which 
material benefits mediate the trust-corruption nexus. Unlike most studies relying on observational 
data, the authors avoid perceptions variables and opt to measure corruption in terms of actual 
instances of embezzlement and its welfare enhancing or welfare reducing effects on electoral 
support. They find that while the vote share is reduced for all corrupt (as opposed to honest) 
mayors, the loss of votes is less steep for corrupt mayors who share rents with citizens. It would 
appear that the Brazilian phrase “Rouba maz Faz” (the politician “steals, but gets things done”) 
appropriately describes the rationale for corruption voting in a number of contexts around the 
globe. Interestingly, the phrase appears to be less resonant in its country of origin, Brazil, based 
on survey experiments conducted by Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2012), which indicate that 
citizens are unwilling to condone corruption even if told that the mayor has delivered substantial 
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material benefits to residents of their hometown. Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2015) also 
implement survey experiments in Greece, demonstrating that short-term welfare enhancing 
policies like tax cuts make it more likely that Greek voters will forgive politicians for taking bribes, 
but opportunities to enter a politician’s clientelistic network actually make voters less likely to 
tolerate their corruption.  
 The ability of economic conditions to moderate the political toll of corruption can be 
observed prevalently but not uniformly in this growing literature. There is sufficient evidence, as 
Fernández-Vásquez et al. (2014, 3) write, that “the standard economic voting model is indifferent 
to the legality of the tools available to the politician.” Thus, contrary to Rothstein's model of 
political legitimacy as something driven by procedural fairness and impartiality, it would appear 
that in a variety of empirical contexts, people care more about results than how one arrives at those 
results. The outputs of the political process are often more influential on political trust than the 
way in which the political process is conducted.  
3.3 Corruption Tradeoff in Authoritarian Regimes 
 While there is preliminary evidence that people exchange concerns about corruption for 
material gains, tests of this theory remain limited primarily to Latin American countries with noted 
histories of clientelism. This link has not been examined in authoritarian regimes or poorer 
countries outside Latin America where corruption presents serious challenges to development and 
political reforms toward the rule of law. I aim to extend a test of this moderation effect in a sample 
of 30 countries spanning Central and Eastern Europe and all former Soviet states. A preliminary 
glance at this relationship indicates that people trust political institutions at the same time that they 
perceive high levels of corruption in everyday life across Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus 
(Figure 3.1). Contrary to expectations, the relationship between the two variables is not negative 
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and is noticeably driven upward by seldom studied autocracies like Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and 
Kazakhstan. This pattern raises interesting questions about how such countries maintain support 
even though citizens acknowledge that they must often pay bribes to obtain public services. 
4 Figure 3.1 Perceptions of Corruption and Trust in Political Institutions 
 
Data Source: EBRD and World Bank, Life in Transition Survey 2010. Political trust is a sum score of trust in the 
government, parliament, political parties and local government, scaled 1-100. Corruption is a sum score of perceptions 
of the necessity of paying bribes across seven public institutions, scaled 1-100 (see Data and Measurement section).   
 This puzzle differs in some ways from the Latin American-centric literature on corruption 
tradeoff in the sense that it concerns the concurrence of petty (not grand) corruption with high 
political trust, resembling Rosas and Manzetti’s (2015) study on bribe victimization more than the 
others. This study also eludes the use of straightforwardly reliable dependent variables like 
intended voting, actual vote shares or incumbent approval, partly due to data limitations and partly 
due to the nature of studying this link in non-democratic political systems where voting is not a 
valid carrier of information about political support. Nevertheless, the nature of the puzzle in among 
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Figure 3.1. Perceptions of Corruption and Trust in Political Institutions 
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breadth of corruption tradeoff theory with regards to individual-level corruption in different 
cultures and regime settings. 
 For theories about moderation effects to work in different contexts, it is important to 
specify the suspected causal mechanisms. Perhaps the most discussed mechanism in the corruption 
tradeoff literature concerns clientelist linkages which help citizens overlook corruption in 
exchange for short-term spoils. Yet governments under different regime settings tend to employ 
different state capture strategies, not all of which can be considered “clientelist.” In Grzymala-
Busse's (2008, 644) typology, clientelist states combine political contestation with rent 
distribution, “exchanging supporter loyalty for rent sharing, as targeted and contingent goods are 
delivered to select constituencies and individuals.” In turn, regimes which fuse party and state tend 
to distribute rents without allowing for political contestation. Finally, full blown kleptocracies 
follow strategies of elite predation where the state neither distributes rents nor allows for political 
contestation. Elites in this scenario expropriate state funds and property for personal use and do 
not depend on the general population to maintain their offices. They choose to repress rather than 
redistribute income to citizens. Arguably a number of former Soviet states employ a mixture of 
fusion and predatory state capture strategies (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan), 
with Uzbekistan employing predatory techniques more exclusively. Based on this picture it would 
be difficult to test theories about the exchange of corruption concerns for material gains when there 
are simply no votes for elites to buy, nor material benefits for citizens to receive. Causal 
mechanisms which work in Latin American clientelist contexts may be absent in authoritarian 
states.  
 I would be inclined to argue, however, that forms of clientelism are not limited to 
democracies. Geddes (2006, 17-18) notes, for instance, that although dictators seek to capture state 
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rents for personal use, they must nevertheless create stakeholders in the population if they wish to 
retain elite support and thwart the opposition from taking advantage of popular dissatisfaction with 
the regime. That is, dictators realize that repression only works so long as people are able to reap 
some benefits under the system. Failure to meet supermajorities, high turnout or inspire mass 
rallies even in fundamentally uncompetitive elections can signal an opportunity for elites or 
underground opposition to remove the incumbent. Elections and parties thus offer incumbents an 
opportunity to selectively redistribute rents back to the population to secure enough popular 
support even if they do not directly depend on it for political survival.  
 Although it seems that public opinion is meaningless in repressive conditions, authoritarian 
incumbents are themselves often interested in the outcomes of polls when they lack elections to 
offer consistent signals about the possibility of popular discontent or protest (Treisman 2014b, 
372). Hale (2005, 140-141) argues that defecting elites coalesce around mass preferences when 
they sense an opportunity for regime change. In fact, taking advantage of public opinion is what 
“crucially distinguishes” cases in which elites have been successful and unsuccessful in ousting 
authoritarian incumbents across Eurasia in the post-Soviet period (ibid., 144). 
 Selective redistributive practices are present in a variety of authoritarian regimes. Overland 
et al. (2009, 179) argue that hydrocarbon-rich governments in particular use natural resources to 
“buy support, pay off opposition actors and depoliticize society.” This argument comes from a 
longer line of work suggesting that resource rich states which do not depend on tax extraction for 
political survival can use oil revenues to buy off parts of the population and successfully quell 
resistance movements (Karl 1997, Ross 2001). Smith (2004) finds that the redistribution of oil 
rents has a regime stabilizing effect in 107 developing countries over a 40 year period even after 
controlling for repression. Morrison (2009) confirms this in a sample of over 100 countries over 
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28 years, interestingly finding that poor dictatorships outspend rich dictatorships on social welfare 
in order to thwart popular discontent. Wright and Stein (2010) also demonstrate in a sample of 
authoritarian countries that poor citizens are less likely to hold political institutions accountable 
for economic performance when they benefit from social spending. These findings tell the broader 
story of the generalizability of clientelism across regime types: welfare transfers and economic 
development are priorities even of authoritarian regimes which depend significantly on non-tax 
revenue.  
 Broadly, clientelism can be considered a way of compensating for the lack of a functional 
redistributive state infrastructure. Kitschelt (2000, 873) argues that clientelist politics in Latin 
America have “constituted the functional equivalent of the welfare state, appeasing the have-nots 
to abide by political orders that tremendously advantage the haves.” In a similar way, elites in post-
communist contexts compensate for poor state welfare provision by redistributing resources 
through citizen-elite linkages when politically opportune. Franke et al. (2009, 127) argue that such 
linkages are prevalent in autocratic rentier states like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, which both 
combine predatory rent seeking with targeted patronage of interest groups, elites and the general 
public. Tactics to appease the latter include the provision of free health care, education, higher 
pensions and subsidized food markets. Between 2003-2007, Kazakhstan experienced real GDP 
growth rates near 10 percent per year, while Azerbaijan experienced real GDP growth rates 
between 11 and an astonishing 34 percent in the same period, mainly thanks to foreign direct 
investments into oil and gas sectors in each country over the previous decade (ibid., 121). 
Extensive investments went into the construction of lush capitals in both countries, and urban 
centers experienced increased consumption, employment and public investment rates.  
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 Kendall-Taylor (2012) links rent seeking strategies in these two countries to Geddes’ 
framework, arguing that although buying support from the mass public is not a priority for political 
survival, incumbents in both countries need it to demonstrate the difficulty of challenges to their 
authority. Channeling some material benefits back to the public is particularly important to 
dissuade rivals from believing that they have enough resources and public backing to stage a coup. 
This would explain why, despite participating in noncompetitive elections, Azerbaijan's President 
Aliyev commissioned the construction of “five new airports...10 new bridges and 18 underpasses 
in the capital city of Baku, and 40 new bridges between Baku and the Russian border” in the run 
up to the 2008 election, and why Kazakhstan's President Nazarbayev spent much more than legally 
permitted on his 2005 presidential campaign and made overtures like sending trains with medical 
supplies to provide health care to Kazakhstan's remote regions prior to the election (ibid., 750).  
 It is particularly popular to argue that economic growth has enhanced the political 
legitimacy of Vladimir Putin's administration in Russia throughout the early 2000s. Even though 
Russia has appeared in the bottom third or quarter of Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index for the entirety of Putin’s tenure as President or Prime Minister, he has never 
received an approval rating below 60 percent. Treisman (2011, 601) argues that the trajectory of 
presidential approval across the Yeltsin, Medvedev and Putin presidencies strongly correlates with 
economic performance indicators, including higher real wages, more job vacancies, lower wage 
arrears, increases in pensions and drops in unemployment. Such increases in the standard of living 
are tangibly felt in the population. Fueled by impressive growth, Moscow’s municipal government 
has, for instance, heavily invested in the gentrification of old Soviet parks and exhibition centers 
into indie art districts and places for western-style cafes and stylish residences, creating a 
phenomenon some term “hipster Stalinism.” In a 2014 Guardian interview, a Moscow student 
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notes that “after the renovation it became impossible to say that the Department of Culture was 
corrupt or that our government didn’t care about its people, or that it hated the west and wanted a 
return to the Soviet Union” (Omidi 2014). 
 Such trends are consistent with earlier studies showing that economic indicators have 
significantly more explanatory power over Russian presidential approval than any other factor 
(McAllister and White 2007, Rose et al. 2004, Mishler and Willerton 2003). In fact, Treisman’s 
(2014) simulations show that Putin’s tremendous support levels would have likely arisen for any 
generic Kremlin incumbent enjoying such growth rates even without a war in Chechnya in late 
1999, which has traditionally been credited for Putin’s early surge in popularity.   
 Unsurprisingly, people across the post-Soviet space respond positively to improvements in 
their wellbeing. In Figure 3.2, the thirty countries across eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space 
I use in this investigation are ordered by the percent GDP per capita growth in each country 
between 2006-2010 (in the lead up to the LITS II survey). Countries in which GDP has grown by 
over 50 percent in this period include Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, 
Mongolia, Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan. In the latter two countries, GDP growth more doubled. 
Countries on this tail of the sample are also the most trusting of government institutions. Political 
trust tends to rise with growth despite high corruption perceptions in select cases. Is it possible that 
people are experiencing increases to their material wellbeing to such an extent that the marginal 
corruption perception becomes less important when they evaluate political institutions? 
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5 Figure 3.2 Percent GDP Growth 2006-2010, Average Corruption Perceptions, Average 
Political Trust 
 
 With the given evidence, this seems likely. I hypothesize that corruption perceivers will 
trust political institutions when they believe they have received gains to their material wellbeing 
and when they are confident about the performance of the economy in their country. Testing this 
theory affords us an opportunity to speculate more broadly about the stability of corrupt 
governments in different regime contexts. Given an incentive structure in which people regularly 
trade off corruption concerns for material gains, it is unlikely that we can expect anti-corruption 
reforms to arise from the top down or from the bottom-up. Short term economic gains can be seen 
as a sort of opioid for the masses, contributing to developmental reform traps in corrupt societies.  
91 
 
3.4 Regime Moderation 
 Although corruption tradeoff is plausible in authoritarian regimes, the extent of the tradeoff 
likely differs across regime types for several reasons. First, marginal corruption perceptions are 
more likely to reduce political trust in democracies than non-democracies because citizens play a 
hand in electing politicians and pay for public services in taxes. As a result they are more likely to 
believe that elected officials are accountable to them and to perceive an instance of corruption as 
a direct abuse of their trust. Such notions of accountability are less likely to arise in autocracies 
where citizens do not elect politicians and especially in resource-rich autocracies like Azerbaijan 
and Kazakhstan which do not principally rely on tax extraction to provide public services.  As 
Huntington (1993, 65) argues in the Third Wave, citizens make fewer demands of the government 
in low tax conditions: “No taxation without representation’ was a political demand; ‘no 
representation without taxation’ is a political reality.”  
 Beyond notions of accountability, it can also be argued that the mechanism through which 
the regime type influences corruption perceptions is political repression. Looking only at post-
communist democracies in Eastern Europe, Ceka (2012) shows that electoral competition 
significantly reduces trust in political parties. Despite high quality democratic institutions in the 
region, electoral competition and vibrant press coverage constantly expose high corruption and 
depress political trust in populations which had expected much more of democracy after the fall 
of communism. Sharafutdinova (2010, 160) also finds that even when political competition strives 
to reduce real corruption, it drives up public corruption perceptions across 40 subnational Russian 
regions largely due to the use of “black PR,” slander and manipulation tactics in political 
campaigns. Although the authors do not extend their analyses to the full regime spectrum in the 
post-communist space, their findings could be generalizable: people in autocracies might have 
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higher political trust because 1) having no real party competition or access to a free press, they 
simply do not know about the extent of corruption, 2) they consume propaganda which paints a 
heroic picture of anti-corruption efforts by the government or casts blame for poor institutional 
quality on third parties, or 3) they are aware of the extent of corruption but are too afraid to reveal 
their true opinion. Any of these reasons can lead us to conclude that citizens of autocracies trust 
political institutions in the presence of corruption regardless of their economic circumstances or 
notions of political accountability.    
 On the other hand, the regime influence can be the exact opposite. Notions of 
accountability can be present in authoritarian contexts, regardless of repression. Although citizens 
of autocracies cannot usually hold authorities accountable electorally, they might exercise softer 
forms of control over political outcomes through public opinion. Treisman (2011, 607) finds that 
fluctuations in presidential support across illiberal democracies and semi-authoritarian states “may 
mirror economic volatility- and the efforts of rational voters, against the odds, to hold their leaders 
to account” (ibid.). Mishler and Willerton (2003, 117) and McAllister and White (2008, 948) posit 
that Russians are even more likely to hold the government accountable for economic performance 
than citizens of Western democracies. Since political accountability in authoritarian contexts is 
concentrated in a leader with extensive discretion over resource distribution, it is easier for a citizen 
to place blame for poor economic performance than it would be in the context of democracy, where 
accountability is more distributed across institutions and a broader global market.  
 Using a cross-regime sample in Asia, for example, Huhe and Tang (2016) find evidence 
that economically dissatisfied strata of the population trust political institutions less in autocracies 
than in democracies because citizens of autocracies do not distinguish between leaders and the 
regime itself, holding the entire system accountable when things go wrong. Citizens of 
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democracies, in contrast, tend to penalize only incumbents rather than the system, making 
democratic political institutions more resistant to economic downturns. It could be alternatively 
hypothesized that even in the absence of functioning electoral controls or a free press, citizens of 
autocracies can be just as (if not more) punitive of corruption as citizens of democracies. In this 
view, they are fully equipped with liberal notions of political accountability one would find in 
democracies; the only reason they do not demand representation is simply that they cannot, or, at 
least, not without a threat to their life or liberty.  
 To sum, I hypothesize that citizens of autocracies who observe more corruption will trust 
political institutions more than citizens of democracies who observe more corruption, either due 
to lacking notions of accountability or repression. The alternative hypothesis is that citizens of 
authoritarian regimes will trust political institutions even less in the presence of corruption than 
those living in democracies because political institutions can be more directly perceived as 
responsible for the provision of public goods. Looking at the regime context helps us learn not 
only about how all forms of government might supply economic gains to overcome corruption 
resentment in the public, but how the institutional rules of the game moderate this corruption 
tradeoff. Some political systems might be less vulnerable to anti-corruption challenges than others.  
3.5 Post-Materialist Values and Education 
 One might argue that my proposed hypothesis is too economically deterministic. Inglehart 
and Welzel (2005) observe that while citizens of industrializing societies tend to privilege gains in 
material wellbeing, they eventually begin to focus on goals beyond immediate survival. After 
experiencing growing living standards, people seek more control over their lives and will 
eventually no longer be willing to exchange political rights for material gains. The state cannot 
easily coax or control independently resourced and independently minded pockets of society. We 
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can hypothesize on these grounds that economic sentiment and development spur precisely the 
opposite of corruption tradeoff. If people adopt post-material values as they become wealthier, 
every marginal unit of material benefit will offer diminishing returns, while every marginal unit 
of corruption will become more costly. Greater satisfaction with material wellbeing and increasing 
wealth might lead citizens to impose an even greater penalty on political institutions for corruption 
rather than reduce it. 
 Part of the shift toward post-materialist values comes from greater education. For Inglehart 
and Welzel, as societies develop economically, beneficiaries of higher education become more 
intellectually autonomous and creative, no longer needing to rely on the guidance of authorities or 
rigid routines to make decisions. People become more skeptical of hierarchies and dogmas as they 
gradually become emancipated from authority (ibid., 26-29). Authority itself comes to be seen as 
something which resides within individuals rather than rule-making institutions. Infractions 
against individual rights and liberties thus become increasingly morally troublesome for people 
with more education.    
 Evidence from developing countries suggests that more educated people tend to be more 
informed and critical of political affairs and thus less inclined to trust government (Catterberg and 
Moreno 2005; Chang and Chu 2006; Luhiste 2006; Cho and Kirwin 2007; Lavallée et al. 2008; 
Arnold et al. 2012) although education tends to increase political trust in Norway (Christensen and 
Laegrid 2005). This slight nuance is upheld in other studies which suggest that people with more 
education have less political trust in highly corrupt societies, but more political trust in cleaner 
societies (Tverdova 2011; Hakhverdian and Mayne 2012).  
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 Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) posit that education impacts institutional evaluations in 
two ways. First, education makes it easier for people to acquire and process information about 
institutional performance: more highly educated people tend to be more interested in politics, read 
more newspapers and participate in civil or political organizations. Glaeser et al. (2007) show that 
education strongly predicts transitions from authoritarianism to democracy and helps consolidate 
democracy over the long term by increasing the number of beneficiaries of political participation. 
They find evidence in favor of the hypothesis that education socializes people in a way that 
supports civic mindedness, public service and political engagement.  Kitschelt (2000, 857) argues 
that educated citizens tend to develop longer time horizons to observe the outcomes of their 
political choices and are no longer willing to organize around immediate material incentives: 
“within countries, a rising urban white-collar and professional middle class is the first to defect 
from clientelism.”  
 In the context of the former Soviet states, there is some speculation about a post-material 
value shift in Russian society as part of the explanation for the 2011-2012 anti-Putin protest cycle. 
Treisman (2014b) argues that mass discontent was largely a matter of disappointment with 
economic circumstances among provincial urbanite, female and rich strata of the population. 
Members of the creative class (dwellers of Moscow or St Petersburg with higher education and a 
laptop computer) did lose faith in the president, but made up only three percent of the population. 
This makes it implausible that the greater population experienced a shift in values. On the other 
hand, Robertson (2013, 21) argues that there is a broader qualitative difference in Russian protest 
activity between the early 1990s and the later 2000s: “citizens are increasingly, it seems, willing 




 If people are indeed experiencing a shift towards post-materialist values across the sampled 
territory, I expect that my tradeoff hypothesis will not be supported. There will be evidence that as 
corruption perceivers become better off, they will trust political institutions less. This effect will 
be more pronounced in more educated strata of the population. In other words, my hypothesis is 
that less educated corruption perceivers will trust political institutions more than highly educated 
corruption perceivers. 
3.6 Culture 
 One might object to the rational choice approach inherent in corruption tradeoff theory as 
something which dismisses the influence of culture on the development of attitudes toward 
corruption and political institutions. Culture is often seen as a form of path dependence. Prominent 
historian Richard Pipes (2004, 10) has argued that Russia’s history of authoritarianism, absence of 
respect for private property and lack of a civil rights tradition has led Russians to “desire strong 
tsarist rule” and made Russians, “even in modern times, the least socialized or politicized people 
on the European continent.” Mishler and Willerton (2003, 114-116) review theories arguing that 
Russian citizens tend to prefer strong leadership and have “collectivist, passionately nationalistic” 
or “rabidly anti-Western” values. Such cultural path dependence would make Russia an 
inappropriate subject of research. Notwithstanding the complex set of variables that determine 
political orientations, in some ways, Russians are immune to economic incentives, or fall into a 
special category of behavior because of their national character.  
 This is not a particularly useful way of discussing cultural influence. First, Russians are by 
no means the lone subjects in this kind of theorizing. Although theories have been advanced about 
the authority deferential tendencies of Asian and Arab societies, research shows almost uniformly 
that people in these regions respond rationally to institutional performance (Chang and Chu 2006; 
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Kim and Voorhees 2011; Maseland and Hoorn 2011; Tessler et al. 2012; Yang and Tang 2010). 
Secondly, the cultural footprint is more often than not an artifact of citizens' perceptions of 
economic performance or material wellbeing. Although Kim and Voorhees (2011, 418) make a 
point about the trust-promoting effects of Confucian attitudes, it appears that the ultimate source 
of that political trust is economic performance and not a cultural tendency to sacrifice individual 
wellbeing for group wellbeing: although the distribution of state rents to favored companies would 
be “regarded as corrupt behavior in transparent societies…citizens [in East Asia] perceive such 
ties to be beneficial to their country’s economic growth.” Similarly, although Askvik and Ishtiaq 
(2013, 472) argue that Bangladeshis have a different, perhaps non-Western, understanding of 
institutional trustworthiness, it too boils down to economic performance: “despite a number of 
deficiencies, people tend to trust public and political institutions because such institutions have 
performed well and contributed to economic progress and better living conditions during recent 
years.” 
 The same trajectory of the argument appears in studies of the former Soviet space. In his 
anthropological study of corruption and patronage in Azerbaijan, Barrett (2015) summarizes 
Rogers’ (2006) account of the Soviet concept of the leader as a “khozyain,” or a “master, owner, 
administrator, boss, man of the house” whose competence is measured by his “ability to maintain 
patronage networks, barter goods and favours, and honour moral expectations that he would 
provide for his employees and the community at large” (Barrett 2015, 525). Barrett argues that this 
notion largely defines how citizens relate to President Aliyev in modern day Azerbaijan. It is 
understood by citizens that the “khozyain” can steal from the common resource pool of the country 
as long as he redistributes back some of the rents. The compatibility of corruption and political 
trust in Azerbaijan and other countries in my sample could thus be explained by specific notions 
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of leadership arising from the post-Soviet moral economy. Again, however, even this specific 
cultural notion is based on the leader's ability to bestow or redistribute material benefits back to 
citizens. In the Azeri case, the president has managed to prove his managerial competence by 
declaring amnesties on utility debts and directly gifting free gas to households (ibid., 527). It is 
likely, therefore, that evaluations of economic conditions and material wellbeing moderate the link 
between corruption perceptions and political trust across both regime types and cultures. 
 This is not to argue that culture plays no role, but that many cultural theories can often be 
more coherently rephrased in a rational choice framework. It is important to be careful about 
making overly general claims about culture (“X people have authoritarian values”) as such theories 
have no limits over the range of empirical phenomena they can claim to explain and are therefore 
extremely difficult to falsify. Because culture is difficult to define or measure, practically no 
amount of empirical testing can deny its presence or influence. To account for culture, we should 
avoid 1) treating it as a form of path dependence which reduces the subjects of study to exceptional 
cases or aberrations, 2) making overgeneralizations or universal causal claims and 3) arguing for 
its influence without specifying the mechanisms through which it operates. If we are unable to 
avoid these temptations, we need not deny culture’s potential influence, but we are also not in a 
good position to use it as a meaningful explanation of an empirical puzzle.  
 Perhaps one way we can think of culture in a meaningful way is by leaning on a game-
theoretical literature which discusses how people solve cooperation games given repeated 
defection. In this sense, culture can come into play as something which regulates norms of behavior 
through a lifetime of signposts and learning trials (Ostrom 1998, 10). Corruption can be considered 
a cultural norm or “social equilibrium with low quality exchanges” in which all parties to a 
transaction assume noncompliance with formal rules (Villoria et al. 2013, 4; Gambetta and Origgi 
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2009). If cheating behavior goes unsanctioned, rule breaking becomes the norm and transaction 
partners develop new shared expectations of cooperation over time. High corruption perceptions 
at the household level can produce “moral externalities” by desensitizing individuals to the costs 
of corruption and making it a normal part of life or the country’s “culture” (Sharafutdinova 2010, 
149). This desensitization or normalization is hard to detect empirically, but is certainly a plausible 
scenario if petty corruption perceptions prove not to exert any influence on a person’s political 
trust regardless of economic circumstances, regime type or education.  
3.7 Theory and Measurement 
3.7.1 Political trust  
 In this study I use the Life in Transition Survey II (LITS II) produced by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The cross-sectional 
sample from late 2010 surveys almost 39,000 households in 35 countries to assess public attitudes 
on a range of social, political and economic variables.6 Two –stage clustered, stratified sampling 
was employed across regions in each country.7 I analyze thirty countries including all of Eastern 
Europe and the hard to reach former Soviet states across Central Asia. I omit the five Western 
European countries thus far used in Chapter 2 because perceived bribery across public institutions 
is practically nonexistent in these cases, yielding very large margins of error around the key 
                                                          
6 Specifically, the sample I use includes (with number of respondents interviewed in each country in parentheses) 
Albania (1029), Armenia (953), Azerbaijan (988), Belarus (895), Bosnia (1075), Bulgaria (1007), Croatia (997), 
Czech Republic (1007), Estonia (989), Georgia (959), Hungary (1031), Kazakhstan (943), Kosovo (1083), 
Kyrgyzstan (992), Latvia (1004), Lithuania (1003), Macedonia (1060), Moldova (1023), Mongolia (981), 
Montenegro (970), Poland (1587), Romania (1068), Russia (1550), Serbia (1506), Slovakia (995), Slovenia (988), 
Tajikistan (996), Turkey (1004), Ukraine (1547), Uzbekistan (1417) 




corruption-trust link. The results of this 30-country study remain robust to their inclusion. To 
measure political trust, I use the standard LITS question on political trust analyzed in Chapter 2.  
 There are theoretical limitations to this measurement of political trust. The literature on 
corruption tradeoff uses a range of dependent variables, including political trust, approval ratings 
of incumbents and vote shares. It is far from obvious that one can derive the same theoretical 
conclusions from each of these measures. After all, I may distrust the system but support my 
favored candidate to manipulate the system ahead of someone else. People ultimately might not 
give political institutions a pass on corruption, but will do so for benefactor-incumbents who 
spread the wealth. Barrett (2014) argues that this is likely the case in Azerbaijan. 
 In this way institutional trust and incumbent support might also imply different logics of 
corruption tradeoff. One might be willing to vote for the incumbent in good times despite 
corruption, but it makes less sense to say that one will be willing to trust institutions in good times 
despite corruption. This latter disposition toward institutions does not quite reflect the same 
tradeoff mechanism. Perhaps one way of describing the potential difference is to think about the 
salience of political institutions. As one sees more corruption in daily life, it is not necessarily the 
case that she is willing to trust institutions in good times as much as she has no reason to 
disapprove of political institutions in good times. Political institutions appear more salient to 
people who are exposed to corruption in bad times, and less salient in good times. Incumbent 
politicians, however, do not merely fluctuate in salience through the ups and downs of the 
economy; they are perhaps trusted in something closer to the individual-level conception of the 
term “trust.” Despite corruption, people are still willing to vote for the incumbent so that he may 
continue to deliver material prosperity. This form of corruption tradeoff is tied to a conscious 
decision to support someone in return for the performance of a concrete task. The diffuse support 
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that institutional trust represents does not imply an immediate target of accountability in the same 
way that specific support for an incumbent does. For this reason we might expect that the 
interaction between corruption, economic performance and institutional trust will be weaker than 
that between corruption, economic performance and incumbent approval.  
 Nevertheless, the verdict is less clear on how this plays out in authoritarian regimes, where 
people are less likely to distinguish between the system and leader largely because the leader has 
become the system (Huntington 1993, 50). Marien (2012, 15) has argued on empirical grounds 
that incumbent and system-level trust are hard to disentangle. Even in democracies, it is rare that 
one evaluates political institutions completely independently from who is in power. Because it is 
hard to tell which of these scenarios applies in the present empirical setting, I will test theories of 
corruption tradeoff against both alternatives. To consider incumbent support, I will cross-check 
my results using trust in the presidency as a dependent variable in the ten countries in my sample 
with presidential or semi-presidential systems. The presidency is not a clear measure of the 
president himself in these countries, but it is the closest approximation available in the survey to 
incumbent support.   
3.7.2 Corruption   
 To measure corruption, I create an additive index of a question gaging perceptions of petty 
corruption: “In your opinion, how often do people like you have to make unofficial payments or 
gifts in these situations?” a) Interacting with road police; b) Requesting official documents; c) 
Going to courts for a civil matter, d) Receiving public education, e) Receiving medical treatment 
in public health system, f) Requesting unemployment benefits; and g) Requesting other social 
security benefits. This measure differs from other corruption measures in the political trust 
literature, which consist either of perceptions of grand corruption, corruption scandals, reports of 
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bribe victimization, or survey experimental vignettes in which respondents are presented with 
potential scenarios of elected officials’ misdemeanors. Once again, it is not clear that the same 
theoretical conclusions should be drawn about corruption tradeoff across this range of variable 
choices. 
 While corruption measured in scandals or perceptions of officials’ misdemeanors is fairly 
straightforwardly tied to incumbent approval or institutional trust, it is less clear that perceptions 
of petty or bureaucratic corruption are tied to those outcome variables. Why, after all, should 
people hold political institutions accountable for their encounters with bribery, and why would 
they be willing to overlook this petty corruption when the economy is doing well? In the post-
Soviet context, there is a clear link between local bureaucracies which interact with people and the 
federal-level decision-making bodies which allocate resources for the public services they provide. 
In Russia, for example, public goods spending on policing, courts, medicine and education largely 
comes from the federal budget (Libman 2012, 1325). According to a 2013 survey in Russia, 
Dmitriev (2015, 240) finds that up to 78 percent of respondents across the country would address 
their economic grievances to the President or the federal government over local authorities. 
Treisman (2014b, 19) finds that Russian citizens’ beliefs that hospitals and clinics have 
deteriorated is the strongest predictor of low incumbent approval over citizens’ beliefs about 
performance in other public service sectors. This effect becomes insignificant after controlling for 
perceptions of the economy, showing that corruption and economic perceptions are correlated. It 
remains plausible that economic perceptions will moderate the extent to which citizens hold 
institutions accountable for that corruption.  
 Unfortunately I am unable to conduct a robustness check using perceptions of grand 
corruption because they are unavailable in the LITS survey. But even if these data were available, 
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they are not an optimal means of testing the present theory. In their well cited study of corruption 
tradeoff in 19 Latin American countries, Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013, from here out 
abbreviated as “ZZC”) measure corruption perceptions with the following survey question in the 
2010 AmericasBarometer (part of the Latin American Political Opinion Project, or LAPOP): 
“Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public 
officials is: very common, common, uncommon or very uncommon?” Similar approaches are 
taken in numerous studies using survey data to study the trust-corruption relationship.8  In theory, 
this approach straightforwardly matches up the questions in a way that citizens are evaluating the 
corruption and trustworthiness of the same political institutions or individuals, providing for a 
clean, logical interpretation of corruption tradeoff above and beyond what citizens’ experiences of 
bribes can deliver. In practice, however, the interpretation is not so straightforward.  
 We can take ZZC’s study as an example. They study corruption tradeoff across 19 Latin 
American countries and the United States. Off the bat, the correlation between country means of 
corruption perceptions in LAPOP and the 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is -.432 (we 
expect a negative relationship because the CPI ranks higher corruption in descending, rather than 
ascending order). The relationship is only moderately strong, suggesting that the LAPOP data is 
tapping into something slightly different than the CPI. In LAPOP, The US has significantly lower 
grand corruption perceptions (.702) than the Latin American mean (.731) although the US 
perceptions are higher than Uruguay (.625), El Salvador (.649), Brazil (.667), Nicaragua (.678) 
and Chile (.685). This trend may appear odd at first glance, but it generally follows expert 
                                                          
8 Perceptions data are usually measured with a version of a question like “how widespread do you think corruption 
and bribe taking are in your national government/local government?” (Asian Barometer), “how widespread do you 
think bribe taking and corruption is in this country? (Gallup World Poll, New Democracies Barometer) or “how 
many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption?” with choices such as the president, MPs, 
national government officials, police, teachers, judges, military officers, political parties, NGO leaders, etc. 
(Afrobarometer, Americas Barometer). 
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evaluations of corruption in the same year: each of these countries but Nicaragua has the cleanest 
CPI scores in the region, although Chile and the USA score considerably higher than some of the 
other top five (Chile CPI=7.2, USA CPI=7.1, Uruguay CPI =6.9, Costa Rica CPI=5.3, Brazil 
CPI=3.7). Among the most vivid discrepancies, Nicaragua scores in the top five cleanest countries 
out of the 21 according to its mean grand corruption perception score in LAPOP, even though it 
scores in the bottom five of the CPI (with a score of 2.5). Also puzzlingly, Costa Rica appears in 
the bottom five countries by its grand corruption perception mean in LAPOP while it scores in the 
top five cleanest countries of the region in the CPI just behind Chile, the US and Uruguay (CPI 
score of 5.3). Roughly speaking, if we were to use the CPI as a benchmark of “true” corruption as 
judged by academic and business elites, it would appear that Costa Ricans highly overestimate the 
amount of corruption in their country while Nicaraguans highly underestimate it. US respondents’ 
perceptions of grand corruption are about five percent higher than those of Brazilians, even though 
Brazil is 63 percent more corrupt than the US according to the CPI. What are we measuring, after 
all? Which scale is more believable as a measure of corruption? 
 In their own study using a similar question, Manzetti and Wilson (2007, 958) argue that 
the only thing that matters is people’s points of view: “we respect the survey respondents’ own 
definition of corruption… if a respondent indicates that there is a high level of corruption in his or 
her country, we assume that this reflects particular acts that the respondent has witnessed or 
otherwise acquired information about and deems corrupt.” After all, if we are interested in learning 
about beliefs, survey responses must already implicitly contain the normative criteria used to form 
those beliefs. But this isn’t entirely right. We might understand the kinds of practices one imagines 
by the term “corruption” in a single place at a single time, but if we stretch the survey question 
thinner over time and space, it will begin to capture a wider range of phenomena which may tap 
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into notions we are unable to disentangle or interpret. Supposing we find evidence of a tradeoff 
effect using this measure in a pooled country sample, we might at best conclude that on average 
people trade off concerns about something they don’t like for economic gains. The corruption 
perceptions measure can become a net which catches everything anyone finds wrong with the 
political system. These evaluations are benchmarked against different national histories and 
institutional practices which are hard to pinpoint with cross national survey data. Citizens of 
country A might not be willing to overlook the same kinds of political transgressions as citizens 
of country B in good economic times, yet such transgressions might fall under the umbrella of 
“corruption” for respondents in both countries.  Granting zoning rights to favored construction 
companies might be more serious for some, and massive money laundering might be more serious 
for others. Some governments will get away with more than others. It is not clear just how serious 
the pooled tradeoff effect really is. Adding country fixed effects into an econometric model to soak 
up country-level characteristics (as ZZC do) does not solve the comparability problem because we 
still would not understand the context and implications of tradeoff. For this reason, survey 
experiments which present respondents with detailed corruption vignettes such as those run by 
Winters and Weitz-Shaprio (2013) offer much more interpretable tests of the theory of corruption 
tradeoff, although they are costly to implement in a large number of countries and difficult to make 
representative of the populations from which they are sampled. Conceptual shallowness is often 
the price one pays for widely representative cross-national data. Still, survey-based corruption 
measures are not all equally shallow; I will argue below that petty corruption perceptions are more 
cross-nationally interpretable than grand corruption perceptions. 
 Before proceeding, however, I will consider another reason why petty corruption 
perceptions can be problematic for a study of corruption tradeoff. While corruption perceptions 
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can reduce political trust, low political trust can also magnify the amount of corruption one sees. 
Mainly to avoid endogeneity, several authors prefer predictors which capture experiences, rather 
than perceptions of corruption (Cho and Kirwin 2007; Clausen 2011; Seligson 2002). These survey 
questions inquire whether and how much respondents have had to pay bribes to obtain public 
services in the recent past. Presumably, these actual instances of bribery are less predictable by 
one’s political trust levels. Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010, 1058) go as far as to argue that 
corruption experiences provide an objective and scientific approach to measurement. Perceptions 
data, they claim, are validated on soft justifications such as correlations with expected outcomes 
and correlations between indices; the “match between perception and fact” is based “more on belief 
than on scientific proof.” Their solution is to use respondents’ self-reports of the frequency and 
amount of bribes paid to government officials in eight African countries (including authoritarian 
regimes). They defend this measure with methods they themselves criticize, however, citing the 
experience-based measures’ expected correlations, as well as “the respondents’ considerable 
interest in governance issues, the interviewers’ impressions concerning data collection, the low 
non-response rates and the internal consistency of the data,” none of which they substantiate with 
evidence (ibid., 1062). Their ultimate finding is that only 13 percent of the eight-country sample 
has experienced bribe victimization in the previous year. The authors conclude that country experts 
who perceived the rate to be 52 percent, particularly those in favor of free market principles (who 
could be upset that the countries have failed to adopt their favored policies), provide unreliable 
information about “the objective phenomenon” of corruption (ibid., 1067).  
 Although these perspectives carry small grains of truth, a hard turn to experience-based 
data should not exaggerate the benefits of such measures. First, while actual instances of extortion 
or bribery are not functions of one’s political trust, self-reports of such instances most definitely 
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can be. If I am upset with the government, I can overstate how many bribes I was forced to pay 
last year. Moreover, what respondents decide to admit in a survey interview is related to their own 
unobservable characteristics, which, despite our inability to model them, influence both trust and 
corruption responses. Using experience-based data offers no more proof of causality than a 
perception-based measure, and is likely more prone to non-response and social desirability biases, 
particularly in contexts where admission of bribery can result in legal or criminal proceedings. 
Azfar and Murrell (2009), for instance, show that reticence among survey respondents (whether 
attributable to giving knowingly false answers, saying ‘don’t know’ or refusing to answer) 
significantly lowers estimates of informal corruption, making the measures incomparable across 
populations where reticence varies. A measure of experienced bribery is simply not more effective 
at demonstrating causality, nor is it more scientifically or objectively representative of “actual” 
corruption than a perception-based measure. In the absence of proper instruments for corruption 
perceptions, regression coefficients using either measure should not be interpreted as causal. This 
applies to the current study as well. 
 Perceptions of petty bribery do not deliver a causal interpretation, but I would argue that 
they still have certain advantages for a cross-national study of corruption tradeoff. First, 
perceptions of petty corruption among “people like me” are likely to be more truthful than personal 
experiences of petty corruption because they do not require an admission of complicity in bribery. 
Second, perceptions of petty corruption do not depend on the respondent having used a public 
service in the previous year. Not owning a car does not mean one is not aware of how commonly 
traffic police demand bribes of motorists. Third, unlike perceptions of grand corruption in the 
federal government, petty corruption perceptions are not as sensitive to corruption scandals, media 
exposure or partisanship. Klasnja et al. (2014), for instance, find that grand corruption perceptions 
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vary significantly based on these variables while reports of bribe victimization remain stable over 
time. This stable picture of corruption is particularly important for citizens of authoritarian states: 
propaganda might easily sway perceptions of grand corruption, but it has less power over 
perceptions of bribery when one uses the police or hospital. Fourth, petty corruption perceptions 
are likely more equivalent in meaning across societies. Bribery imposes a cost on individuals 
wherever they are located, exposing them to real institutional dysfunction and the mismanagement 
of public resources. A lot less is up to the imagination than in cases of grand corruption or scandals, 
which can be perceived differently in different societies. I am not aware of conceptual differences 
inherent in perceptions of bribery between public institutions like schools, hospitals and others, 
but will consider potentially systematic differences in their response patterns across the sampled 
countries in the next chapter. 
3.7.3 Economic Context  
 In the political trust literature, satisfaction with material wellbeing is often conceptualized 
along several dimensions, most commonly sociotropic evaluations (concerning the national 
economy), pocketbook evaluations (concerning one’s personal finances), retrospective evaluations 
(the financial situation today relative to the past) and prospective evaluations (the financial 
situation today relative to what one expects in the future). Less used but perhaps no less interesting 
are measures of general life satisfaction, which can capture a wider sense of a person’s health, 
wealth and capabilities that the other measures cannot. While these indicators are immensely 
important – and usually powerful predictors of political trust— authors often depend on one or 
two of these survey questions to draw broad empirical conclusions, neglecting robustness checks 
to alternative measures of wellbeing. To improve our ability to infer meaningful attitudinal 
relationships from survey data, it is important to exercise caution on several fronts.     
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 While theoretically important, measures of the above economic sentiments can add noise 
to the regression of trust on corruption. Unavoidably, all three perception-based measures (trust, 
corruption and economic evaluations) can be influenced by unobserved features of the individual, 
leading to bias in the parameter estimation of key variables. Simultaneous and reverse causation 
is also probably in play: high satisfaction with one’s financial situation might simultaneously 
increase political trust and lead one to perceive less corruption. For this reason, it is important to 
test models of the tradeoff effect using both subjective and more objective (income based) 
measures of wellbeing.   
 Subjective and objective indicators are likely to produce different outcomes for statistical 
reasons. In the same way that subjective heat rankings are a “noisy proxy” for real temperatures 
(Westfall and Yarkoni 2016, 3), subjective evaluations of economic conditions are noisy proxies 
for actual economic conditions. Using an imperfect proxy to estimate the effect of the true 
construct has been shown to inflate Type I errors in simulation studies (ibid., 5). In other words, 
measurement unreliability in the proxy often leads the researcher to conclude that it has a 
significant effect when it does not. This concern is less pertinent when we are explicitly interested 
in belief concepts rather than using the beliefs as proxies for “real” concepts. Nevertheless, we 
should expect differences in regression coefficients between subjective and objective economic 
indicators.  
 Subjective and objective economic indicators should also be treated distinctly on 
theoretical grounds. In the context of economic development in the post-Soviet states, it is 
reasonable to suspect that the poorer strata of the population will feel the benefits of growth more 
substantially (and thus appear more financially satisfied) than the rich. A marginal increase in the 
standard of living will be more significant for someone who has less to begin with. It could be the 
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case that wealthier people trade off concerns about corruption because they are materially better 
off. But if poorer strata are more satisfied with their financial situations, we might observe that 
they trade off corruption more than the rich. After all, relying on short term benefits, the worst off 
stand to benefit the most from social transfers and economic growth (Kitschelt 2000, 857). 
 Measures of economic sentiment are no less prone to errors and non-equivalence across 
populations than any other attitudinal measure. Some populations might over- or underestimate 
their wellbeing due to cultural differences, question wording, translations and other effects of the 
survey instrument. Deaton (2013, 51) documents that Scandinavian countries tend to score 
exceptionally highly on subjective measures of wellbeing, Latin American countries relatively 
highly, East Asian countries rather poorly, and former Soviet countries exceptionally poorly: “We 
do not know whether these continental differences come from genuine differences in some 
objective aspect of wellbeing, from national differences in disposition, or from national differences 
in the way people respond to the ladder question” (the ladder question asks respondents to rank 
their life satisfaction in “steps” from 0 to 10).   
 At the moment there does not appear to be a straightforward way to ensure the equivalence 
of economic perceptions. Evaluations of the national economy are perhaps more plausibly related 
to evaluations of political institutions – and it could be this measure (rather than an evaluation of 
personal wellbeing) which captures corruption tradeoff. Retrospective evaluations of the economy, 
meanwhile, do not always lead to the same conclusions as hopes for the future (Lewis-Beck and 
Stegmaier 2008, 312). Conflating conceptually distinct phenomena like these will likely obfuscate 
the meaning of any resulting regression coefficient. For clarity of interpretation, I choose to test 
the trust-corruption relationship for moderation against each indicator of wellbeing and economic 
sentiment separately. While this does not fully alleviate measurement equivalence concerns, the 
111 
 
robustness checks can alert us to unexpected cross-country variation in economic sentiment 
reporting.  
 The Life in Transition Survey allows us to exploit a rich set of questions covering more 
objective measures of wellbeing like monthly consumption of food, utilities and transportation. 
Such data are beneficial because they give us an idea of a person’s capabilities to lead a good life 
regardless of what she feels about her circumstances. If we assume that growth has a real impact 
on human welfare, we can use these measures to identify the beneficiaries of the economic growth 
or spoils distribution at the household level. Helpfully, such indicators of welfare enhancement are 
not entirely dependent on characteristics of individuals which directly influence their political trust 
and corruption perceptions. Such “objective” measures are, of course, also vulnerable to 
measurement error, particularly in shadow economies. The sheer newness of data collection 
practices on poverty in developing and authoritarian countries should make us particularly wary 
of the reliability of such data.   
 Despite their interesting uses, these more objective data might do a poor job of capturing 
actual beneficiaries of government welfare transfers or economic growth. It is unclear if the level 
of objective material wellbeing has resulted from government actions which would lead 
individuals to trust political institutions in the presence of corruption. The comparatively wealthier 
members of society may have simply been better off for generations, and the poorer strata of 
society who have been experiencing gains to their wellbeing from recent macroeconomic 
conditions haven’t yet risen on these objective wellbeing indicators in a cross-sectional snapshot. 
Thus, current material wealth may prove inconsequential for one’s tendency to trade off corruption 
concerns. In the absence of longitudinal data about how households have fared financially over 
time, the next best thing is economic sentiments, which can capture a respondent’s consideration 
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of improvement or deterioration over time, bringing us back to square one. Using attitudinal data 
can be worth the potential estimation uncertainty because of its theoretical relevance: knowing 
how people feel is essential to the study of political trust and legitimacy, perhaps more so than 
knowing people’s more objective material circumstances.  
 There are costs to internal validity whatever measures one chooses. In practice, the bar is 
not high to begin with, as measures of economic development and sentiment are often assumed to 
be perfectly measured in the trust literature. To move beyond this precarious assumption, we 
should take advantage of methodological advances to detect and control for measurement error. 
Where this is not possible, robustness checks to alternative measures are crucial for conducting 
meaningful data analysis.  
3.8  Theoretical Summary 
  In over a decade of cross-national political trust research, it has become clear that 
corruption tends to reduce political trust and economic satisfaction tends to enhance it. Yet we still 
do not know enough about how these variables interact. This study contributes most importantly 
to the literature by considering the possibility that people trade off concerns about corruption in 
good economic times across a diverse regime spectrum.  Although introducing different regime 
types complicates the theory of corruption tradeoff, it is a fruitful complication, allowing us to test 
the generalizability of a theory in environments with dissimilar rent seeking arrangements. Great 
theories explain a lot with a little. In seeking to explain more, “the persuasiveness of a theory 
depends not only on how many facts are explained, but also on how diverse are the kinds of facts 
explained” (Olson 1982, 13). If we begin to ask why leaders get re-elected despite corruption in 
clientelist democracies, it is not a far step to ask why political institutions maintain support despite 
corruption of different varieties across different regime types and cultures. Indeed, it would be odd 
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to suggest that rational tradeoffs of corruption concerns for material gains are only a Latin 
American phenomenon, or, alternatively, that people of select cultures are immune to such 
incentive structures. If commonalities exist across many societies, we will better understand why 
governments with poorly functioning institutions tend to succeed in both democratic and non-
democratic environments. Such an analysis can help illuminate why some societies get stuck in 
the process of development. In what follows, I will provide an empirical test of the theory of 








4 Chapter 4: A Revision of the Theory of Corruption Tradeoff  
4.1 Introduction9  
 In this chapter, I will provide an empirical test of the theory of corruption tradeoff outlined 
in Chapter 3. Before proceeding, I will restate my key hypotheses.  
H1: Corruption perceivers will trust political institutions when they believe they have 
received gains to their material wellbeing and when they are confident about the 
performance of the economy in their country. 
 H2: Corruption perceivers in autocracies will trust political institutions more than their   
 counterparts in democracies, either due to lacking notions of accountability or repression. 
 H3: Less educated corruption perceivers will trust political institutions more than highly 
 educated corruption perceivers. 
4.2 Data and Variables 
 In the following section I will elaborate on the variable choices I discussed in Chapter 3. 
To reiterate my data source, I use the Life in Transition Survey II (LITS II) produced by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. The cross-
sectional sample from late 2010 surveys almost 39,000 households in 35 countries to assess public 
attitudes on a range of social, political and economic variables.10 Two –stage clustered, stratified 
                                                          
9 Supplementary materials for this chapter are available in Appendix B. 
10 Specifically, the sample I use includes (with number of respondents interviewed in each country in parentheses) 
Albania (1029), Armenia (953), Azerbaijan (988), Belarus (895), Bosnia (1075), Bulgaria (1007), Croatia (997), 
Czech Republic (1007), Estonia (989), Georgia (959), Hungary (1031), Kazakhstan (943), Kosovo (1083), 
Kyrgyzstan (992), Latvia (1004), Lithuania (1003), Macedonia (1060), Moldova (1023), Mongolia (981), 
Montenegro (970), Poland (1587), Romania (1068), Russia (1550), Serbia (1506), Slovakia (995), Slovenia (988), 
Tajikistan (996), Turkey (1004), Ukraine (1547), Uzbekistan (1417) 
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sampling was employed across regions in each country.11 I analyze thirty countries including all 
of Eastern Europe and the hard to reach former Soviet states across Central Asia. 
4.2.1 Coding for Political Trust 
 To measure political trust, I use the standard LITS question on political trust: “To what 
extent do you trust the following institutions?” Response choices range from complete distrust (1) 
to complete trust (5). For preliminary models, I construct my dependent variable as a simple sum 
score of trust in the government/cabinet of ministers, parliament, local government and political 
parties.  I rescaled this 5-point measure to run from 0-100 for ease of interpretation. I ran a multiple 
group confirmatory factor analysis to gain confidence about the cross-country measurement 
equivalence of this combination of indicators in Chapter 2, and will presently run a robustness 
check in a SEM framework using the latent factor of political trust rather than the sum score. To 
consider incumbent support, I will cross-check my results using trust in the presidency as a 
dependent variable only in the ten countries in my sample with presidential or semi-presidential 
systems (that is, where the president exercises real, not symbolic power).12 The presidency is not 
a clear measure of the president himself in these countries, but it is the closest approximation 
available in the survey to incumbent support.  Finally, I cross-check my results against a measure 
of political trust in which I omit the ‘trust in the local government’ indicator to limit the analysis 
to federal level political institutions. This simpler measure is also equivalent in meaning across 
this set of countries (see Chapter 2). 
                                                          
11 See the full methodological report on the EBRD website: http://www.ebrd.com/news/publications/special-
reports/life-in-transition-survey-ii.html  
12 These countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan 
and Ukraine. Uzbekistan could not be included due to omission of the presidential trust question.  
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4.2.2 Coding for Corruption 
 To measure corruption, I create an additive index of a question gaging perceptions of petty 
corruption: “In your opinion, how often do people like you have to make unofficial payments or 
gifts in these situations?” a) Interacting with road police; b) Requesting official documents; c) 
Going to courts for a civil matter, d) Receiving public education, e) Receiving medical treatment 
in public health system, f) Requesting unemployment benefits; and g) Requesting other social 
security benefits. I ran a preliminary exploratory factor analysis in each country to assess possible 
inconsistencies in response patterns to this set of indicators. All indicators overwhelmingly load 
on a single factor, suggesting that people have a general awareness of corruption in society which 
informs their views of bribe taking across specific institutions. No alternative factor showed strong 
enough loadings to justify investigating conceptually separate dimensions of petty corruption 
perceptions across countries. 
 This index is heavily right skewed, with a mean of 19.4 points out of 100. To better observe 
its effects across its range, I split the variable into terciles of corruption (‘1’ referring to the subset 
of the sample which did not perceive any necessity of bribery, ‘2’ referring to the subset with low-
medium corruption perceptions, and ‘3’ referring the subset with high corruption perceptions).13 I 
run my analysis both with this categorical variable and with a simpler dummy variable in which 
‘1’ refers to the top tercile (the third of the sample with the highest corruption perceptions) and ‘0’ 
refers to the bottom two terciles (the two-thirds of the sample with mild or moderate corruption 
                                                          
13 Approximately one third (34.54 percent) of the sample recorded no corruption perceptions. This made splitting 
the corruption perceptions scale into thirds more intuitive, allowing us to better isolate the highest third of corruption 






perceptions). Because the results do not substantively differ between the two, I present my results 
using this simpler dummy variable.  
4.2.3 Coding for Economic Context, Regime Type and Controls 
 I use four main measures of economic context. To measure pocketbook evaluations, I use 
the question asking respondents to agree or disagree (on a 5-point scale) with the statement “I am 
satisfied with my financial situation as a whole.” I measure sociotropic assessments of the 
economy with a question asking respondents to agree or disagree with the statement “on the whole, 
I am satisfied with the present state of the economy.” Finally, although there are no data about 
income, I proxy personal wealth with a question about average monthly consumption: 
“approximately how much does your household spend on each of these items per month? a) food, 
beverages and tobacco, b) utilities (electricity, water, gas, heating, fixed line phone), and c) 
transportation (public transportation, fuel for car). Instead of considering a continuous measure of 
consumption, I split the measure into consumption quartiles within each country to examine non-
linearities in the trust-corruption relationship across levels of consumption. Finally, I use a more 
subjective measure of income, which I refer to as the “ladder question”: “Please imagine a ten-
step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest 10% of people in our country, and 
on the highest step, the tenth, stand the richest 10 percent of people in our country. On which step 
of the ten is your household today?” I split the ten steps into five to ease interpretation. To help 
balance out observations in each category, my categorical variable marks “1” for those who placed 
themselves on steps 1 or 2 (13.96 percent of respondents), ‘2’ on steps 3 or 4 (37.23 percent of 
respondents), ‘3’ on step 5 (27.91 percent of respondents), ‘4’ on steps 6 or 7 (17.63 percent of 
respondents) and ‘5’ on steps 8 and above (3.28 percent of respondents). I complement these 
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measures with robustness checks using measures of life satisfaction, retrospective and prospective 
evaluations of the economy.14 
 To measure regime effects, I use Polity Scores from 2010, creating three categories of 
autocracy, anocracy and democracy. My sample contains four autocracies (Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan), five anocracies (Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Bosnia, Armenia) and 
21 democracies. Polity scores can be criticized for their atheoretical content, particularly the notion 
of ‘anocracy’ which falls vaguely in the middle of the regime spectrum. In the current sample, this 
middle category captures several semi-authoritarian states and maps broadly onto 2010 Freedom 
House scores. By looking at all three categories, we can assess the extent to which the middle 
category differs from the most repressive countries. If at least some political freedom results in 
different assessments of corruption, we will have more room to manoeuver with theory building 
about which characteristics of regimes affect public opinion. Despite bones we might pick with 
the middle category, the classification of autocracies and democracies in this sample is not 
controversial according available regime indices.    
 Before proceeding with the analysis, I checked for the potential clustering of high 
corruption perceptions in the least economically satisfied strata of the sample. I found, however, 
that there is no great variation in levels of corruption perceptions across levels of satisfaction with 
personal finances (at sat=1, mean corruption is 18.59 out of 100, at sat=2, mean corruption is 
19.297, at sat=3, mean corruption is 20.218 and at sat=4, mean corruption is 19.654). Corruption 
perceptions are also relatively evenly distributed by levels of satisfaction with the national 
economy and consumption quartiles. Corruption perceptions are, predictably, not evenly 
                                                          
14 See Appendix B for the full set of robustness checks. 
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distributed by regime type: in autocracies, average corruption is 28.64, in anocracies it is 25.84 
and in democracies it is 16.29. This is not a great danger to the analysis but deserves 
acknowledgement. If we find that corruption exerts less influence on political trust in democracies, 
we cannot conclude that this is simply because there is less corruption in democracies. In the 
following analysis, the effects of corruption are assessed by comparing the subset of the sample 
which perceives the highest level of corruption in both democracies and autocracies. Respondents 
in the “high corruption” category should be exposed to similar levels of petty corruption, wherever 
they are located. We would be in some danger if perceptions of bribery meant different things to 
respondents in different regime types, or if reticence has prevented open or honest responses in 
authoritarian regimes. Although I have argued that this is unlikely to be the case with petty 
corruption perceptions, it remains an empirical question that deserves future study and 
recommends some interpretive caution in the present one.  
4.3 Models and Robustness Checks  
 I begin my analysis with a set of country fixed effects OLS models in which I estimate a 
set of interactions between corruption and economic context, and between corruption and regime 
type. Alongside a vector of sociodemographic controls, I also include interactions between 
corruption and education to determine whether more highly educated corruption perceivers place 
higher penalties on political institutions than less educated corruption perceivers.15 Education is 
                                                          
15 Summarizing the variables of interest, the main specification is: 
  
Political Trustij =  β0 + β1Corrij + β2Econij + β3Regimej  + β4CorrijXEcon ij
+ β5CorrijXRegimej +  β6−36CountryDummiesj + αi + u 
 
where “Corr” is corruption, “Econ” is a measure of economic context or sentiment (such as sociotropic or 
pocketbook evaluations, consumption quartiles or the ladder question) and “Regime” measures regime type. αi 
represents a vector of individual level controls which include age, age squared, household size, urban and capital 
dwellers, education and its interaction with corruption. 
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split into three categories to separate those who have obtained at most primary, secondary and 
post-secondary level educations. While I include all interactions together, I re-ran my analysis with 
each interaction separately, ensuring that the interpretation presented here is accurate. Given the 
categorical nature of my independent variables, this OLS model is similar to ANOVA, the simplest 
and most parsimonious test of the theory. I test this model for robustness against other economic 
variables (mentioned above) and model specifications, the results of which are available in 
Appendix B. 
 With regards to alternative specifications, I test for robustness against a set of two-level 
models in which the effect of corruption perceptions on trust varies across the 30 countries. Doing 
so removes the unrealistic assumption in the OLS models that corruption has a fixed influence on 
political trust across countries and corrects for spatial autocorrelation among individuals clustered 
in the same territory. The intra-class correlation (ICC) indicates that approximately 28 percent of 
variation in the trust-corruption relationship is attributable to country-level characteristics. A 
likelihood ratio test confirms that a multilevel structure is appropriate (p<0.000), justifying the 
random coefficient specification. I also check the original OLS specifications in a single and two-
level structural equations (SEM) framework in which I substitute the political trust sum score with 
a metrically invariant latent factor based on the same indicators (trust in the government, 
parliament, local government and political parties). This specification controls for the portion of 
the political trust latent factor which cannot explain variation among the chosen indicators. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, implementing such “controls” helps us separate actual political trust levels 
from noise associated with their cross-country measurement.16 I also include robustness checks 
against OLS models with standard error adjustments for survey weights. Because the results do 
                                                          
16 See Westfall and Yarkoni (2016) 
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not substantively differ between these specifications, I present only the fixed effects OLS models 
below and leave the results of the robustness checks in Appendix B.  
4.4 Results   
 A baseline country-fixed effects model with no interactions (Table 4.1) shows that there is 
a very strong correlation between economic sentiment and political trust. People who are very 
satisfied with their personal finances (scoring 4 or 5 on a scale of 1-5) trust political institutions 
19-21 points more (on a scale of 1-100) than those who are very unsatisfied (scoring 1). People 
who are very satisfied with the national economy trust political institutions by 25-26 points more 
than those who are very unsatisfied. These steep effects are highly significant and robust across all 
model specifications.  
8 Table 4.1 Baseline OLS with country fixed effects, no interactions  












-2.462*** (0.325) -3.640*** (0.373) -3.504*** (0.341) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 8.295*** (0.460) 10.052*** (0.396) -0.689 (0.471) 5.301*** (0.491) 
3 14.143*** (0.471) 19.754*** (0.451) -0.491 (0.488) 9.154*** (0.518) 
4 19.671*** (0.494) 26.007*** (0.505) -2.073*** (0.522) 13.336*** (0.570) 
5 21.287*** (0.864) 25.173*** (0.923) N/A 16.266*** (0.917) 
Anocracy -11.022*** (1.284) -9.996*** (1.240) -12.065*** (1.471) -11.435*** (1.305) 
Democracy -44.001*** (1.131) -41.394*** (1.105) -44.595*** (1.269) -46.945*** (1.159) 
Middle Ed 0.246 (0.392) 1.187*** (0.379) 1.220*** (0.437) 0.212 (0.400) 
Upper Ed 0.114 (0.412) 1.689*** (0.397) 2.075*** (0.460) 0.281 (0.423) 
R2 0.323 0.359 0.270 0.289 
N 23313 23253 20383 23538 
Note: Controlled for female, age, age squared, household size, urban and capital dwellers (see Appendix B2 for full table). 




 It appears that sociotropic perceptions of the national economy have a slightly stronger 
effect on political trust than assessments of personal wellbeing or financial satisfaction, which is 
consistent with the literature. A slightly less pronounced effect is evident in the ladder question: 
people who perceive themselves at least above average in wealth trust political institutions 13-16 
points more than those on the bottom rungs of the ladder. A measure of consumption quartiles, the 
least subjective indicator, does not show any trust-promoting effect. People in the top consumption 
quartile of their country tend to trust political institutions by two points less than those in the 
bottom quartile. This negative effect tends to vary in significance and remains substantively 
negligible across different model specifications.  
 On average, people who perceive the most amount of corruption trust political institutions 
less by 3-5 points than those who perceive little to no corruption. Does the extraordinary economic 
stimulus to political trust wipe out this corrosive influence of corruption? It appears that the answer 
is overwhelmingly no (Table 4.2). It is not the case in almost any model that satisfaction with 
personal finances, the national economy, life satisfaction, prospective or retrospective economic 
hope makes individuals less punitive of corruption. The same goes for income status: people in 
higher consumption quartiles or on higher steps of the ladder are not more tolerant of corruption 
than those who consume less or believe they are less well off. Almost all interaction coefficients 





9 Table 4.2 OLS with country fixed effects 












-5.026*** (1.377) -7.054*** (1.443) -8.441*** (1.489) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 8.875*** (0.559) 10.183*** (0.484) -0.396 (0.568) 4.995*** (0.588) 
3 14.441*** (0.574) 20.289*** (0.545) -0.276 (0.588) 8.839*** (0.622) 
4 19.006*** (0.598) 25.543*** (0.613) -2.000*** (0.627) 13.296*** (0.688) 
5 21.586*** (1.030) 25.761*** (1.121) N/A 15.365*** (1.148) 
Corr x 1 (Ref) 
Corr x Sat. with 
financial situation 
Corr x Sat. with 
national economy 
Corr x consumption 
quartiles 
Corr x ladder 
 
Corr x 2 -1.836* (0.970) -0.373 (0.822) -1.009 (0.989) 0.943 (1.056) 
Corr x 3 -0.966 (0.975) -1.630* (0.918) -0.776 (0.986) 0.928 (1.094) 
Corr x 4 1.821* (1.014) 1.172 (0.996) -0.409 (1.000) 0.112 (1.176) 
Corr x 5 -1.238 (1.851) -1.880 (1.911) N/A 2.419 (1.865) 
Ref=Autocracy 
Anocracy -12.707*** (1.369) -11.758*** (1.329) -14.113*** (1.581) -13.237*** (1.391) 
Democracy -45.395*** (1.175) -42.514*** (1.155) -45.693*** (1.316) -48.317*** (1.201) 
Corr x Anoc 4.873*** (1.305) 4.813*** (1.290) 5.801*** (1.495) 5.868*** (1.335) 
Corr x Democ 4.407*** (1.118) 3.608*** (1.121) 4.145*** (1.262) 5.035*** (1.146) 
Middle Ed 0.270 (0.466) 1.299*** (0.452) 1.162** (0.522) 0.248 (0.476) 
Upper Ed 0.585 (0.484) 2.063*** (0.467) 2.164*** (0.544) 0.672 (0.496) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.155 (0.793) -0.439 (0.769) 0.125 (0.884) -0.188 (0.812) 
Upper Ed x Corr -1.309* (0.784) -1.107 (0.760) -0.180 (0.878) -1.068 (0.803) 
R2 0.324 0.361 0.271 0.289 
N 23313 23253 20383 23538 
Note: The 1-5 column indicates survey responses from 1 to 5 on each economic sentiment variable, consumption quartile or 
step of the ladder (see column headings) “High corruption” is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the top tercile of the 
corruption perceptions distribution and 0 indicates the bottom two terciles (those who perceive little to no corruption). This 
dummy variable is interacted with each category of economic context and regime type. Key interaction effects are in bold. 
Controlled for female, age, age squared, household size, urban and capital dwellers (see Appendix B3 for full table). Standard 
errors in parentheses.  *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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 In fact, a few models hint at the opposite effect. There is some evidence that people who 
express at least some satisfaction with their financial situation are more punitive of corruption than 
those who express no satisfaction with their financial situation. This is particularly evident if we 
examine presidential, rather than general political trust in the subset of 10 semi or fully presidential 
countries in the sample (Table 4.3). High corruption perceivers (that is, those in the top tercile of 
the corruption perceptions distribution) who score a 4 out of 5 on satisfaction with personal 
finances trust the presidency 4.2 points (out of 100) less than high corruption perceivers who are 
least satisfied with their personal finances. High corruption perceivers who are maximally satisfied 
(scoring a 5 out of 5) with personal finances trust the presidency 9.1 points less than high 
corruption perceivers who are least satisfied. The same trend appears for sociotropic economic 
sentiments: high corruption perceivers who score a 4 out of 5 on satisfaction with the national 
economy trust the presidency 4.3 points less than high corruption perceivers who are least satisfied, 
and high corruption perceivers who score a 5 out of 5 on satisfaction trust the presidency 12.4 
points less than high corruption perceivers who are least satisfied. High corruption perceivers are 
no different from their ‘low or no’ corruption perceivers at low levels of economic satisfaction, 
but at higher levels of both pocketbook and sociotropic economic satisfaction (scores of 4 or 5), 
high corruption perceivers are significantly less trusting of the presidency than ‘low or no’ 
corruption perceivers. From this we can infer that the political toll of petty corruption gets heavier, 
not weaker, as economic sentiments improve. We do not observe this trend for consumption 
quartiles or the ladder question. Ultimately, even if dictators are credited with growing the 
economy or handing out occasional spoils, they are not only not given a pass for petty corruption 
among people satisfied with their (or their country’s) economic situation, they appear to be held 
even closer to account. 
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Within this analysis of trust in the presidency, we also observe different conditioning 
effects at the macro and micro levels of economic evaluation. National economic conditions appear 
to be a benchmark against which citizens judge presidential performance more readily than 
personal economic conditions. If one’s country is experiencing high levels of economic growth, 
one presumably begins to demand more of the president; the national context can inspire blame 
attribution for corruption on the national leader. With a weaker interaction coefficient, perceptions 
of household economic performance do not translate into presidential penalties quite as easily. 
From this finding, one could posit that household income is not a critical contributor to institutional 
and presidential trust. Indeed, one could go further in hypothesizing that higher income corruption 
perceivers should be less likely to punish the presidency because they are better positioned to 
remove themselves from the state by seeking private governance solutions and avoiding contact 
with petty corruption altogether. Lower income corruption perceivers would in turn be expected 
to increase their presidential penalty because they depend more on state service provision and are 
more likely to suffer from petty corruption. The results in Table 4.3 show, however, that income 
indicators (both proxies for consumption and the ladder question) do not moderate the corruption-
trust link. Citizens are more likely to impose penalties on political authorities in their trust 
assessments because they believe something about their economic conditions, not because they are 
experiencing a certain economic reality. This finding depends on an endogenous relationship 
between three attitudinal variables and certainly requires interpretive caution. At the same time, 
we have reason to believe that relatively objective income indicators have little to do with 
corruption perceivers’ orientations toward the state. 
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10 Table 4.3 Presidential Trust, 10 countries, OLS with country fixed effects 












-0.248 (1.428) -2.952** (1.469) -1.558 (1.608) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 10.942*** (1.171) 12.871*** (1.139) 1.203 (1.251) 5.741*** (1.149) 
3 16.648*** (1.234) 22.473*** (1.261) -0.082 (1.316) 11.903*** (1.279) 
4 22.656*** (1.339) 29.604*** (1.384) -0.485 (1.398) 13.963*** (1.528) 
5 23.618*** (2.723) 30.030*** (3.043) N/A 14.718*** (3.363) 
Ref= Corr x 1 
 
Corr x Sat. with 
financial situation 
Corr x Sat. with 
national economy 
Corr x consumption 
quartiles 
Corr x ladder 
 
Corr x 2 -1.909 (1.878) -1.352 (1.777) -2.220 (1.976) -1.892 (1.866) 
Corr x 3 -1.181 (1.941) -3.032 (1.915) 0.810 (1.985) -4.121** (2.013) 
Corr x 4 -4.243** (2.053) -4.321** (2.012) 0.549 (2.012) -3.430 (2.301) 
Corr x 5 -9.078** (4.263) -12.379*** (4.301) N/A -2.271 (4.728) 
Anocracy -30.384*** (1.568) -29.715*** (1.549) -34.878*** (1.754) -32.839*** (1.573) 
Democracy -37.483*** (1.337) -33.425*** (1.344) -41.377*** (1.443) -39.099*** (1.357) 
Middle Ed 1.759* (0.968) 2.448*** (0.954) 2.442** (1.067) 1.623* (0.979) 
Upper Ed -0.487 (0.941) 0.713 (0.928) 0.735 (1.045) -0.499 (0.956) 
R2 0.415 0.438 0.391 0.392 
N 8048 7931 6955 8140 
Note: The 1-5 column indicates survey responses from 1 to 5 on each economic sentiment variable, consumption quartile or 
step of the ladder (see column headings) “High corruption” is a dummy variable where 1 indicates the top tercile of the 
corruption perceptions distribution and 0 indicates the bottom two terciles (those who perceive little to no corruption). This 
dummy variable is interacted with each category of economic context. Key interaction effects are in bold. Controlled for 
female, age, age squared, household size, urban and capital dwellers (see Appendix B5 for full table). Standard errors in 
parentheses.  *p< 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 Returning to general political trust in the full sample, I decided to test if the tradeoff effect 
might be contextual. When evaluating political institutions, individuals most likely do not judge 
their material conditions in a vacuum; they are inevitably influenced by how they are doing relative 
to others. If the town has generally fallen into an economic slump and everyone around appears to 
be suffering, one’s personal financial circumstances might matter less for the way she evaluates 
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corruption and political institutions. Furthermore, politicians deliver spoils or economic growth to 
regions rather than individuals. To assess this contextual effect, I looked at how local economic 
conditions might moderate high corruption perceivers’ penalties on political institutions by 
breaking the sample into 444 subnational regions with an average of 54 people per region. A 
variance components analysis indicates that there is significant variation in the trust-corruption 
relationship across these regions. Political trust responses between two people in the same region 
have a .34 correlation, whereas responses between two people in the same country but different 
regions have a .24 correlation. Local context appears to matter. I tested whether people’s tendency 
to reduce political trust for corruption depends on the overall proportion of people who are very 
satisfied with their personal finances or the economy, or the proportion of people who rank 
themselves on top of the ladder in their locality. Once again, however, the interaction effects are 
all negligible and insignificant for each variable and across the range of the variable (Table 4.4). 
While good economic conditions and optimism at home consistently boost political trust, people 
who perceive high levels of corruption do not reduce their penalty on political institutions when 
their locality appears to be prospering. 
 
11 Table 4.4 Three-Level Analysis, Contextual Effects 
DV=Political Trust scaled 1-100, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Regional 
Proportion Most 
Satisfied with Personal 
Finances 
Model 2: Regional 
Proportion Most 
Satisfied with National 
Economy 
Model 3: Regional 
Proportion on Steps 6-10 




-3.788* (2.213) -6.848*** (1.982) 
Economic Context (see column heading)  
2 7.776*** (0.452) 9.489*** (0.393) 4.759*** (0.481) 
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3 13.241*** (0.465) 18.618*** (0.451) 8.576*** (0.511) 
4 18.754*** (0.492) 24.760*** (0.507) 12.206*** (0.569) 
5 20.391*** (0.851) 24.029*** (0.916) 15.462*** (0.909) 
Regional Proportion 4.201 (3.747) 9.932** (3.947) 4.142 (3.494) 
Corr x Regional 
Proportion 2.193 (3.631) -2.039 (3.628) 1.714 (3.672) 
Middle Ed -0.296 (0.456) 0.671 (0.444) -0.317 (0.466) 
Upper Ed 0.308 (0.478) 1.747*** (0.463) 0.536 (0.489) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.623 (0.794) -0.879 (0.775) -0.527 (0.809) 
Upper Ed x Corr -1.834** (0.807) -1.771** (0.788) -1.703** (0.824) 
Anocracy -18.698*** (6.192) -13.313*** (5.020) -19.901*** (7.010) 
Democracy -24.722*** (5.005) -17.463*** (4.117) -27.134*** (5.655) 
Corr x Anoc 5.405** (2.239) 4.518** (2.275) 5.792** (2.342) 
Corr x Democ 3.796** (1.765) 2.599 (1.920) 4.072** (1.798) 
ICC (at region) 0.23 0.18 0.26 
N 23313 23253 23538 
Note: In this three-level analysis, there are 30 countries and 444 subnational regions with an average of 52.5 
observations per region. The ‘regional proportion’ variable calculates the proportion of individuals in each 
region who scored a 4 or 5 (out of 5) on satisfaction with personal finances or the national economy, or steps 
6-10 (out of 10) on the income ladder. A variance components analysis indicates that there is significant 
variation in the trust-corruption relationship on both country and regional levels. The intra-class correlation 
(ICC) of political trust responses at the region level is .34 (or the correlation of responses between two people 
in the same region). The regional ICC in this table indicates the correlation between two people after accounting 
for region-level proportions of economically satisfied strata in the sample. Controlled for female, age, age 
squared, household size, urban and capital dwellers (see Appendix B10 for full table). Standard errors in 
parentheses.  *p< 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
  
 What role does the regime type play? Firstly, it should be noted that dwellers of 
democracies are consistently and dramatically less trusting of political institutions than dwellers 
of autocracies. In most country fixed effects models, this difference in political trust between the 
regime types hovers around an impressive 45 (out of 100) points. In models without country 
dummies, the difference remains near 25 points. Even more surprising, the regime type plays a 
significant moderating role in the way high corruption perceivers penalize political institutions, 
but not quite in the way I hypothesized. Across all models, dwellers of democracies or anocracies 
129 
 
who perceive a high level of corruption are significantly more, not less trusting of political 
institutions than dwellers of autocracies. This is among the most significant and stable outcomes 
across all model specifications, with and without country dummies. Looking at the variance 
components, the regime effect tends to cut down variation in the trust-corruption relationship 
across countries by more than half. This moderating effect is modest, but consistent and significant, 
venturing above a one percent significance level only in a couple of regressions. In almost all 
models, high corruption perceivers in autocracies trust political institutions between 4-6 points 
(out of 100) less than high corruption perceivers in democracies and anocracies.  
 What can we say about the ambiguous territory of the “anocracy” which contains Russia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Bosnia and Armenia? On the whole, these countries do not behave entirely 
like democracies or full-fledged autocracies, which somewhat vindicates their separation from the 
others. On average, citizens of these countries tend to trust the presidency less than citizens of 
autocracies by 30-34 points out of 100, a similar magnitude of difference as that between 
democracies and autocracies. Their evaluations of political institutions soften: citizens of 
anocracies trust political institutions less than citizens of autocracies, but only by 12-14 points. 
Semi-authoritarian leaders receive decidedly less support from their populations than fully 
authoritarian leaders. We should pause, however, in concluding that autocracies elicit high trust 
responses through repression. As shown above, citizens of autocracies who register widespread 
corruption report less trust in government than high-corruption perceivers in freer societies.  
 Does education have a moderating role in the trust-corruption relationship? It appears not. 
Across all models and specifications, education has almost nothing to do with political trust or the 
way people penalize political institutions for corruption. The effect of education is consistently 
close to zero and usually statistically insignificant. This null effect holds when I look at a simple 
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baseline with no interactions and a model with only education interactions. Part of the reason might 
be the influence of state propaganda in schools on the authoritarian part of the regime spectrum. 
The trust-mobilizing tendencies of these educational institutions might be canceling out the trust-
eroding tendencies of those in more open political systems. This possibility remains to be explored 
in the future. 
4.5 Discussion 
 In this study, I hypothesized 1) that high corruption perceivers in the former Soviet space 
will trust political institutions more when they are experiencing a flourishing economy or 
improvement in material conditions and 2) that high corruption perceivers in autocracies will trust 
their political institutions more than their counterparts in democracies. I found evidence for neither 
hypothesis. Despite the extraordinary influence of economic sentiment and material wellbeing on 
political trust, people who perceive more corruption in society do not reduce penalties on political 
institutions in good economic times. If anything, they enhance penalties as they get better off, 
particularly when evaluating the presidency. Similarly, despite the fact that citizens of autocracies 
are on average much more trusting of political institutions than citizens of democracies, high 
corruption perceivers in autocracies consistently place higher penalties on political institutions 
than high corruption perceivers in democracies. How can we explain these unexpected outcomes? 
The results of each hypothesis test have separate implications for the theory of corruption tradeoff 
and for the study of authoritarian political legitimacy. I will take each in turn. 
4.5.1 Implications for the Theory of Corruption Tradeoff 
 It would be misleading to suggest that these results are entirely at odds with the theory of 
corruption tradeoff prevalently supported in Latin American clientelist democracies. I was able to 
obtain replication materials for Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga’s (2013) study of corruption 
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tradeoff in 19 Latin American presidential systems to see whether the results would change if I 
changed the locus of corruption. The authors premise their study on a measure asking survey 
respondents whether they think “corruption among public officials” is common or uncommon. As 
I argued before, it is difficult to understand the meaning of their strong positive interaction 
coefficients given the lack of clarity in the meaning of the corruption measure across countries. 
But supposing the authors are correct—that people across Latin America who believe there is a 
good deal of “corruption among public officials” are prone reduce penalties on their presidents in 
good economic times—do people respond the same way if they have encountered a great deal of 
petty corruption? I replicated ZZC’s study, changing the corruption measure to one of three petty 
corruption measures: 1) government bribe victimization measured by the question “In the last 
twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?” This is a dummy variable, 1 
for “yes” (5.48 percent of respondents) and 0 for “no”; 2) local bribe victimization, a dummy 
variable indicating 1 for respondents who reported that they were asked to pay a bribe either at 
school, hospital or work in the last 12 months (49.07 percent have and 50.93 have not); and 3) high 
local bribe victimization, a dummy variable indicating 1 for respondents who reported being asked 
to pay a bribe in all three of the above places (school, hospital and work) in the last 12 months 
(7.18 percent of respondents).  
 Consistent with ZZC’s findings, there is no evidence of a significant interaction effect 
between measures of petty corruption and pocketbook evaluations of the economy (Table 4.5). 
Bribe victims of the government or local bureaucracies across Latin America neither increase nor 
decrease their presidential approval as they become more satisfied with their personal finances.  
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12 Table 4.5  Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) Replication 
 ZZC Fully 
Interacted Model 
My replication with 
govbribe 
My replication with 
locbribe 




-11.52*** (1.62) -4.54** (1.84) 4.22*** (1.06) -1.01 (1.45) 
Pocketbook Eval 5.86 (2.39) 8.29*** (0.89) 7.97*** (1.27) 8.13*** (0.89) 
Sociotropic Eval 18.06*** (0.203) 26.76*** (0.84) 31.49*** (1.17) 27.13*** (0.86) 
Corr x Pocketbook 2.80 (2.98) 2.17 (3.28) 0.78 (1.64) 5.62** (2.82) 
Corr x Sociotropic 11.17*** (2.58) 2.88 (2.93) -9.23*** (1.49) -2.37 (2.33) 
Voted for Incumb 12.10*** (0.353) 12.66*** (0.35) 12.61*** (0.35) 12.64*** (0.35) 
Income -4.22*** (0.84) -4.42*** (0.80) -4.63*** (0.79) -4.62*** (0.79) 
Age -1.61*** (0.491) -0.44*** (0.09) -0.42*** (0.09) -0.43*** (0.09) 
Female 1.00*** (0.276) 0.97*** (0.26) 1.06*** (0.26) 1.02*** (0.25) 
Education -2.39*** (0.679) -3.22*** (0.67) -3.23*** (0.67) -3.38*** (0.67) 
Urban -0.37 (0.448) -0.68 (0.45) -0.73 (0.44) -0.73 (0.45) 
R Sq. .28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
N 27311 28464 28594 28594 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p< 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. DV= Presidential approval. Govbribe= 
government bribe victimization, locbribe= local bribe victimization, highbribe= high local bribe victimization 
(see p. 128 for variable descriptions). In this replication, ZZC get a significant positive interaction between grand 
corruption and sociotropic economic evaluations which helps mitigate the negative effect of corruption on 
presidential approval. We expect to see similarly positive interactions with measures of petty corruption in the 
replication columns but do not observe them. A full table with interactions across the range of both pocketbook 
and sociotropic evaluations is available in Appendix B11.  
 
 There is a significant positive interaction coefficient between high bribe victimization and 
pocketbook economic evaluations, but the upward climb of the interaction term across levels of 
pocketbook satisfaction is not significant at any level of satisfaction (Appendix B11). Not 
consistent with ZZC’s findings but consistent with my own, there is a significant negative 
interaction between local bribe victimization and sociotropic economic evaluations. This means 
that bribe victims become more critical of the president as they become more satisfied with the 
national economy. To understand the full extent of this decreasing trust, I looked at the interaction 
across the range of economic satisfaction (Appendix B11). Bribe victims who score a 2 out of 5 
on satisfaction with the national economy approve of the president 3.5 points less than bribe 
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victims who are least satisfied. Bribe victims who score a 3 out of 5 approve 6.02 points less than 
the least satisfied, bribe victims who score a 4 out of 5 approve 6.8 points less than the least 
satisfied, and bribe victims who score a 5 out of 5 on satisfaction approve 12.37 points less than 
the least satisfied. Each of these differences in approval among bribe victims at different levels of 
satisfaction is significant at the 0.01 level. A similar negative interaction effect is observable for 
victims of high bribe victimization (those who had to pay a bribe at school, work and hospital), 
but because there are fewer observations on this variable, the standard errors are much bigger at 
high levels of economic satisfaction, making it difficult to infer the real interaction estimate in the 
population. Bribe victims of the government in general (a vaguer question which does not inquire 
about what sort of government interaction took place) are neither more approving nor disapproving 
of the president at higher levels of economic satisfaction.  
 On the whole, this is consistent with my current analysis: good economic times do not buoy 
presidential approval among corruption perceivers. Perhaps the most interesting addendum to 
ZZC’s findings is that even if people are more likely to ignore grand corruption in good times, 
they are actually likely to become more concerned about petty corruption. That is, they might 
forgive politicians for scandals or misuses of public funds (although precisely what constitutes 
corruption across Latin American countries remains unclear) but may also become more 
displeased with the institutional decay at the bottom. One possible reason for this finding is that 
grand corruption might be capable of producing economic gains for people in a clientelist system, 
whereas corruption at the bottom of the system which strips people of personal resources only 
becomes more repugnant as they get better off.   
But what exact mechanism accounts for this repeated and theoretically surprising 
presidential penalty at high levels of economic satisfaction? While data limitations prevent a 
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comprehensive investigation of this question, the LITS survey does afford us an opportunity to 
test preliminary explanations. One possible reason for this finding is that economically satisfied 
corruption perceivers are more likely to hold the presidency accountable because they can 
increasingly afford to develop better standards for governance. Evidence of this “improving 
standards” or “postmaterial values” effect could be detected if we observe that economically 
satisfied corruption perceivers score higher on indicators of political accountability or postmaterial 
values than similarly economically satisfied “low or no” corruption perceivers (or less satisfied 
corruption perceivers). If this effect is absent, however, then we can most likely rule out the 
possibility that the steeper presidential penalty in this particular substratum of the population has 
to do with postmaterial values or improving standards for governance. 
 Improving standards or postmaterial values can be proxied by a number of questions in the 
LITS survey. Specifically, I tested 1) whether highly satisfied corruption perceivers are more likely 
to agree with the statement “As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of 
our authorities” (as opposed to “in our country today, we should show more respect for our 
authorities”); 2) whether they are more likely to agree with the statement “democracy is preferable 
to any other form of political system” (as opposed to the statements “under some circumstances, 
an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one” and “for people like me, it 
does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritarian”); 3) whether they are more 
likely to believe that “elections are necessary” for leaders of local and regional administrations (as 
opposed to believing that “leaders should be appointed” or “it does not matter”); and 4) whether 
they are more likely to believe that certain behaviors like “a public official asking for a favor or 
gift in return of services” or “buying a university degree that one has not earned” are seriously 
wrong (on a scale from “not wrong at all” to “seriously wrong”). 
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 The results indicate that the higher presidential penalty among highly satisfied corruption 
perceivers does not stem from an underlying postmaterial attitudinal basis (See Appendices B12-
B15 for descriptive statistics, results and descriptions of the probit models). It appears that people 
who are increasingly satisfied with the economy (both at the national and household levels) are in 
fact marginally less likely to have an absolute or relative belief that citizens should be more active 
in questioning the actions of their authorities than their less economically satisfied counterparts. 
At the same time, however, corruption perceivers do not differ in critical attitudes toward authority 
from non-corruption perceivers at any level of economic satisfaction. The lack of an interaction 
suggests that economic satisfaction does not influence corruption perceivers’ presidential attitudes 
through a change in their underlying orientations toward authority. A “postmaterial effect” of this 
kind might still be in play over time, but we do not observe differences in such authority 
orientations among different economically satisfied strata in the cross-sectional sample. 
 The same null interaction effect occurs among the other “postmaterial” proxies. 
Economically satisfied corruption perceivers (at both national and household levels) are not more 
likely than similarly satisfied ‘low or no’ corruption perceivers to believe in democracy, desire 
elections for local or regional governments or believe that certain traditionally “corrupt” practices 
are seriously wrong. Nor is there a difference on these attitudinal indicators between high 
corruption perceivers at different levels of economic satisfaction.  
 Granted the lack of an interaction in these sensitivity checks, we can tentatively rule out 
the possibility that higher standards for governance influence corruption perceivers’ presidential 
approval patterns. If the economically moderated correlation between corruption and presidential 
trust truly arises from corruption resentment, it appears entirely plausible that people simply find 
the necessity to pay bribes at schools, hospitals and other public institutions more jarring and 
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unacceptable in good economic times without adopting particularly sophisticated liberal notions 
of political accountability. Next to new cosmopolitan boulevards and cafes, broken hospitals and 
schools can appear discordant with the improving living conditions, and may inspire blame 
attribution toward the presidency as a matter of pure frustration with festering institutional 
dysfunction. Testing this feeling of enhanced exploitation is difficult with the current survey data. 
We could posit that highly economically satisfied corruption perceivers are more likely to be upset 
with the institutions that force them to pay bribes than their less economically satisfied 
counterparts. One question in the LITS survey inquires precisely about people’s satisfaction with 
the “quality and the efficiency of the service or interaction” which they previously rated on 
corruption. Unfortunately, such questions are of little use because of their high rates of 
nonresponse. Seven out of eight of these survey questions have nonresponse rates above 74 
percent, and only one (a question concerning satisfaction with medical treatment at state hospitals) 
has a lower nonresponse rate (31.32 percent), which still makes for an unreliable indicator in the 
present attempt at a sensitivity check. Testing the perceived enhanced exploitation of corruption 
could benefit from field or lab experimental applications in which corruption perceivers are 
granted the opportunity to express or choose narratives describing the political targets and reasons 
for their blame attribution in good economic times. Such a design would produce results with 
limited external validity, but would certainly aid in teasing out causal mechanisms that we cannot 
identify with the present research design. 
Although the story of the precise mechanism remains underexplored, several findings are 
clear from the above analysis. There is no evidence in either Latin America or the post-Soviet 
space suggesting that people trade off concerns about petty corruption for economic gains. 
Corruption that poses a direct cost to people remains a significant corrosive influence on their 
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presidential approval. Although presidents in Latin America might successfully get away with 
transgressions in good times, they do not manage to fool people about the quality of public 
institutions in their countries. There is also a marginally higher presidential penalty among 
economically satisfied petty corruption perceivers in both empirical contexts, although it appears 
that this penalty is not the result of rising standards for governance.  
Implications for Authoritarian Political Legitimacy  
 My findings also have implications for the study of authoritarian political legitimacy. In 
this study I included parts of Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus which appear to be driving 
up the correlation between corruption and political trust across countries in the former Soviet 
space. Inside those countries, however, the story is different. It bears noting that while autocracies 
appear better than democracies at eliciting trust, this is not a uniformly uncritical form of trust. 
Political institutions appear to be seen as more accountable for petty corruption in autocracies than 
democracies. These results would be implausible if citizens of autocracies overwhelmingly 
inflated their trust responses out of fear, if they were governed by a hard-to-measure collectivistic 
culture or if they lacked notions of accountability. Critical attitudes toward authoritarian political 
systems among high corruption perceivers suggest precisely that people respond rationally to 
institutional performance. In fact, given the possibility of preference falsification, the interaction 
estimate in this regression is a conservative one, and the real impact of corruption perceptions on 
trust in autocracies is likely steeper. 
 To diagnose the interaction effect more carefully, I plotted the point estimates of the 
political trust scores among high corruption perceivers by country, maintaining the standard 
sociodemographic controls (Figure 4.1). These estimates represent the extent to which political 
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trust among high corruption perceivers differs from ‘low or no’ corruption perceivers on the 1-100 
trust scale. In over half of the sampled countries, there is no significant difference between the two 
groups. The autocratic effect we observe in the pooled regression is driven primarily by the low 
point estimates in Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan (where the estimated political trust scores are close 
to 10 points lower among high corruption perceivers than ‘low or no’ perceivers—this is about 
twice the effect of the lowest point estimates in other countries.). The corruption effect is actually 
absent in autocracies like Kazakhstan and borderline insignificant in Belarus. At the same time, 
Armenia, Macedonia, Hungary, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia and Ukraine do maintain 
significant corruption effects on trust, even if not quite as steep as those in Uzbekistan and 
Azerbaijan. There remains meaningful variation in corruption responsiveness within the roughly 
cut regime spectrum. Certainly, not all autocracies in general, nor Central Asian autocracies in 
particular, are the same.    
6 Figure 4.1 Political Trust among High Corruption Perceivers by Country 
 
Note: The graph describes point estimates of political trust among those regularly exposed to petty corruption (relative 
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are 95 percent confidence intervals. Example: high corruption perceivers in Azerbaijan trust their political institutions 
approximately 10 points less than ‘low or no’ corruption perceivers in Azerbaijan.  
 
 Granted the relatively steep corruption effect in two of the most authoritarian regimes in 
the sample, my findings are somewhat consistent with Huhe and Tang’s (2016) research on 
political trust in East Asia, which suggests that citizens of autocracies are more sensitive to political 
outcomes than citizens of democracies. The authors argue that in democracies “with 
institutionalized competition, effective electoral procedures, and resultant office alteration, the 
incumbent governments or particular politicians, and not the overall political system, are likely to 
be held accountable for economic performance” (ibid., 5). By contrast, in countries like China and 
Vietnam where power is more concentrated in a few hands, political institutions as a whole take 
more of the blame during economic downturns. 
 It was not a far step to test Huhe and Tang’s hypothesis with more clarity. If citizens of 
autocracies hold political institutions more accountable for corruption, they should also hold them 
more accountable for economic performance. I found preliminary evidence to support this theory, 
again with some nuance (Table 4.6). Citizens of democracies who are maximally satisfied with 
their financial situation (scoring a 5 out of 5 on satisfaction) trust political institutions 5.6 points 
(out of 100) less than those who are maximally satisfied with their financial situation in 
autocracies. Those who score a 4 out of 5 on financial satisfaction in democracies trust political 
institutions 7.5 points less than those who score a 4 out of 5 on financial satisfaction in autocracies. 
The effect is more striking for sociotropic evaluations of the economy. Citizens of democracies 
who are maximally satisfied with the national economy trust political institutions 12.7 points less 
than citizens of autocracies who are maximally satisfied with the national economy. Citizens of 
democracies who score a 4 out of 5 on satisfaction with the national economy trust political 
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institutions 11.8 points less than citizens of autocracies who score a 4 out of 5 on satisfaction with 
the national economy. In fact, every perceived marginal improvement in the country’s economy 
significantly boosts political trust at least 7 points more in autocracies than democracies. The effect 
does not appear for consumption quartiles or the ladder question. Interestingly, there is some 
evidence that citizens of democracies on the highest part of the ladder (steps 8-10) trust political 
institutions about 6 points more than citizens of autocracies on the highest part on the ladder. This 
positive effect holds only for the proportion of people on top of the ladder, however; on all lower 
steps of the ladder, citizens of democracies are either no different from or less trusting than citizens 
of autocracies. 
13 Table 4.4 Regime moderation of economic influence on political trust  










Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 11.739*** (1.539) 17.520*** (1.814) 0.439 (1.204) 8.385*** (1.409) 
3 18.112*** (1.556) 28.424*** (1.766) -0.131 (1.213) 11.887*** (1.449) 
4 26.314*** (1.517) 37.708*** (1.729) -4.066*** (1.229) 12.622*** (1.547) 
5 26.825*** (2.209) 37.859*** (2.225) N/A 10.304*** (2.328) 
Ref= Autocracy     
Anocracy -6.600*** (1.940) 2.332 (2.124) -10.220*** (1.551) -8.713*** (1.964) 
Democracy -35.399*** (1710) -28.219*** (1.920) -41.709*** (1.370) -41.733*** (1.689) 
Regime x Econ 
Interactions 
Sat. with financial 
situation x Regime 
Sat. with national 
economy x Regime 
Consumption 
quartiles x Regime 
Ladder question x 
Regime 
2 x Anoc -2.275 (1.872) -9.406*** (2.038) -3.159* (1.629) -2.665 (1.823) 
2 x Democ -3.759** (1.611) -7.065*** (1.858) -1.410 (1.300) -3.921*** (1.497) 
3 x Anoc -3.029 (1.902) -10.826*** (2.049) -0.472 (1.632) -2.413 (1.876) 
3 x Democ -4.759*** (1.629) -8.817*** (1.826) -1.033 (1.305) -3.689** (1.545) 
4 x Anoc -4.568** (1.894) -13.070*** (2.085) 0.936 (1.642) -1.480 (2.065) 
4 x Democ -7.570*** (1.604) -11.840*** (1.822) 1.691 (1.315) -0.059 (1.654) 
5 x Anoc -4.653 (3.063) -10.865*** (3.153) N/A 4.585 (3.325) 
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5 x Democ -5.619** (2.404) -12.619*** (2.471) N/A 6.168** (2.523) 
Middle Ed 0.213 (0.359) 1.068*** (0.348) 1.329*** (0.405) 0.245 (0.369) 
Upper Ed -0.256 (0.378) 1.193*** (0.364) 1.865*** (0.425) 0.035 (0.388) 
R2 0.321 0.362 0.269 0.284 
N 28423 28294 24516 28671 
Note: Key interaction effects are in bold. Controlled for female, age, age squared, household size, urban and capital 
dwellers (see Appendix B16 for full table). Standard errors in parentheses.  *p < 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p <0.01 
 
 Once again, I diagnosed this interaction more carefully by plotting the country regressions 
side by side (Figure 4.2). Responses of 5/5 on satisfaction with the national economy are scarcer 
than other options and yield higher standard errors, so I plotted political trust among respondents 
who scored a 4/5 on satisfaction with the national economy (relative to the least satisfied) to 
enhance accuracy in the cross-national assessment. Uzbekistan again stands out with the highest 
point estimate. Azerbaijan, Belarus and Kazakhstan also exhibit notably higher estimates than 
other countries, but these are not much different from Macedonia, Kosovo, Mongolia, Montenegro, 
Russia and Ukraine, where people also trust political institutions by about 30 points more than the 
least economically satisfied strata in their respective countries. On the whole, however, the 
averaged estimates we get from the pooled regression summarize this variation accurately: citizens 
of most countries in Eastern and Central Europe do not reward political institutions for economic 
satisfaction as much as those living in autocracies further east. 
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7 Figure 4.2 Political Trust Among Those Satisfied with the National Economy by Country 
 
Note: The graph describes point estimates of political trust among those who score a 4/5 on satisfaction with the 
national economy (relative to the least satisfied) in 30 separate OLS country regressions maintaining 
sociodemographic controls. Bars are 95 percent confidence intervals. Example: Citizens of Azerbaijan who score a 
4/5 on satisfaction with the national economy trust political institutions by about 34 points more than those who score 
a 1/5. 
  
 This additional piece of analysis can help explain why political institutions bear the brunt 
of petty corruption more heavily in authoritarian states in the former Soviet space. Since 
incumbents are not renewable and political institutions do not function independently of the 
incumbent, people perceive that their wellbeing overwhelmingly depends on the behavior of those 
in power. Although political institutions in autocracies take disproportionate credit for economic 
outcomes, they also take disproportionate blame for petty corruption. We tentatively observe the 
same elevated sensitivity to political outcomes in authoritarian polities in this sample as Huhe and 
Tang observe in their East Asian counterparts. At the same time, there are interesting differences 
































































































































































public opinion in authoritarian regimes, and which should inspire crisper data collection and future 
substantive research about the nature of political trust and accountability in closed societies. 
 While I found that high corruption perceivers trust the presidency even less than political 
institutions in a smaller subset of presidential systems, I was unable to determine the particular 
way in which regime types influence the effect of corruption perceptions on presidential trust 
because the smaller sample had too little variation in regime types to permit a reliable comparison. 
The weaker correlation between corruption perceptions and institutional trust suggests that trust in 
political institutions represents a diffuse form of support (using Easton’s distinction) whereas trust 
in the presidency implies a more immediate target of accountability. Nevertheless, even if the 
presidency is held especially accountable by well-off corruption perceivers, citizens of autocracies 
still hold entire political systems accountable for political outcomes more than citizens of 
democracies. This is consistent with my findings in Chapter 2, which show that citizens of 
autocracies do not distinguish as much between branches and levels of government. 
 These patterns offer somewhat of a cautionary tale for autocracies hoping to sustain 
legitimacy through occasional economic stimulus without reforming corrupt institutions. In line 
with Huhe and Tang’s arguments, “authoritarian regimes, although they may enjoy all the benefits 
entailed by economic growth, are also likely to take full responsibility for any economic 
downturns” (ibid., 5). My findings show that not only is this likely the case, but economic growth 
can be a double edged sword for authoritarian legitimacy: people who perceive high levels of petty 
corruption potentially hold the presidency even more accountable as they become more pleased 
with their financial situation and the national economy. Economic improvement at the individual 
level is more likely to spur critical rather than complacent political attitudes, but the precise reasons 
for this deserve future study. On the one hand, as English philosopher Thomas Hodgskin lectured 
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in 1843, perhaps “people want food, and wanting food, want clothing, want cleanliness, want 
comfortable habitations, want decency, want kindliness, and want morality…” (Hodgskin 1843, 
15). On the other hand, sensitivity checks suggest that morality has nothing to do with this steeper 
decline in presidential trust. 
 The lack of evidence for a corruption tradeoff effect in good times suggests that there is 
more to performance legitimacy than economic development. Regardless of how well off people 
believe they are, petty corruption consistently erodes their political trust, particularly in autocracies 
like Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan. Under the bubbling surface of high growth and propaganda, 
people are not happy with exploitative and corrupt public institutions. Once the fuel runs out and 
authoritarian elites are no longer able to supply the economic performance they have ridden in the 
post-Soviet period, their political trust levels are likely to suffer faster downward swings than what 
we would expect of democracies. When those economic downturns occur, political legitimacy in 
these regimes will likely depend more exclusively on the strength of their coercive apparatuses.   
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5  Chapter 5. Economic Growth and Anti-Putinism  
5.1 Introduction17 
 In the previous chapters I have focused mainly on the influence of economic attitudes on 
how corruption victims evaluate their political institutions. While political and economic attitudes 
are intimately causally interconnected, the influence of objective improvements in material 
wellbeing on political attitudes is more tenuous. When does real economic growth reinforce or 
undermine the incumbent’s position in politically closed societies? I will consider this question 
with a case study in this chapter. 
 Russia’s GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity rose from $6825 in 2000 to 
$24,000 in 2011, a 252 percent increase comparable to China’s rise from $2915 to $10,270 in the 
same period. The percentage of Russia’s population living below the national poverty line halved 
between 2002 and 2011. Life expectancy at birth rose from 65.3 years in 2000 to 69.7 years in 
2011. Annual growth rates between 2000 and the financial crisis of 2008 were at least triple the 
growth rates of any year after the fall of the Soviet Union.18 Towards the end of Russia’s 
extraordinary decade of growth, the largest protests in post-Soviet history broke out against then-
Prime Minister Putin in December 2011. Although growth has often been considered the main 
source of Putin’s tremendous popularity (Treisman 2011) much like Chinese growth has been 
credited with bolstering the Chinese Communist Party (Wong et al. 2011, Yang and Tang, 2010), 
many speculated by the end of the decade that growth had produced an unintended threat to the 
Russian incumbent by facilitating the adoption of post-material values (Dmitriev and Treisman 
                                                          
17 Supplementary materials for this chapter are available in Appendix C. 
18 Data obtained from World Development Indicators at the World Bank http://data.worldbank.org/  
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2012). No longer worried about survival, Russian citizens seemingly became more concerned 
about political rights and good governance.  
 The literatures on social movements and political trust make empirically supported but not 
fully compatible claims about the long-term political consequences of economic growth. On the 
one hand, economic growth spurts result in the gradual development of post-material values which 
can lead to protests and demands for democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). On the other hand, 
a long period of economic growth has contributed to Putin’s overwhelming approval ratings, 
which, despite occasional dips, remained at 63 percent of the population even when protests 
initially broke out in December 2011. These ratings would not dip below 61 percent as of the time 
of this writing—and have fluctuated between 80 and 88 percent since the annexation of Crimea.19 
Although the 2011-12 outbreak of protests seems compatible with theories of post-materialism, 
Putin’s high-to-colossal approval ratings speak to the strong trust-promoting effects of positive 
economic attitudes found in the political trust literature. It would appear that it is now 
simultaneously easier and more difficult for Putin and his inner circle to buy off Russian society 
in the interests of political survival. Which of these scenarios is closer to the truth? 
 We do not yet have a clear sense of when economic development is a boon or a burden for 
incumbent legitimacy. One possibility in the Russian case is that economic growth is 
simultaneously promoting and deflating presidential approval depending on variation in political 
openness and historical income conditions across Russia’s 84 regions. That is, although the country 
as whole has undergone an impressive decade-long developmental climb since the late 1990s 
(coinciding almost perfectly with Putin’s tenure), economic growth among initially wealthy 
                                                          
19 See Levada Center polls at http://www.levada.ru/en/about-us/ 
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regions might not be driving up presidential approval as much as economic growth among initially 
poor regions. At the same time, regions with higher political competition and ties to the west might 
prove more impervious to the trust-promoting effects of economic growth. Even though the uneven 
distribution of economic development and political openness across Russia’s vast territory has 
been widely documented (Lankina 2015; Petrov 2005; Popov 2001), the literature on political trust 
and presidential approval in Russia has thus far eluded a proper contextual analysis of the country’s 
conflicting approval patterns.   
 Another part of the reason we are relatively short on nuanced theory about the attitudinal 
implications of growth is that growth simply has not been a big part of the equation in political 
trust or incumbent approval research. The social movement literature tends to measure the effects 
of current socioeconomic conditions on protest activity while the political trust literature relies on 
the effects of people’s perceptions of economic performance on public opinion. Although 
contributors to both discussions often speculate about the consequences of growth, commonly used 
predictors like regional GDP or attitudes toward the economy are static and subjective. My goal 
in this paper is to take what is best from these literatures to capture the effects of growth on 
presidential approval while accounting for its contextual interactions across the country.  
 Studying this link has important implications for our understanding of authoritarian 
survival around the world.  Economic growth tends to boost incumbent survival (Bueno de 
Mesquita and Smith 2010; Marinov 2005), allowing leaders to maintain a favorable status quo, 
build patronage networks and quash opposition. Across autocracies, government elites tend to 
defect less from hegemonic parties during periods of growth (Reuter and Gandhi 2011; Magaloni 
2008, 15). For Treisman (2009), this growth-induced legitimacy is a key but underappreciated 
element of the political economy of post-socialist transition. President Yeltsin faced oppositional 
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coalitions in the Duma during Russia’s massive economic contraction after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. Rapid development at the start of Putin’s presidency in turn removed hindrances to his 
ability to create a legislative coalition and steadily suffocate the opposition. Elites apply 
oppositional pressure on the incumbent when they have the backing of the mass public, making 
public approval ratings of the incumbent a key part of their strategy building (Treisman 2009; Hale 
2005, 2010). In Treisman’s narrative, mass satisfaction with the economy in the early 2000s 
inspired representative bodies to let their guards down as Putin carried out his destructive agenda. 
At least in the short term, the broader literature suggests that periods of growth undermine systems 
of checks and balances in favor of authoritarian consolidation.   
 In the long term, however, autocratic states with high rates of growth tend to democratize 
(Geddes 1999). It has long been argued that only wealthy societies can maintain the ability to 
participate in politics without succumbing to demagoguery or tyranny (Lipset 1959, 75). As noted 
above, in modernizing autocracies an aptitude for democratic participation can arise from the 
triumph of post-material values over survival priorities. Transitions to democracy, however, are 
not likely to occur until incumbent dictators exit office (Treisman 2014a). It remains to be seen 
whether Russia will follow the path of Spain, which quickly democratized in 1975 after 
experiencing quadrupling GDP growth under four decades of rule by Franco. Rapid growth can 
set into motion a runaway train resistant to any attempts of an incumbent dictator to stop a full-on 
derailment. 
 Although an exact prediction of Russia’s trajectory is impossible, it is possible to reduce 
the level of abstraction in such a discussion by considering the dynamics of growth within the 
country. Hybrid regimes like Russia which combine some electoral contestation with central 
control by a political machine are nevertheless vulnerable to shifts in political trust and street 
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protests (Robertson 2013). Given the diversity of economic development and political openness 
across Russia’s vast territory, it is possible to pinpoint the government’s local vulnerabilities to 
anti-incumbent challenges. While such a case-oriented approach sheds light on Russia’s political 
dynamics, it also helps us theorize about the conditions under which economic growth threatens 
or promotes incumbent survival in hybrid political regimes. 
5.2 Empirical Considerations 
 Economic performance can be seen as a proxy for the competence of the country’s 
leadership, especially when the electorate lacks other information or criteria against which to 
assess its performance (Burke 2012, 2). Positive economic evaluations usually have significantly 
more explanatory power over political trust and presidential approval than other performance-
based variables in Russia (McAllister and White 2007; Rose, Munro and Mishler 2004; Mishler 
and Willerton 2003; Treisman 2011), China (Wong et al. 2011, Yang and Tang, 2010), Latin 
America (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013) and Africa (Lavallée et al. 2008). Despite the 
persistently strong influence of economic sentiment, economic performance is not a good predictor 
of cross-national differences in political trust (Wong et al. 2011, 273; Van der Meer and 
Hakhverdian 2016, 4).  
 Evidence of the influence of objective economic performance on political attitudes is 
mixed. Clarke et al. (1993) show that growth in unemployment and inflation significantly 
depressed support for governing parties in eight Western European countries between 1976-1986 
while Van Erkel and Van der Meer (2016) somewhat contradict this finding by arguing that 
unemployment reduces political trust while economic growth and inflation enhances it over time 
in fifteen EU countries between 1999-2011. In several cross-sectional studies, Van der Meer and 
Hakhverdian (2016) find that macroeconomic indicators have no effect on confidence in 
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government across 48 European countries, confirming the null effect found in Hakhverdian and 
Mayne (2012) between country-level GDP and institutional trust. 
 Why are correlations of subjective attitudes so strong and objective indicators so tenuous? 
What do subjective attitudes capture, if not objective economic conditions?  For one, regressions 
of attitudes on attitudes are subject to spurious correlations and reverse causation. Although 
economic sentiment enhances political trust, people are just as likely to rate the economy more 
favorably because they approve of current political institutions—not because they are actually 
better off. Economic perceptions are also functions of individual characteristics, ideological 
proclivities and sources of exposure to information about politics—not all of which are 
immediately measurable or controllable. They also capture different benchmarks against which 
people judge economic performance, whether they are cultural, regional or longitudinal. Given 
globalization and the spread of information, people might be ranking their wellbeing or national 
economic performance against how they perceive other countries are doing (Deaton 2008, 70; Van 
der Meer and Hakhverdian 2016, 6). 
 In the Russian case, the limited evidence we have is unclear about the effect of objective 
economic conditions on political support. Using Levada Center opinion polls, Treisman (2009, 10) 
finds that although Russians’ evaluations of the economy were higher than warranted in the lead 
up to elections in 1996 and 2004, on the whole they reflected variation in objective indicators like 
real wages, pensions, wave arrears, unemployment and job openings. Colton and Hale (2009, 493) 
similarly argue that Putin’s approval throughout the 2000s was driven more by positive evaluations 
of the economy than any policy initiative in the Putin administration. At the same time, however, 
they use survey data to argue that the bulk of Putin voters had experienced no increase to their 
personal wellbeing over the course of his presidency, concluding that sociotropic economic 
151 
 
evaluations reflect state-media exposure and positive expectations of the future rather than 
objective improvements in material welfare. Even this interpretation is based on self-reported 
income rather than an objective evaluation of income or its growth. It is important to use more 
objective measures to avoid conflating the effects of growth on political trust with the effects of 
the government’s attempts to manipulate public opinion—or, indeed, with any number of 
influences on attitudes which do not relate to objective material wellbeing. 
 The effect of growth itself remains unclear in the broader literature. Popularly used 
measures of income levels can tell us how much people trust political institutions based on their 
income, but they do not tell us what happens to attitudes when those incomes change.  In a recent 
breakthrough on the effects of growth on political attitudes, Guriev and Treisman (2016, 22) use 
the Gallup World Poll to show that annual GDP growth rates are straightforwardly connected to 
government approval between 2005-2014 in the UK, Brazil, Turkey, Zimbabwe and Venezuela, 
but, interestingly enough, they are not straightforwardly connected in Russia. The authors explain 
this away by attributing temporary dips and spikes to a presidential election, war in Georgia and 
the financial crisis. Despite event-based fluctuations, however, the long-term relationship between 
growth and government approval remains tenuous in a country where growth is generally believed 
to play a stronger role in the formation of political attitudes than any other variable (as argued by 
Treisman himself on many occasions). In a follow up to the article, Guriev (2016) argues that the 
social contract between the Russian government and its citizens after the growth decade may be 
moving away from a promise of economic betterment to a promise of reclaimed geopolitical status. 
Even if that is the case, the lack of a clear relationship between growth and approval between 2005-
2010 (see their graph on page 22), before the change in the social contract, is puzzling. If 
government approval is so sensitive to temporary events like elections during a decade of intense 
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growth, it would appear that the growth rate is not, after all, so crucial to incumbent legitimacy. 
Or are we missing other factors?  
5.3 Contextual Effects  
 The picture could be incomplete because we are not yet properly diagnosing contextual 
growth effects on incumbent approval within the country. Inferring things about individuals in a 
country based on cross-national trends can, of course, put us at risk of committing an ecological 
fallacy. Yet local context can be quite important to incumbent support across internally 
heterogeneous societies and rapidly growing non-democracies where citizens are more sensitive 
to economic performance than their counterparts in democracies (Huhe and Tang 2016; Tang et 
al. 2015). Taking into account large imbalances in development across China, Hutchison and Xu 
(2016) argue that regional economic performance significantly enhances political trust and (so far) 
offsets the negative effects of regional inequality and openness to global markets. Interestingly, 
Su et al. (2016) show that provincial level GDP in China lowers trust in the central government. 
Neither study considers regional differences in economic growth, but it is reasonable to suppose 
that uneven distributions of growth and institutional openness across both Russian and Chinese 
subnational regions produce out of sync incumbent approval ratings which give rise to competing 
theories about the trust-promoting and post-material effects of growth.  With regards to Russia, 
both effects are probably in play depending on when and where we look. 
 Russia is a particularly fruitful case study because of its immense internal variation in 
economic performance. As of 2009, GDP per capita adjusted for purchasing power parity in the 
top three performing regions was equivalent to that of Norway, Hong Kong and the Netherlands, 
while the bottom three regions were equivalent to Turkmenistan, Bhutan and Iraq. The unevenness 
of economic development across Russia is determined both by varying endowments of natural 
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resources and Soviet practices of concentrating the production of certain goods and services in 
specific locations (Van Selm 1998, 605). Regional success in the post-socialist transition heavily 
depended on regional specialization in competitive industries like fuel and energy production as 
opposed to non-competitive ones like machinery building and agriculture (Popov 2001, 877). Even 
in 2014 average monthly income per capita was 2.7 times higher in oil rich Tyumen than in the 
resource poor, non-industrial Republic of Tyva. Yet some inherited differences have seen big 
transformations in the course of the post-socialist transition. While the Sakha region outperformed 
the republic of Dagestan 5.4 times in average monthly income per capita in 1995, it reduced its 
lead to 1.5 times by 2014. Regions across Russia have had staggered growth spurts over the 
previous two decades.20  
 Geographer Natalia Zubarevich (2012) describes four “Russias” which have spun out of 
the transition: 1) the land of large post-industrial cities with over 250,000 inhabitants, 2) the land 
of blue collar workers in smaller company towns dependent on non-competitive industries, 3) the 
land of rural and semi-urban populations and 4) the land of non-industrial undeveloped areas 
capturing the northern Caucasus. While Putin has largely been able to buy off the support of 
populations in categories 2-4 with direct welfare transfers from the federal budget, the growth of 
medium-to-large cities in the first category (currently home to a little under half of the Russian 
population) has given rise to a mobile, educated, internet-savvy middle class that is not 
significantly tied to the state, one location or one job. It is “an electorate that won’t stay zombies 
for long,” she argues, suggesting that long-term demographic shifts may give rise to expectations 
for reform beyond the ability of the government to control (ibid.). 
                                                          
20 Data obtained from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) www.gks.ru  
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 Trends in protest activity across Russia provide some insight into this long-term shift. The 
number of protests since the 1990s has steadily increased and become more politicized (Lankina 
2015, 39). Robertson (2013, 19) shows that protest demands in the 2000s have shifted from 
concerns about the unpaid wages and poverty of the transition period to concerns about political 
and civil rights, the environment and urban planning. He speculates that these qualitative changes 
“are early warning signs that the implicit exchange of economic growth for political stability of 
the early Putin years may be coming undone” (ibid.). While the 2011-2012 anti-Putin protest wave 
drew the largest crowds in Moscow and St Petersburg, most protests took place outside the two 
capitals in regions that are comparably wealthier, more politically open and independent of 
handouts from the federal center (Lankina 2015, 34). Protest levels did not correlate with regional 
GDP levels, making it somewhat puzzling that citizens with more socioeconomic grievances did 
not choose to air them publicly (ibid., 31-32). Lankina’s observation is ultimately difficult to 
interpret because it is based on the total number of protests per region without accounting for the 
size of the regional populations.    
 Nevertheless, Russia’s poorest regions—particularly those in the northern Caucasus—also 
tend to host the most repressive political systems in the country, which reduces the amount of 
protest mobilization in the region that gets recorded by journalists and social scientists. Recent 
work suggests that Russia’s regime hybridity is a spatial phenomenon (Lankina 2015; Lankina and 
Voznaya 2015; Libman 2012). That is, elements of electoral competition and political liberty are 
selectively incorporated into a vertical power structure at both national and regional levels. After 
the fall of the Soviet Union, a weak federal state meant that regions could develop diverse local 
political systems. Since the rise of Putin and his abolition of the popular election of regional 
governors in 2004, pockets of regional autonomy have nevertheless persisted. Some regions have 
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managed to retain the popular election of mayors who can make alliances with local civil society 
and enhance media freedom if it helps them counteract regional governors (Lankina 2015, 28). 
Despite the efforts of the federal center to undermine local initiatives, incentive structures within 
municipal politics generate significant, lasting differences in regional voting patterns, elite 
turnover and civil society activity (ibid.). Regional authoritarianism also tends to be reinforced 
through trade with former Soviet Union countries but mitigated by inflows of EU aid to civil 
society partners (Lankina et al. 2016). If elites truly do follow public opinion as Treisman and Hale 
suggest, it is possible that regions which have benefited most from economic growth and relatively 
open political structures are ones where local elites can, given a political or economic crisis, take 
advantage of low incumbent approval ratings to challenge the center. 
5.4 Hypotheses  
 Judging by protest statistics alone, however, it would be premature to conclude that 
incumbent disapproval comes from the fastest growing regions. Internal variation in Russian 
economic development, political openness and anti-regime mobilization suggests that the 
influence of growth on incumbent support is likely subject to a set of complex interactions which 
are contextual, rather than individual in nature. Several potentially important interactions come to 
mind.  I begin with a simple unidirectional hypothesis (H0) that economic growth has a positive 
effect on approval, moving toward more nuanced hypotheses below. 
H1. The effect of economic growth on incumbent approval depends on the length 
of time regions have been growing. 
 We know that economic growth tends to enhance the survival of incumbent dictators in the 
short term, and any translation of income growth into political liberalization often takes 10-20 
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years or the removal of the incumbent from office (Treisman 2014a). At the level of attitudes, 
Inglehart’s (1990) theory about the post-material effects of growth is based on decade-long trends 
of declining trust in government among advanced industrialized democracies in the post-war era. 
The adoption of worldviews which emphasize self-actualization over survival develops over the 
course of one or more generations and usually cannot be triggered at the onset of growth. With 
regards to Russia, major protests and demands for better governance developed only after the 
country’s decade of hyper growth had ended. Given the uneven level of development across the 
country, I expect that regions which have experienced sustained growth will have lower incumbent 
approval ratings toward the end of the decade than regions which have experienced more recent 
growth spurts. The proposition here is that longer-term growth leads to more critical political 
attitudes while recent growth enhances incumbent support. 
H2.The effect of economic growth on incumbent approval depends on initial 
regional economic performance. 
 Regions which are better off to begin with might experience diminishing returns from 
economic growth. After attaining a certain level of development, more growth will likely do 
increasingly less to improve one’s view of political authorities. As suggested in the social 
movement literature, citizens in historically more developed and cosmopolitan regions are more 
active in pursuit of higher order demands like justice and better governance. At the same time, 
citizens in initially poor regions which are experiencing “catch up” growth might not yet be ready 
to exchange additional material gains for better governance.  The proposition here is that growth 




H3. The effect of economic growth on incumbent approval depends on regional 
political openness. 
 Unlike their authoritarian counterparts, politically open regions are more likely to be 
exposed to the west, have more independent media exposure, host more civil society organizations 
and have histories of protest activity. I expect that the diffusion of democratic values proceeding 
from such factors will lower incumbent support, and that this negative effect will mitigate the 
positive influence of economic growth in these regions. The proposition here is that economic 
growth will not enhance incumbent support as much in politically open regions as it will in less 
open regions.  
5.5 Analytical Strategy  
 To test these propositions, I was able to obtain incumbent approval data in February 2011 
from the Public Opinion Foundation (Fond Obschestvennogo Mneniya, or FOM), regional 
economic development data from the Russian State Statistics Agency (Rosstat) and regional 
democracy data from the Independent Institute of Social Policy (IISP) in Moscow. Unfortunately 
I was unable to get access to longitudinal incumbent approval data from FOM due to restrictive 
subscription costs. This somewhat limits, but does not totally preclude an analysis of a growth 
effect on incumbent approval.  
 I chose to look at approval data from February 2011 for several reasons. This time period 
follows Russia’s decade of growth, allowing us to measure long-term regional growth effects on 
incumbent approval. At the same time, it was a relatively “normal” time for incumbent approval 
in the sense that political attitudes in February would not have been temporary shifted by sudden 
shocks or events; it was not a presidential election year and the economy was largely recovered 
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from the 2008 financial crisis (which depressed approval ratings at the time, and unevenly so across 
regions). February 2011 also precedes Putin’s announcement of returning to the Presidency in 
September and fraudulent parliamentary elections in December which triggered mass protest 
activity that would last through the 2012 presidential election season. These events would have 
been unforeseen in February 2011; indeed, the public response to such triggers would likely not 
have been so intense were there indications of major political breaches earlier in the year. Putin’s 
approval rating decreased fairly dramatically over the year, from 79 percent in December 2010 to 
63 percent in December 2011. Yet if we examine the data from the Levada Center, approval ratings 
remained relatively stable in the upper 60s throughout 2011 until a more concerted drop after the 
onset of protests in December. Approval ratings in February 2011 still caught the upper end of that 
approval trend at 72 percent. If economic growth does affect incumbent approval as I think it does, 
it is fair to suggest that some amount of incumbent disapproval arising from long-term economic 
shifts will have predisposed parts of the public to protest at the end of the year. These anti-
incumbent predispositions should be detectable in February 2011, before they were triggered into 
action.  
 FOM conducts quarterly nationwide surveys, randomly selecting household samples 
within districts to match their population characteristics (see Ananyev and Guriev 2016, 13-14). 
The February 2011 data consist of 54,388 households, offering significantly more coverage than 
any other publicly available dataset that I know of (such as the LITS, local opinion barometers or 
the World Values Survey, each offering approximately 1000 households). Since the large N of the 
FOM survey allows for more observations within regions (between 500 and 800 per region) a 
contextual analysis of regional incumbent support becomes considerably more reliable.   
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5.5.1 Dependent Variable 
 By “incumbent approval” I mean approval of Vladimir Putin. Even though he was Prime 
Minister in February 2011, he had served as the country’s President since the onset of the growth 
period and would return to the post a year later. Putin would have been held responsible for 
economic performance from 2000 to the current day. Although Dmitry Medvedev was president 
in February 2011, Treisman (2014b, 8) shows that approval ratings for Putin and Medvedev 
throughout their tenures were almost perfectly correlated, suggesting that the latter was under the 
control of the former, and that the public did not distinguish between the two figures.  
 To measure incumbent approval, the FOM survey question reads, “Is the head of the 
government Vladimir Putin performing well or poorly at his job? Has his work in recent times 
been improving, deteriorating or has it remained unchanged?” Respondents have six response 
options: “1) He performs well and is improving; 2) he performs well and hasn’t changed; 3) he 
performs well, but is deteriorating; 4) he performs poorly, but is improving; 5) he performs poorly 
and hasn’t changed; 6) he performs poorly and is deteriorating.” To capture approval, I will create 
a dummy variable where ‘1’ indicates respondents who believe Putin is performing well and is 
either improving or staying the same (items 1 or 2) and ‘0’ indicates the rest. It might be argued 
that such a question is problematic because it directs respondents’ attention to Putin’s recent 
performance and may therefore cause us to underestimate the long-term regional growth effect on 
incumbent approval. My hunch is that this may not matter because 1) the first part of the question 
focuses on a generic performance evaluation regardless of time span, and 2) long-term economic 
shifts are structural factors which will likely produce different associations of Putin in respondents’ 
minds regardless of the question’s reference to changes in his performance in “recent” times. 
Nevertheless, we could detect such an underestimation effect by conducting robustness checks to 
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alternative measures of incumbent support available in the survey, including evaluations of 
President Medvedev, the government in general and whether respondents would vote for Putin’s 
party, United Russia, should elections be held the following Sunday.21 If the different kinds of 
questions lead to very different outcomes we might have evidence that such differences can be 
attributed to features of the approval question. 
 It must be noted that approval of United Russia and/or Putin himself may not symbolize 
active enthusiasm as much as resigned acceptance, particularly because citizens may feel that there 
is no real alternative to the current power structure. Nevertheless, respondents have neutral and 
non-response options which give them a chance to mark something other than the incumbents even 
if they feel there is no real alternative. Approval ratings in a hybrid regime might also reflect 
preference falsification due to repression rather than real attitudes. On repeated occasions, 
however, this argument has not held water in the Russian context (Frye et al. 2016; Guriev and 
Treisman 2016; Rose 2007). 
5.5.2 Controls 
 In my first hypothesis, I proposed that long-term growth leads to more critical political 
attitudes while more recent growth enhances incumbent support. This is perhaps the most difficult 
hypothesis to test in the absence of longitudinal incumbent support data. At the same time, 
quarterly or even yearly growth changes are unlikely to significantly impact political attitudes, let 
alone political changes. Van Erkel and Van der Meer (2016, 194) speculate that unemployment 
                                                          
21 Robustness checks: The question on United Russia reads: “Imagine that parliamentary elections are held next 
Sunday. What party would you vote for?” Alongside United Russia and six other parties, respondents have a choice 
of ‘other party,’ ‘I would destroy the ballot,” “I wouldn’t vote,” and “I’m having difficulty answering.” The question 
on Medvedev is phrased identically to that on Putin. The question about the government reads: “Is the Russian 
government performing well or poorly? Is its performance in recent times improving, deteriorating or staying the 
same?” Respondent options: “well and improving,” “well and staying the same,” “well, but deteriorating,” “poorly, 
but improving,” “poorly and not changing,” “poorly and deteriorating” and “difficulty responding” 
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has a short-term impact on political trust whereas people respond to economic growth in reference 
to a more “stable, historical standard.” One way to assess the long and short term impacts of growth 
in Russia is to simply to calculate regional GDP per capita (in other words, gross regional product 
per capita or GRP per capita) in 2011 as a percentage change from GRP per capita in 2000 and 
2008. This provides 11-year and 3-year growth windows. Growth rates take a plunge during the 
2008 financial crisis, making the 2008-2011 growth period a proxy of how well regions recovered 
from the crisis.22  
 Assuming that regions which have experienced the most growth over 11 years are different 
from those which have experienced the most growth over 3 years, I would expect that regions with 
steep 11-year growth will have lower incumbent approval than regions with steep 3-year growth. 
If the same regions are demonstrating the highest growth in both time frames, however, one reason 
might be because of regional path dependence on economic structure. If regions which had 
historically specialized in competitive industries like fuels since the Soviet period fared best in the 
post-socialist transition, they might have also grown the most over the 2000s and fared best in the 
2008 financial crisis. If we wish to separate out high growth regions in an 11 and 3 year period, it 
is important to control for initial regional GRP at the start of both growth periods.  
 In my third hypothesis, I proposed that growth rates will have weaker impacts on 
incumbent support in more politically democratic regions. To test this proposition it is possible to 
                                                          
22 The regional GDP per capita data are reported by the Russian statistical agency in nominal prices, or in the prices 
of each year. It would be inappropriate to compare growth across different years with such data because they 
conflate real GDP changes with price fluctuation due to inflation. To obtain real GDP per capita growth estimates 
which account for inflation, I would ideally require the nominal GDP data in each region along with a regional price 
index like the GDP deflator or CPI. To my knowledge, no such regional price index is available. Granted this 
obstacle, I will assume that price changes in a given year are identical for all regions in the country and will use the 
national GDP deflator to convert nominal into real data at the regional level. GDP deflator data are available from 
World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.DEFL.ZS?locations=RU  
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assess differences in the growth effect at each growth period among politically open, hybrid and 
closed regions using the latest available regional democracy rankings in 2004 which summarize 
indicators of regional political pluralism, economic openness, civil society activism and press 
freedom.23 Because regional democracy is fairly stable over time, small regional shifts in political 
openness over the previous decade are unlikely to significantly change where the regions stand in 
2011, particularly if the regions are grouped into three broad categories of political openness.  
 I also control for regional dependence on the federal center and regional income inequality. 
The lack of growth in some parts of the country, particularly in blue collar, industrial rust belt 
regions, can be offset by federal transfers. Although federal transfers are no substitute for real 
growth, they can “fabricate winners and losers” in economic development (Popov 2001, 873-4).24 
I estimate income inequality by calculating differences in average monthly earnings per capita 
between the regions and Moscow in 2011 using data from the Russian State Statistics Service. 
This is a plausible measure in so far as residents of regions will be made aware of Moscow living 
standards on a regular basis through Moscow-based news reports on state news channels. 
Perceived differences between images of Moscow and their localities can lead to consternation 
with political authorities for failing to deliver similar economic performance at home.25    
                                                          
23 The full index combines a variety of indicators of regional democracy, including local balances of power, 
independence of local courts, violations of civil rights, the transparency of the political process, the competitiveness 
of local elections, the presence of stable, functional parties and coalitions, the independence of the press in the 
locale, corruption as measured by the political and economic power of local elites, the extent of economic 
liberalization, privatization and the protection of private property; the presence of civil society in the form of NGOs, 
referendums, independent activism and protests; elite turnover and local self-government in the form of elected 
bodies in community life. Full details are available from the Independent Institute of Social Policy at 
http://atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml 
24 Regional budgetary statistics in 2011 are publicly available from the Russian Ministry of Finance. Data available 
here: http://info.minfin.ru/region_compare.php 




 I will maintain regional democracy indicators as controls for each hypothesis, adding 
dummies for conflict ridden, repressed republics in the Northern Caucasus and the capital, 
Moscow. These regions have specific geopolitical characteristics which would likely skew 
incumbent support trends across the country. At the individual level I will maintain standard 
sociodemographic controls, including individual-level income. Unfortunately the survey does not 
contain information about respondents’ exposure to state television, but it has a question about the 
last time respondents had used the internet. Responses can range from “in the previous 24 hours” 
to “more than a year ago.” Frequent users are most likely to come across independent media 
sources; this question can act as proxy for one’s ability to escape propaganda on state television. 
 Even with the necessary controls, I cannot prove that varying growth dynamics cause 
incumbent support to rise or fall. A few recent attempts to instrument economic growth in the 
former Soviet space would be unsuccessful in the present study. For example, Ananyev and Guriev 
(2016) treat the financial crisis of 2008 as an exogenous shock which allows them to isolate the 
causal influence of income changes on changes in interpersonal trust between 2008-2009. They 
instrument income change with the regional share of employment which produced industrial 
machinery, metal products, oil and gas in 1989 because these regions were still dependent on such 
industries in 2008 and were most severely hit by the financial crisis. While they make a case that 
this IV is exogenous to interpersonal trust, it would not be exogenous to incumbent approval 
because these industries came under heavy state manipulation as oil prices rapidly increased in the 
mid-2000s. People’s experience with the state through their employment would affect their 
political attitudes through channels other than an income shock in 2008-2009.  
 De Haas et al. (2016) make a similar attempt to diagnose the causal effect of the economic 
crisis on attitudes toward democracy and the market economy in Ukraine, instrumenting income 
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change with the financial health of foreign banks in the country. Their rationale is that the crisis 
was channeled to Ukraine mainly through foreign owned banks; thus, poorly performing foreign 
branches would have left households more credit-constrained during the crisis. This is a weak 
design for several reasons, whether the outcome variable is attitudes toward democracy or 
incumbent approval. First, western banks are not the only transmitters of the financial crisis to 
households (as Ananyev and Guriev point out above), making it highly unlikely that the authors 
are isolating the treatment effect of crisis exposure. Second, banking in Russia and Ukraine is 
highly politicized. The top Russian banks (Sberbank and VTB) have more assets than the next 20 
banks combined, meaning that people’s banking experience is overwhelmingly tied to the state. 
Loan activity will also be correlated with the government’s developmental agenda in different 
regions, making economic development across the country far from independent of political 
activity. Finally, even if bank health were the only transmitter of the crisis to households, we would 
have to argue that it affects incumbent support only through that transmission of the crisis. But 
banks with varying loan dependencies are not randomly distributed throughout the population. 
Healthier banks are likely selected into wealthier, urban and cosmopolitan regions where people 
are more likely to take out loans to start businesses—and also perhaps distrust the government.26  
 Other than these attempts, the number one instrument for income or income growth is 
rainfall (Bohlken and Sergenti 2010; Tanaka et al. 2010), but the rationale only works for 
agriculture-dependent countries (rainfall is expected to raise incomes by increasing crop yields). 
Rainfall would not be a plausible IV in a country like Russia, which is not an agriculture-dependent 
economy. More approaches are now avoiding implementing IVs for economic development in 
                                                          
26 Both attempts to isolate a treatment effect depend on income shocks through the financial crisis. The causal 
influence of a shock is theoretically different from long-term economic growth, making such IVs inappropriate tests 
of the current hypotheses on both a theoretical and statistical level. 
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favor of explaining causal mechanisms in the absence of pseudo-experimental designs (Deaton 
2010; Bazzi and Blattman 2014). Without a decent instrument for economic growth, I will have to 
continue with a correlational design with relevant controls. It is certainly true that people will have 
had many experiences with the state now and through history which will play a part in their 
incumbent approval, and which are not functions of growth. It is not possible to account for 
everything, but I have attempted to account for the most relevant confounding factors to isolate 
the interactions of interest.   
5.6 Results 
 I run a binary probit model where Putin’s approval is a factor of growth (as a percentage 
change in GRP per capita since 2000 or 2008), initial GRP per capita in 2000 or 2008, regional 
democracy, income inequality between the regions and Moscow, federal welfare transfers to the 
regions, and individual-level sociodemographic controls.27 I test each interaction separately for 
clarity of interpretation, estimating changes in the predicted probability of approval across growth 
rates for different levels of democratic openness, as well as the average marginal effects of growth 
on the predicted probability of approval across the full range of initial GRP in both time intervals.  
 Descriptive statistics show that there is significant dispersion in both absolute GRP in 2011 
and its growth over time across the country (Table 5.1). In 2011, there were five ultra-wealthy 
outliers (Moscow, Tumenskaya Oblast, Sakahlinskaya Oblast, Khanti-Mansiiskij Autonomous 
                                                          
27 The model specification for an interaction between regional democracy and growth between 2000-2011 would 
look like: 
Pr (IAij) =  β0 + β1Growthj + β3Demj  + β4GrowthjDemj + β2IGRPj +  β6Inequalityj
+ β7Transferj + β8Urbanityij +β9Internetij + β10−11RegDummiesj + αij + u 
 
where IA = incumbent approval for individual i in region j, Dem= regional democracy, IGRP= initial GRP, 
Inequality= regional income inequality from Moscow, Transfer= federal transfers to the regions, RegDummies = 
regional dummies for Moscow and the Northern Caucasus, and alpha = vector of sociodemographic controls. 
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Okrug and Yamalo-Nenetskij Autonomous Okrug) on the GRP per capita distribution. Even if we 
ignore these outliers, the wealthiest region at the tail end of the distribution, the Republic of Komi, 
is still 4.65 times wealthier than the poorest region, Karachevo Cherkesskaya Republic. Regions 
near the median of the distribution are almost twice as rich (about 1.8 times) as those in the fifth 
percentile.  
 Growth patterns are different across the 11 and 3 year periods. We observe a significant 
long-term growth footprint across the country. Growth in GRP per capita between 2000 and 2011 
has the highest dispersion, with 4 outlier regions which experienced ultra-high growth rates 
(Moscow Oblast, which grew 140.31 percent over this period, Belgorod Oblast at 143.82 percent, 
Dagestan at 169.54 percent and Sakhalin at 299.45 percent). The top 10 growing regions more 
than doubled GRP over this period, while the bottom 10 grew by less than 35 percent. Excluding 
outliers, the dispersion runs from GRP per capita growth as little as one percent to as large as 118 
percent.  
 Regional GRP per capita growth in the 08-11 period is considerably smaller in dispersion.  
Due to the financial crisis, about half of the regions experienced a contraction in GRP per capita 
over this period. Excluding outliers, the dispersion runs from a GRP per capita contraction of 24 
percent to a positive growth of 21 percent, with high-growth outliers only 27 and 29.6 percent 
(Sakhalin and Magadan, respectively). From this we can expect a minimal or null impact of short-
run growth on approval. 
14 Table 5.1. Dispersion of Predictors of Interest 
 1st perct. 25th perct. 50th perct. 75th perct. 95th perct. 
GRP 2011 
 
105.5k r. 169.9k r. 224.4k r. 298.9k r. 865.6k r. 




GRP Growth 08-11 -24.30% -9.73% -4.21% 4.37% 11.91% 
 
Note: GRP 2011 is expressed in rubles at 2011 price levels. GRP growth in both ranges is measured in percent growth in 
regional GRP in 2011 either since 2000 or 2008. 
 
 Although the distribution is skewed with regards to both absolute economic performance 
and growth, the outliers are a unique feature of the Russian development landscape. I will keep all 
outliers in the dataset as indicative of real, extreme disparity in economic conditions across the 
country, looking at predicted probabilities of approval of Putin across the full range of these 
economic performance distributions. 
 A variance components analysis indicates that only 2.7 percent of variation in Putin’s 
approval can be attributed to region-level characteristics, which illuminates the lack of a multilevel 
data structure. Substantively, this means that Putin’s approval is quite uniform throughout the 
country regardless of regional clustering. Contrary to expectations, regional economic 
performance and growth will have less of an impact on approval than I anticipated. This is 
precisely what I find in the probit models below. 
 Predicted probabilities are estimated separately for each predictor while holding other 
predictors at their means, medians or modes.28 Despite the marked variation in absolute GRP levels 
and long term growth within the country, none of these key variables has a meaningful effect on 
Putin’s approval (Table 5.2). Absolute GRP in 2011 does not begin to significantly matter until 
the 99th percentile of the GRP distribution, which signals that approval ratings are marginally 
higher in outlier regions than the rest of the country, and there is no further internal contextual 
                                                          
28 In other words, the effects of each predictor on approval are estimated for individuals of an average age, income, 
education, and frequent internet usage located in a region of moderate or high urbanity and median GRP, inequality, 




variation in approval ratings. Growth does not have any significant impact on the predicted 
probability of approval at either the 10 or 3-year growth periods. These null effects are consistent 
across robustness checks to alternative dependent variables. If we consider these latter variables 
in their binary form (coding as ‘1’ those who are pleased with and believe there is consistency or 
improvement in the performance of the person or party and ‘0’ for all less enthusiastic evaluations), 
approximately 72 percent of the sample approves of Putin, 58 percent approves of Medvedev, 37 
percent approves of the government in general, and 49 percent would vote for United Russia in a 
hypothetical election next Sunday rather than any other party, disposing of the ballot or not voting 
at all. Despite this variation in separate approval measures, less than three percent of variation in 
each measure is a function of region-level characteristics, which allows us to rule out any 
meaningful region-specific absolute GRP or growth effects.29  
15 Table 5.2 Predicted Probabilities of Approval for Predictors of Interest 
 1st perct. 25th perct. 50th perct. 75th perct. 95th perct. 
GRP 2011 .708 .716 .723 .732 .796 
95% CI .674-.742 .682-.749 .689-.756 .698-.765 .745-.846 
GRP Growth 00-11 .707 .715 .719 .723 .731 
95% CI .675-.738 .684-.746 .684-.755 .684-.762 .680-.782 
GRP Growth 08-11 .718 .720 .721 .723 .724 
95% CI .668-.768 .684-.756 .688-.754 .690-.755 .689-.759 
Note: These predicted probabilities are calculated holding all predictors at their means, medians or modes. For the effects of 
controls, see Table X. Standard errors are clustered at the region level. 
 
 Most other region-level characteristics also have little to do with Putin’s approval (Table 
5.3). Welfare transfers and regional democracy have no meaningful or statistically significant 
difference in effect across their ranges. With regards to income inequality, surprisingly, regions 
closest in income to Moscow have a lower predicted probability of approval than the rest of the 
                                                          
29 The intraclass correlation (ICC) at the region level is 2.2 percent for approval of Medvedev, 1.6 percent for a 
determination to vote for United Russia, and 2.8 percent for approval of the government. 
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country—a difference of about 10 percentage points which is ultimately statistically insignificant 
at the 5 percent level. Substantively, the effect is mainly captured by Tumenskaya Oblast and 
Khanti Mansiiskij Okrug; the former region has jurisdiction over the latter, which produces the 
majority of Russia’s oil. These regions are not representative of socioeconomic performance in the 
country. 
16 Table 5.3. Predicted Probabilities for Controls 
Continuous Predictors 
 1st perct. 25th perct. 50th perct. 75th perct. 95th perct. 
Transfers (smallest transfers)  (largest transfers) 
 .732 .726 .723 .718 .692 
95% CI .697-.767 .693-.759 .689-.756 .682-.753 .628-.756 
Inequality (most unequal)   (most equal) 
 .745 .731 .723 .710 .652 
95% CI .704-.786 .696-.766 .689-.756 .676-.744 .576-.729 
Regional Democracy (least democratic)  (most democratic) 
 .723 .724 .723 .721 .719 
95% CI .687-.764 .692-.756 .689-.759 .680-.762 .659-.777 
Categorical Predictors   
Sex Male Female    
 .602 .723    
95% CI .565-.639 .689-.756    
Age Age 20 Age 40 Age 60 Age 80  
 .769 .731 .689 .647  
95% CI .738-.799 .698-.763 .654-.726 .605-.688  







 .763 .723 .683   
95% CI .734-.792 .689-.756 .652-.715   
Income <4k rub 4-7k rub 7-10k rub 10-20k rub 20-45k rub 
 .722 .687 .723 .726 .729 
95% CI .689-.755 .651-.723 .689-.756 .699-.752 .694-.765 
Urban Rural/Village 50-250k ppl 250k-1m ppl 1m ppl+ Moscow 
 .792 .753 .723 .772 .772 
95% CI .766-.817 .722-.783 .689-.756 .724-.819 .667-.877 
Internet Never used Used in last 
week or longer 
Used in last 24 
hrs 
  
 .740 .719 .723   
95% CI .711-.769 .686-.753 .689-.756   
Protest 2011-12 Top 10 Bottom 90    
 .716 .725    




Note: Each effect is tested separately while holding the other predictors at their medians or modes. Controlled for 2011 
GRP per capita (estimates presented in Table A).  The probit estimations are run with clustered standard errors and 36,827 
observations. 
 
 There are interesting, pronounced sociodemographic effects on approval. Perhaps the most 
distinct is the role of sex. The predicted probability of approval rises from 60 percent among men 
to 72 percent among women, a significant difference. Age also has a consistent negative effect on 
approval. Somewhat surprisingly, young people are significantly more approving of Putin than 
baby boomers and older generations. The predicted probability of approval decreases from 77 
percent at age 20 to 65 percent at age 80, and drops progressively across the intermediate age 
range, with significant differences between under-30s and over-60s. Education carries a significant 
but modest corrosive effect. The predicted probability of approval rises from 68 percent among 
those with at least some university or a full postgraduate education to 76 percent among those with 
a secondary education at most. 
 Also of interest is the lack of an effect of urbanity. Residents of rural villages have an 
equivalent predicted probability of approval to residents of Moscow (79-80 percent), although the 
margin of error is higher in Moscow. Citizens of cities with 250,000 to one million people are 
significantly less approving of Putin than those in rural villages by seven percentage points. No 
other significant variation in approval is evident across other levels of urbanity. Internet usage also 
lacks an effect; there is no difference in approval among those who frequently use the internet, 
those who have used the internet in the last week or longer, and those who have never had to use 
the internet. It should also be noted that approval patterns do not map onto the protest patterns 
which occurred in the recent past or 10 months following this survey. Using Lankina’s (2015, 33) 
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tabulations of top protesting regions between 2007-2012 targeting political, economic and social 
grievances, the top ten regions30 do not differ from the rest of the country in approval patterns.  
 The interactions also bear little fruit. Regional democracy and growth in the 2000-2011 
period have neither absolute nor interactive effects on approval, although growth tends to 
marginally boost approval more in highly democratic regions. Counterintuitively, the predicted 
probability of approval among residents in democratic regions rises from approximately 67 percent 
to 87 percent as we move from a growth rate of 1 percent to a growth rate of 170 percent. This 
boost in predicted probability is at least 10 percentage points higher than in less democratic regions 
at high levels of growth. It is also curvilinear, suggesting some diminishing political returns to 
growth: increases in the predicted probability of approval at small levels of growth taper off as the 
growth level steepens. Ultimately, however, the growth effect is insignificant between levels of 
sub-national democracy if we account for regionally clustered standard errors in the probit 
estimation. As expected, there is no such interactive effect in the 2008-2011 growth period either 
(Appendix C1-2).  
 I also hypothesized that we would observe an interaction effect between initial GRP levels 
in either 2000 or 2008 and regional growth rates since those periods. Neither of these effects takes 
place. I estimated average marginal effects for the influence of growth on the predicted probability 
of approval across levels of initial GRP, maintaining the standard sociodemographic controls. I 
expected to see a negative interaction (the growth effect should be smaller for initially wealthy 
regions), but it is substantively and significantly not different from zero. Again, predictably, the 
effect is also non-existent in the 2008-2011 growth period (Appendix C3-4).  
                                                          
30 Moscow, St Petersburg, Samara, Moscow Oblast, Penza, Sverdlovsk, Voronezh, Primorsky Krai, Kaliningrad, 
Krasondar, Novosibirsk, Nizhegorodskaia, Chelyabinsk, Kirov, Ulyanovsk 
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 Granted the null effect of absolute socioeconomic performance and growth on approval, 
do economic perceptions retain an influence? To consider this possibility I drew on three questions 
measuring pocketbook evaluations, regional sociotropic evaluations and retrospective pocketbook 
evaluations.31 Unfortunately most of these variables are not scaled with enough nuance to capture 
enough observations across their range; only 6.45 percent of the sample marked that their personal 
financial situation is “really good” or “good,” 4.97 percent marked that their regional economic 
situation is “good” and 10 percent marked their situation as having improved over the past. Even 
with this limited scale and variability, we can still make some observations. First, each of these 
variables has a meaningful positive influence on approval which is significantly higher across each 
subsequent category despite the low number of observations at the top. Moving from evaluations 
that one’s personal material situation is “really bad” to “really good”, the predicted probability of 
approval increases from 53 percent to 90 percent. Moving from bad to good evaluations of regional 
economic performance, the predicted probability of approval increases from 59 percent to 92 
percent. Moving from those who believe their personal material situation has deteriorated to those 
who believe it has improved over the previous year, the predicted probability increases from 62 
percent to 86 percent.  
17 Table 5.4 Predicted Probabilities of Approval for Perceptions Predictors 
Pocketbook Really Bad Bad Medium Good Really Good 
 .527 .645 .751 .838 .902 
95% CI .477-.574 .606-.683 .719-.783 .809-.866 .876-.927 
Regional Sociotropic Bad Medium Good   
 .594 .789 .915   
95% CI .554-.634 .758-.821 .894-.936   
Retrospective Worse The Same Better   
 .617 .750 .854   
                                                          
31 Pocketbook: “How would you evaluate your current material situation” on a 5-point Likert scale from “very bad” 
to “very good”; Regional Sociotropic: “How would you currently assess the state of the economy in your region—
good, medium or bad?”; Retrospective Pocketbook: “What do you think, has your material situation in the last year 
improved, deteriorated or stayed the same?”  
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95% CI .577-.656 .722-.779 .833-.876   
Note: These predicted probabilities are calculated holding all predictors at their means, medians or modes. 
 
 As a second observation, there are no meaningful correlations between any relatively 
objective measures and subjective perceptions of economic performance. Growth is not associated 
with pocketbook evaluations (correlation= -0.02), regional sociotropic evaluations (-0.03) or 
retrospective evaluations of the economy (-0.02). Absolute GRP across regions in 2011 is also 
unrelated to these perceptions (with respective correlations at -0.03, -0.09 and -0.03). 
 It remains puzzling that economic perceptions are not linked to real performance. What 
explains this gap? Growth alone boosts neither incumbent approval nor perceptions of economic 
performance. One limited hypothesis we could test is that people may be prone to believe they are 
doing better when they also have some political freedom. Residents of more repressive regions 
may in turn be more likely to discount official news, statistics or notions that their lives are better 
than they actually are. Unfortunately there is no easy way to test this proposition with the coarsely 
scaled perceptions data at hand. If we take the perceptions variable with the most variation at the 
top of its scale, retrospective pocketbook evaluations, we find that growth enhances the predicted 
probability of reporting a positive retrospective evaluation of one’s material status, but again, this 
estimate is not significantly different from more repressive regions (Appendix C5). This null effect 
is likely an artifact of poor data and should be re-examined in empirical contexts with more 
differentiated survey scales of economic perceptions.   
 In the absence of longitudinal approval data, it can still be possible that real growth has had 
a cumulative positive influence on approval over time. At present, however, the lack of an effect 
at two different time lags is consistent with other survey-based literature which has turned out 





 Contrary to my expectations, Putin’s approval rating was not vulnerable to internal 
variation in absolute levels of socioeconomic performance or long-term growth months prior to 
the largest protest breakout in the country’s post-Soviet period. Despite substantial variation in 
economic performance across the country over time, it has been of little consequence for Russia’s 
reigning incumbent. It would appear from this analysis that Putin has significantly more control 
over the long-run post-material effects of economic development which have purportedly brought 
down long-term autocracies in the third wave of democratization. On the other hand, such results 
might only signify the limits of what we can learn about regime stability from the study of public 
opinion. If the standard economic theory does not fit, what are the real foundations of incumbent 
approval in hybrid authoritarian regimes like Russia, and why do the approval patterns fail to map 
onto real manifestations of dissidence? 
 There remains a gap between literatures on regional politics, public opinion and social 
movements which deserves exploration. Examining the implications of regional diversity in 
Russian socioeconomic performance, Zubarevich (2012) argues that “the increasing concentration 
of active and well educated citizens in the big cities tolls the death knell of the ‘power vertical.’” 
She speaks to the concentration of internet users in large cities, whose desire to protest in 2011-
2012 was “not an economic crisis or a collapse in the price of oil, but rather a moral repugnance.” 
Lankina (2015) connects Zubarevich’s regionalism argument to social movement theory. Using 
the same regional democracy index as I use in this paper, Lankina (2015, 28) argues that high-
democracy regions with greater pluralism in civil and political life “retained their edge as entities 
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contributing to the generation of uncertainty faced by the federal electoral authoritarian regime, 
much more so than did the more docile regions that continued to engineer grotesquely large 
margins of victory and turnouts in federal elections.” She documents that most protests in 2011-
2012 occurred in what Zubarevich classifies as Russia 1 (cosmopolitan large cities) or Russia 2 
(industrial cities motivated by socioeconomic concerns) as opposed to Russias 3-4. 
 Granted the above data analysis, however, no regional characteristics predict the 
population’s approval of Putin, Medvedev, United Russia or the broader government prior to the 
protest wave. Russias 1-4 are on equal standing with regards to perceptions of Putin. Moscow is 
equivalent in approval to the poorest regions in the country. Docile regions are as supportive of 
Putin and company as the most liberated and plural. The usual suspects behind democratic 
flourishing in modernization theory—education, income, urbanity, internet usage and youth—
have almost consistent null effects on approval of all of the above, with the youth being more pro-
Putin and education exerting a very modest corrosive effect (the predicted probability of approval 
of Putin remains at 68 percent among the highest educated strata in the sample). Contrary to 
Zubarevich’s argument, this collection of regional and individual factors does not carry the seeds 
of dissidence or forebode the death knell of the “power vertical.” What explains the simultaneous 
uniformity of approval and the diversity of anti-regime social mobilization across the country? 
 Smyth (2014, 570) argues that trust in Putin is tied to personalism, a “composite mixture 
of a charismatic myth, effective state management, and a symbolic ideology that portray Mr. Putin 
as the source of Russian stability and architect of Russian revival…” In her analysis of the 2011-
12 protests, she argues that rival narratives and opinion data in the pro- and anti-Putin rallies 
illuminate a “clear attitudinal and behavioral divide within the Russian population” (ibid., 585). 
Those on Putin’s side defended his role as a steward of both state and economy while anti-Putin 
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protesters aimed to undermine the personalism of such appeals. But much like Zubarevich’s and 
Lankina’s assessments, claims about fissures in public dispositions toward the state within the 
country should be moderated. Given the near uniformity of support for Putin in what appeared to 
be the most vulnerable point of his tenure, we should not miss the forest for the trees by inferring 
population characteristics from the vantage point of the protests. 
 At the same time, this latter point depends on our object of inquiry. Protests are better 
indicators of political legitimacy than approval ratings in so far as they indicate citizens’ 
unwillingness to accept the authorities as rightful holders of power. Demonstrations of public 
dissidence erode the veneer of the regime’s invincibility, helping citizens imagine an alternative 
universe to the status quo. The implications of such anti-regime acts on the public imagination can 
be crippling for the incumbent, however small or geographically confined they start out. 
Responding to the latest wave of anti-Putin protests in early February 2017, Sam Greene argues 
that Putin’s approval ratings are not a matter of fear but people’s conviction that they are  
living in a country where there were no alternatives, and thus no choices to be made, a 
country in which society could not be pushed to act on its own behalf, in which solidarity 
extends no further than rhetoric… Imagination matters in politics. When dealing with the 
past and present, we can hope to rely on fact… The future, however, is always imagined. 
What happened today demonstrated the imagination watershed in Russia, between those 
who cannot imagine a future much better than today, and those who can. That’s why the 
Kremlin went hard at Navalny and the protesters today; to restore the confidence of the 
unimaginative.32  
 Indeed, we find in my analysis that the economic imagination matters more for approval 
than economic circumstances. Regardless of one’s current or past wellbeing, the past can be re-
imagined and a better future can always be anticipated. The fact that young people in their twenties 
                                                          
32 This came from a blog post in the immediate aftermath of the April 2017 protests: 
https://moscowonthames.wordpress.com/2017/03/26/game-on/. Alexey Navalny is an oppositional leader and 
prospective 2018 presidential candidate who incited the latest anti-corruption protest wave. 
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are more likely to approve of Putin by 10-12 percentage points more than their grandparents is 
also striking. These people were too young to remember the 1990s or the Soviet Union, historical 
comparisons which are part and parcel of the state’s narrative about stability under Putin. Their 
allegiance to the regime is less likely a function of bad memories as positive expectations of the 
future. In this sense, Smyth’s analysis of the different narratives about regime legitimacy between 
pro- and anti-Putin protesters is important. Political legitimacy in Russia will likely depend more 
on who ends up controlling this narrative and less on economic conditions. The Kremlin’s 
investment into an expansive propaganda machine is consistent with this rationale (Pomerantsev 
2014) and helps explain Putin’s sustained approval ratings despite a heavy recession compounded 
by sanctions between 2014 and 2016.  
 Interestingly, using such data, we could not have predicted the latest protest wave in April 
2017, which was populated largely by young students across the country. Their ability to imagine 
an alternative future cannot be reaped from individual sociodemographic characteristics or 
structural variables at the country or region level. Social mobilization is not linearly or randomly 
distributed. Personal histories, network effects and triggers interact with the environment in 
complex ways which require mixed methodologies to uncover. The discovery of how competing 
imaginations emerge and spread will say more about the vulnerabilities of hybrid political regimes 
like Russia than brute facts about economic structure. In this way, static approval ratings and 
dynamic social mobilization patterns are empirically compatible phenomena. The uniformity of 
incumbent approval can be a chimera, something which is susceptible to sudden shifts in ways of 
thinking about the political future. My data analysis in this chapter speaks to the weakness of 
popular theories about the influence of economic growth and regional characteristics on Putin’s 
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popularity, but we can ultimately infer little from such data about the foundations of political 




6 Conclusion  
 
 This dissertation combines commentaries on the methodology of cross-national public 
opinion research and the comparative political economy of political trust formation across the 
regime spectrum. I have attempted to shed light on how economic incentives shape political beliefs 
and corruption responsiveness in understudied parts of the former Soviet space. Why do 
governments known for their corruption maintain high levels of political trust in Latin America, 
China and Central Asia? Do autocrats and democrats alike use economic tools to muffle corruption 
resentment and depoliticize society? Does economic development serve as an opiate for the masses 
in corrupt systems of governance? How can we best compare sensitive attitudes across open and 
closed societies? My research makes very modest inroads into these questions, focusing on macro-
level theories and cross-national survey data in the former Soviet space while leaving immense 
room for targeted theory building about causal mechanisms, exploration of novel case studies and 
methodological innovation in the study of political trust around the world. 
 The expansion of survey data into developing and authoritarian countries in the last decade 
has complicated our understanding of what it means to trust a political institution, what constitutes 
corruption and how to compare these concepts intelligibly around the world. In the first empirical 
chapter of this dissertation (Chapter 2), I use multiple group confirmatory factor analysis, a subset 
of structural equation modeling, to test the cross-national validity and measurement equivalence 
of political trust.  I show that averaging sets of standard survey questions using a “kitchen sink” 
approach can mask significant differences in how people interpret those questions across the 
regime spectrum. Mostly due to data limitations, this test of measurement equivalence does not 
fully address mounting concerns about the gap between concept building and operationalization 
in the political trust literature. That is, I do not begin with a sophisticated, detailed account of 
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political trust and test its validity and equivalence across the countries in the survey data. I show, 
however, that naïve index building even with the simplest questions about institutional trust can 
make for a clumsy mean comparison in cross-regime contexts. Building survey questions around 
more sophisticated concepts is a needed effort, but requires sufficient care to avoid idealism in 
measurement building which can distort the validity and comparability of survey questions in 
different contexts. Perhaps the best way to reconcile the largeness of the N and the richness of the 
locale in measurement building is to conduct meaningful ethnographic research and probing 
studies which capture local knowledge about the concept under study and allow the researcher to 
parse out elements of measurements which can and cannot be generalized across societies. Probing 
studies can incorporate small and large sample sizes. With small samples, researchers can conduct 
focus groups across populations in which respondents are asked to react to different question 
wording and phrasing. With larger samples, researchers can ask open-ended questions about what 
sensitive constructs (like political legitimacy or corruption) mean to people in different 
populations, and one can probe such narratives using quantitative text or discourse analysis (see 
Braun et al. 2014 for a comprehensive literature overview). Opportunities for such detailed work 
are ripe, as public opinion research in developing and authoritarian countries is still very young. 
 In the body of my thesis (Chapters 3 and 4), I examined the applicability of the theory of 
corruption tradeoff in the former Soviet space, where citizens of some autocracies have 
extraordinarily high levels of trust in their political institutions despite registering the highest petty 
corruption perceptions in the region. Popular theories of corruption tolerance in Latin America 
suggest that citizens hold politicians less accountable for corruption in good economic times or 
when they are the beneficiaries of short term welfare transfers. I examined the moderating 
influence of different indicators of economic satisfaction and flourishing on how citizens most 
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affected by petty corruption trust their presidents and political institutions in the former Soviet 
space. I found little evidence, however, to suggest that citizens in former Soviet countries trade off 
concerns about corruption when they are (or believe they are) prospering at an individual, regional 
or national level. In fact, high corruption perceivers in among the most politically trusting countries 
in the sample, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, demonstrated the lowest trust in their political 
institutions. Citizens of autocracies in general tend to reward political institutions more for “goods” 
(like economic performance) and punish them more for “bads” (like corruption) than their 
counterparts in democracies, although there is interesting variation in corruption responsiveness 
among Central Asian autocracies that deserves future study. It would be incorrect to discard such 
high-trust data among authoritarian countries on the assumption that respondents are too afraid to 
reveal their true opinions. Granted a scatterplot of the cross-country relationship between 
corruption and trust, it would also be an ecological fallacy to infer individual-level characteristics 
from cross-national aggregates of public opinion. Theories about preference falsification or 
cultural path dependence on petty corruption do not stand up to test when we observe that citizens 
in among the most bribe-dependent cultures in the sample respond overwhelmingly negatively to 
such abuses when rating their political institutions.  
 The puzzle of these chapters was ultimately about the concurrence of high trust and high 
petty corruption (rather than grand corruption), making it an imperfect test of the external validity 
of corruption tradeoff theory. While my data did not allow me to check the robustness of my results 
to grand corruption measures (due to their absence from the survey), I was able to replicate a study 
by Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) on corruption tradeoff in Latin America, finding 
that the sign of the interaction flips when we replace grand with petty corruption perceptions. 
Consistent with my own results, petty corruption perceivers who are increasingly satisfied with 
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their economic conditions progressively downgrade their trust in political institutions. Economic 
improvements appear to magnify rather than mitigate the influence of direct extortion on political 
attitudes. This presidential penalty does not appear to have any relation to postmaterial values as 
measured by critical orientations toward authority, preferences for democracy or elections, or the 
moral condemnation of various corrupt practices. The results to such sensitivity checks suggest 
that economically satisfied corruption perceivers are not necessarily exercising more sophisticated 
notions of political accountability or employing stricter standards for governance than their less 
satisfied counterparts. Being fed up with corruption appears not to require a liberal or postmaterial 
attitudinal basis. 
The findings in this section also offer an avenue for testing the causal influence of different 
kinds of corruption on political attitudes with survey or field experiments in democratic and non-
democratic contexts. The implications of such extended research can be useful in understanding 
reform traps in clientelist democracies and autocracies: on the one hand, people might be willing 
to overlook large scale corruption; on the other, constant exploitation at the hands of government-
run schools, hospitals or bureaucracies instigates dissatisfaction with the authorities which only 
gets worse in boom times. One set of mechanisms demobilizes society while the other mobilizes 
it. One can help politicians get away with large scale malfeasance while the other might encourage 
citizens to hold political institutions more accountable for institutional dysfunction. Understanding 
this interesting push and pull can inform literatures on the political economy of development and 
transition about the causes of bottom-up pressure for reform in corrupt systems of governance.  
 In Chapter 5, I continued my exploration of the economic influence of political approval 
in a single case study, leaving behind perceptions indicators and focusing on the influence of more 
objective measures of absolute socioeconomic performance and growth across the diverse Russian 
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territory.  Despite significant variation in economic performance and institutional openness across 
the country, these factors are not linked to citizens’ support of Putin. Modernization theory from 
the 1960s and 70s would suggest that economic development gives rise to democratization in the 
long term. Yet large scale societal enrichment is not straightforwardly tied to attitudinal shifts or 
demands for change in modern autocracies like Russia and China. Both regimes have demonstrated 
resilience to any potentially liberalizing consequences of economic growth, engaging in forms of 
authoritarian entrepreneurship to control the narratives that guide popular imaginations about their 
political futures (Pomerantsev 2016, Brady 2016). The study of this narrative control will likely 
prove to be more informative about authoritarian political legitimacy than economic structure. The 
incumbent approval data I used in this chapter could not have predicted the imminent outbreak of 
the largest anti-regime protests in Russia’s post-Soviet history, nor their geographical distribution. 
Survey data analysis does not adequately tap into the systematic, non-linear influences on people’s 
motivations to challenge regime-led narratives. Social network analysis, process tracing and 
ethnographic work can crucially supplement survey data to uncover the content of such 
motivations. By moving beyond structural arguments and illuminating the role of the political 
imagination, we can better understand the foundations of authoritarian resilience and vulnerability 
in the twenty-first century.  
 Political trust is an incredibly important binding force between governors and governed, 
both in its benign capacity to support democratic processes and its pernicious capacity to advance 
authoritarianism. Understanding the incentives and notions which undergird this trust can 
illuminate why some political systems change and others survive. In his most recent work, 
Granovetter (2017, 75-79) reviews notions and applications of trust in social and economic life, 
arguing that the term is relevant to far more than proximate relationships between individuals. He 
184 
 
argues that Hardin’s view about the necessity of personal familiarity and interest encapsulation for 
trusting relationships to work would recommend too mechanistic and flawed a view of social 
cooperation in which all manner of interactions in public (non-intimate) life would have to be seen 
as the result of rules, sanctions or path dependent norms. This is typically not the case in small 
communities, market settings or large political societies. I believe Granovetter is correct in arguing 
that “it is more fruitful to theorize at both small- and large-scale levels under what circumstances 
people assume that others in a position to hurt their interests will not do so” (ibid., 80, my italics). 
Trust is conceptually relevant to a variety of empirical settings. Indeed, when it comes to politics, 
trustees in power are in a position to cause immense potential harm to their truster-constituents. 
Constituents’ expectations and attitudes toward these actors are far from irrelevant in the social 
science research landscape on trust. As we obtain better opinion data in hard to reach empirical 
settings across the world, we will develop a better understanding of the ties that bind us not only 
to each other, but to the political systems that help determine our ability to live well and freely. 














Appendix A (Ch. 2) 
1) Fit Statistics for Models 1-4 
2) Standardized factor loadings for each model  
3) Table of trust means per country 
 
1) Global Fit Statistics for each model 







           
RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Reg & Loc 
Error  
Corr (SE)  




Azerbaijan 27.055 0.076 0.993 0.013 .199 (.047)  
Turkey 54.334 0.112 0.979 0.023 .252 (.043) REG WITH GOV    42.165 (.344) 
Tajikistan 116.876 0.168 0.966 0.026 .298 (.055) 
 
REG WITH GOV    112.105 (.644)      
LOC WITH GOV  60.538 (-.370) 
Belarus 55.132 0.12 0.986 0.015 .321 (.046) 
 
PARL WITH REG    46.304 (-.421)      
REG WITH GOV   46.037 (.712) 
Uzbekistan 63.597 0.103 0.991 0.012 .323 (.035) 
 
PARL WITH REG    31.897 (-.266)       
REG WITH GOV   31.484 (.273) 
Bosnia 92.748 0.144 0.983 0.015 .329 (.038) 
 
REG WITH GOV      83.420 (.512)      
PARL WITH REG  40.389  (-.363) 
Ukraine 42.524 0.079 0.991 0.013 .388 (.027) 
 
REG WITH GOV     32.756 (.277) 
Russia 96.368 0.122 0.979 0.021 .422 (.029) 
 
REG WITH GOV     79.976 (.337) 
Kyrgyzstan 117.887 0.169 0.945 0.045 .435 (.045) 
 
POLP WITH PARL   98.104 (.422)        
REG WITH GOV   65.924 (.417) 
France 10.609 0.04 0.995 0.012 .447 (.027)  
Estonia 25.617 0.074 0.98 0.023 .455 (.033)  
Sweden 6.946 0.029 0.998 0.009 .455 (.034)  
Serbia 73.822 0.108 0.984 0.015 .478 (.025) 
REG WITH GOV   71.166 (.303)     
LOC WITH GOV   42.352 (-0.201) 
Germany 21.836 0.066 0.994 0.013 .495 (.028)  
Czech 
Republic 21.142 0.065 0.992 0.018 .515 (.025)  
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Kazakhstan 22.489 0.07 0.995 0.011 .516 (.030)  
Armenia 45.584 0.105 0.988 0.015 .522 (.029) 
POLP WITH PARL  33.648 (.282)    
REG WITH GOV   31.635  (.319) 
Slovakia 13.838 0.05 0.996 0.01 .529 (.026)  
Italy 30.85 0.08 0.991 0.013 .531 (.024) REG WITH GOV    31.029  (.230) 
Moldova 30.485 0.08 0.993 0.009 .557 (.026)  
Mongolia 29.031 0.080 0.988 0.019 .569 (.028)  
Lithuania 12.378 0.046 0.995 0.015 .580 (.026)  
Georgia 15.397 0.055 0.997 0.011 .594 (.028)  
Bulgaria 57.393 0.115 0.978 0.026 .595 (.025) 
POLP WITH PARL   36.549 (.391)     
POLP WITH GOV   32.086 (-.313) 
Albania 113.962 0.163 0.957 0.029 .598 (.023) 
REG WITH GOV   91.411 (.449)     
PARL WITH REG  70.629 (-.296) 
Poland 72.349 0.104 0.986 0.019 .638 (.017) 
 
POLP WITH PARL  51.173 (.317)   
REG WITH GOV    45.010  (.180) 
Romania 43.027 0.096 0.984 0.017 .665 (.018) 
 
REG WITH GOV   30.630 (.174) 
Croatia 26.129 0.074 0.993 0.012 .707 (.017)  
 
Note:  
All correlations are significant (p<0.01) 
REG= regional government; LOC=local government, PARL=parliament, GOV=government, 
POLP=political parties. WITH = suggestion of an error correlation.  
 
 
Fit Statistics: Model 2 Political and Protective Trust (Bi-dimensional model) 
Country Chi Square RMSEA  CFI  SRMR   Factor Corr         
Modification Index (EPC), 
standardized 
 
Italy 9.44 0.036 0.998 0.014 0.327 (.032)  
Great Britain 3.519 0 1 0.006 0.372 (.040)  
Romania 6.375 0.024 0.999 0.014 0.418 (.032)   
Kosovo 26.81 0.073 0.991 0.013 0.443 (.030)  
Czech Rep 24.379 0.071 0.990 0.024 0.473 (.033)  
Croatia 10.933 0.042 0.997 0.012 0.491 (.031)  
Turkey 11.895 0.044 0.995 0.015 0.503 (.034)  
Slovakia 22.731 0.068 0.991 0.02 0.514 (.030)  
Bosnia 90.723 0.142 0.974 0.042 0.558 (.025) 
PROTECT BY POLP  50.043 (.206)  
PARL WITH GOV  50.038  (2.011) 
Latvia 17.92 0.059 0.988 0.017 0.558 (.038)  
Slovenia 35.172 0.089 0.981 0.024 0.561 (.032)  
Poland 17.315 0.046 0.996 0.012 0.562 (.023)  
Serbia 8.506 0.027 0.999 0.008 0.572 (.023)  
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Lithuania 18.094 0.059 0.988 0.023 0.573 (.040)  
Germany 16.202 0.054 0.993 0.017 0.592 (.035)  
Mongolia 9.704 0.038 0.995 0.013 0.595 (.037)  
Estonia 26.477 0.075 0.978 0.024 0.605 (.038)  
France 3.479 0 1 0.009 0.610 (.031)  
Hungary 42.114 0.096 0.985 0.032 0.624 (.025) 
PROTECT BY POLP 40.678  (.237)      
PARL WITH GOV  40.690 (983) 
Sweden 14.107 0.053 0.988 0.021 0.638 (.044)  
Albania 14.291 0.05 0.993 0.018 0.644 (.032)  
Bulgaria 28.084 0.078 0.987 0.022 0.650 (.029)  
Georgia 6.591 0.026 0.999 0.013 0.665 (.024)  
Macedonia 18.142 0.058 0.994 0.016 0.683 (.024)  
Belarus 52.419 0.114 0.973 0.037 0.694 (.029) 
 
POL WITH POLP 45.759  (.389)        
PROTECT BY POLP 36.044  (.331)    
Ukraine 33.387 0.069 0.990 0.021 0.727 (.023) 
 
PROTECT BY POLP 31.092  (.250)      
PARL WITH GOV  31.078  (.626) 
Moldova 45.722 0.101 0.986 0.027 0.731 (.024) 
 
PROTECT BY POLP  37.570 (.267)     
PARL WITH GOV 37.544  (1.170) 
Armenia 20.414 0.065 0.992 0.015 0.733 (.030) 
 
 
Kyrgyzstan 23.286 0.07 0.984 0.022 0.747 (.030)  
Montenegro 46.607 0.105 0.985 0.027 0.767 (.019) 
PROTECT BY POLP  24.899 (.245)     
PARL WITH GOV  24.886 (.841) 
Russia 18.488 0.048 0.995 0.012 0.776 (.021)  
 
 
Tajikistan 43.479 0.099 0.982 0.026 0.786 (.021) 
PROTECT BY PARL 28.542 (-.422)        
POLP WITH GOV  28.536 (-.275) 
Kazakhstan 65.451 0.127 0.973 0.036 0.790 (.023) 
 
PROTECT BY POLP  64.943 (.501)  
PROTECT WITH GOV  64.942  (1.233) 
Azerbaijan 56.406 0.115 0.977 0.028 0.798 (.025) 
 
POLP WITH GOV 43.184 (.519)          
PROTECT BY GOV 43.180 (.382) 
Uzbekistan 178.838 0.175 0.961 0.046 0.809 (.014) 
 
PROTECT BY POLP 121.964 (.510)      
PARL WITH GOV  121.952 (1.686) 
 
Note:  
All correlations are significant (p<0.01) 
PARL=parliament, GOV=government, POLP=political parties, PROTECT = protective institutional trust 
factor, POLIT = political trust factor. WITH = suggestion of an error correlation. BY = suggestion of an 





Fit Statistics: Model 3 Courts and Police Error Correlation   
Country Chi Square RMSEA  CFI  SRMR   Error Corr         
Modification Index (EPC), 
 standardized 
Kosovo 42.680 0.094 0.984 0.019 -0.050 (.035) COURTS WITH POLP 38.429 
Albania 46.761 0.102 0.976 0.024 0.056 (.036) COURTS WITH GOV 33.882 (-.271) 
Georgia 91.029 0.149 0.964 0.036 0.089 (.039) COURTS WITH POLP 62.319 (.309) 
Mongolia 13.936 0.050 0.992 0.015 0.104 (.037)  
Tajikistan 54.436 0.112 0.978 0.026 0.135 (.045)  
Azerbaijan 53.178 0.111 0.984 0.021 0.149 (.042) POLICE WITH GOV 38.830 (.241) 
Macedonia 45.438 0.099 0.980 0.021 0.154 (.035) POLICE WITH GOV 37.244 
Montenegro 48.297 0.107 0.986 0.019 0.198 (.037) PARL WITH GOV 32.852 (.640) 
Estonia  19.052 0.062 0.985 0.021 0.204 (.037)  
Italy 51.661 0.107 0.875 0.025 0.209 (.031) COURTS WITH POLP 34.431 (.203) 
Bulgaria 80.042 0.138 0.959 0.034 0.236 (.035) PARL WITH GOV 47.837 (.544) 
France 26.188 0.074 0.983 0.018 0.242 (.033)  
Croatia 20.695 0.065 0.992 0.015 0.251 (.032)  
Latvia 6.581 0.025 0.998 0.012 0.266 (.034)  
Britain 7.865 0.026 0.998 0.009 0.280 (.025)  
Turkey 25.545 0.073 0.986 0.021 0.280 (.033)  
Romania 22.427 0.066 0.990 0.018 0.284 (.031)  
Sweden 18.443 0.063 0.984 0.023 0.284 (.033)  
Belarus 65.173 0.128 0.970 0.043 0.285 (.034)  
Armenia  26.308 0.076 0.992 0.017 0.291 (.039) PARL WITH GOV 56.504 (1.856) 
Serbia 12.496 0.038 0.997 0.009 0.295 (.026)  
Kyrgyzstan 23.271 0.069 0.984 0.021 0.298 (.036)  
Kazakhstan 102.756 0.161 0.963 0.038 0.351 (.034) PARL WITH GOV 105.577 (1.085) 
Lithuania 21.023  0.065 0.987 0.024 0.356 (.030)  
Czech Rep 61.840 0.120 0.971 0.032 0.375 (.029) PARL WITH GOV 58.853 (.899) 
Poland 26.718 0.060 0.993 0.013 0.376 (.024)  
Russia  28.776 0.063  0.992 0.017 0.380 (.027)  
Slovakia  31.169  0.082 0.988 0.022 0.395 (.029)  
Moldova 59.483 0.116 0.983 0.028 0.407 (.030) PARL WITH GOV 41.269 
Hungary 42.901 0.097 0.984 0.026 0.426 (.028)  
Ukraine 40.486 0.077 0.989 0.023 0.429 (.023) PARL WITH GOV 34.879 
Bosnia 100.788 0.150 0.971 0.035 0.432 (.026) PARL WITH GOV 91.344 (1.721) 
Germany 8.843 0.034 0.998 0.013 0.440 (.026)  
Uzbekistan 236.213 0.202 0.951 0.052 0.496 (.023) PARL WITH GOV 172.738 (1.964) 
 
All correlations are significant (p<0.01) 





Fit statistics: Model 4 (Simple) 
Country Chi Square RMSEA CFI SRMR 
Modification Index (EPC),  
standardized 
 
Albania 15.208  0.080   0.991  0.018   
Armenia 9.499 0.063   0..997  0.010   
Azerbaijan 7.280  0.051  0.997  0.010   
Belarus 1.499  0.000  1.000  0.004   
Bosnia 15.152  0.078  0.996  0.009   
Bulgaria 39.545  0.137  0.975  0.024  
PARL WITH LOC  33.975 (-.326) 
POLP WITH GOV  33.983 (-.373) 
Croatia 5.515  0.042  0.998  0.008    
Czech Rep 13.745  0.076  0.992  0.017   
Estonia 2.085  0.007  1.000  0.010   
France 2.362  0.013  1.000  0.008   
Georgia 3.063  0.024  1.000  0.007   
Germany 15.686  0.081  0.993  0.013   
Great Britain 3.173  0.020  1.000  0.006   
Hungary 24.328  0.104  0.989  0.020  
PARL WITH GOV  22.975 (-0.667) 
POLP WITH LOC  22.967  (-0.178) 
Italy 0.541  0.000  1.000  0.003   
Kazakhstan 9.819  0.064  0.996  0.009    
Kosovo 34.128  0.122  0.986  0.019  
 LOC WITH GOV 34.900  (0.266) 
 POLP WITH PARL 34.903 (0.425) 
Kyrgyzstan 53.980  0.162  0.946  0.036  
 
 LOC WITH GOV 54.637 (.402) 
 POLP WITH PARL 54.602 (.467) 
Latvia 9.849  0.063  0.992  0.015   
Lithuania 4.604  0.036  0.997  0.011   
Macedonia 1.808  0.000  1.000  0.005   
Moldova 7.092  0.050  0.998  0.006   
Mongolia 9.581  0.062  0.994  0.015       
Montenegro 47.674  0.154  0.982  0.018  
 PARL WITH LOC 38.086 (-.404) 
 POLP WITH GOV 38.083 (-.115) 
Poland 24.925  0.085  0.992  0.015  
  
 LOC WITH GOV 23.558 (.194) 
 POLP WITH PARL 23.558 (.266) 
Romania 5.542  0.041  0.997  0.011   
Russia 9.817  0.050  0.997  0.010   
Serbia 2.136  0.007  1.000  0.004    
Slovakia 5.179  0.040  0.998   0.008   
Slovenia 7.534 0.053 0.995 0.012  
Sweden 2.971  0.023  0.999  0.008    
Tajikistan 7.280  0.051  0.997  0.010    
Turkey 13.177  0.075  0.993  0.015    
Ukraine 4.193  0.027  0.999  0.007   
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Uzbekistan 27.013 0.094 0.994 0.012  
Note:  PARL=parliament, GOV=government, POLP=political parties, LOC= local government, WITH = 
suggestion of an error correlation.  
 
2) Standardized factor loadings for each model 
 
STANDARDIZED FACTOR LOADINGS Model 1 Trust in political institutions in relation to 














Azerbaijan 0.797 (0.014) 0.897 (0.009) 0.766 (0.015) 0.871 (0.011) 0.840 (0.013) 
Turkey 0.817 (0.014) 0.819 (0.015) 0.521 (0.026) 0.780 (0.017) 0.803 (0.016) 
Tajikistan 0.840 (0.012) 0.842 (0.013) 0.587 (0.024) 0.852 (0.013) 0.908 (0.010) 
Belarus 0.945 (0.006) 0.863 (0.010) 0.549 (0.026) 0.837 (0.013) 0.933 (0.007) 
Uzbekistan 0.925 (0.005) 0.920 (0.005) 0.726 (0.014) 0.883 (0.007) 0.927 (0.005) 
Bosnia 0.916 (0.006) 0.919 (0.006) 0.723 (0.016) 0.859 (0.009) 0.933 (0.006) 
Ukraine 0.877 (0.009) 0.841 (0.010) 0.694 (0.015) 0.629 (0.018) 0.836 (0.010) 
Russia 0.809 (0.012) 0.879 (0.010) 0.668 (0.017) 0.773 (0.013) 0.842 (0.011) 
Kyrgyzstan 0.708 (0.021) 0.667 (0.025) 0.573 (0.028) 0.742 (0.023) 0.824 (0.021) 
France 0.735 (0.021) 0.803 (0.020) 0.591 (0.025) 0.399 (0.031) 0.548 (0.027) 
Estonia 0.733 (0.025) 0.832 (0.025) 0.475 (0.031) 0.386 (0.032) 0.539 (0.034) 
Sweden 0.785 (0.020) 0.808 (0.021) 0.611 (0.025) 0.687 (0.024) 0.687 (0.024) 
Serbia 0.855 (0.010) 0.880 (0.009) 0.722 (0.014) 0.696 (0.015) 0.784 (0.013) 
Germany 0.893 (0.010) 0.838 (0.012) 0.649 (0.020) 0.708 (0.018) 0.809 (0.013) 
Czech 
Republic 0.837 (0.014) 0.870 (0.013) 0.700 (0.019) 0.468 (0.027) 0.613 (0.023) 
Kazakhstan 0.918 (0.008) 0.872 (0.010) 0.692 (0.020) 0.806 (0.014) 0.857 (0.011) 
Armenia 0.921 (0.008) 0.898 (0.009) 0.723 (0.018) 0.752 (0.016) 0.873 (0.010) 
Slovakia 0.867 (0.012) 0.860 (0.012) 0.732 (0.017) 0.578 (0.024) 0.740 (0.017) 
Italy 0.873 (0.012) 0.859 (0.012) 0.721 (0.017) 0.569 (0.023) 0.713 (0.018) 
Moldova 0.933 (0.007) 0.909 (0.008) 0.783 (0.014) 0.703 (0.017) 0.843 (0.011) 
Lithuania 0.781 (0.020) 0.798 (0.019) 0.623 (0.024) 0.480 (0.029) 0.643 (0.025) 
Georgia 0.931 (0.007) 0.906 (0.008) 0.532 (0.025) 0.855 (0.011) 0.884 (0.010) 
Bulgaria 0.794 (0.016) 0.836 (0.015) 0.737 (0.019) 0.607 (0.024) 0.720 (0.020) 
Mongolia 0.815 (0.017) 0.781 (0.019) 0.675 (0.022) 0.634 (0.025) 0.741 (0.020) 
Albania 0.870 (0.015) 0.785 (0.017) 0.624 (0.023) 0.604 (0.023) 0.713 (0.019) 
Poland 0.834 (0.011) 0.866 (0.010) 0.696 (0.015) 0.706 (0.015) 0.746 (0.014) 
Romania 0.809 (0.016) 0.863 (0.015) 0.624 (0.023) 0.534 (0.025) 0.612 (0.023) 
Croatia 0.859 (0.012) 0.866 (0.012) 0.735 (0.017) 0.630 (0.022) 0.699 (0.019) 
 




STANDARDIZED FACTOR LOADINGS Model 2 Trust in political and protective institutions 
Country 
Trust in   
Government  





Trust in  
Police  
Trust in Armed  
Forces         
Italy 0.845 (0.014)  0.884 (0.013)  0.728 (0.017)  0.891 (0.032)  0.887 (0.032) 
Great Britain 0.831 (0.013)  0.866 (0.013)  0.694 (0.016)  0.835 (0.071)  0.415 (0.041)  
Romania 0.769 (0.018)  0.907 (0.016)  0.615 (0.023)  0.887 (0.032)  0.787 (0.030)  
Kosovo 0.767 (0.016)  0.919 (0.012)  0.768 (0.016)  0.872 (0.028)  0.816 (0.027)  
Czech Rep 0.812 (0.015)  0.883 (0.014)  0.718 (0.019)  0.861 (0.034)  0.726 (0.031)  
Croatia 0.844 (0.014)  0.882 (0.013)  0.737 (0.018)  0.827 (0.030)  0.782 (0.029)  
Turkey 0.757 (0.021)  0.882 (0.020)  0.540 (0.026)  0.888 (0.034)  0.688 (0.031)  
Slovakia 0.848 (0.014)  0.873 (0.013)  0.744 (0.017)  0.884 (0.028)  0.754 (0.027)  
Bosnia 0.871 (0.010)  0.958 (0.008)  0.743 (0.015)  0.925 (0.020)  0.799 (0.020)  
Latvia 0.749 (0.022)  0.849 (0.020)  0.613 (0.025)  0.647 (0.037)  0.729 (0.038)  
Slovenia 0.786 (0.018)  0.871 (0.017)  0.629 (0.023)  0.820 (0.030)  0.726 (0.029)  
Poland 0.805 (0.013)  0.888 (0.011)  0.713 (0.015)  0.831 (0.020)  0.802 (0.020)  
Serbia 0.842 (0.011)  0.890 (0.010)  0.728 (0.014)  0.896 (0.021)  0.735 (0.020)  
Lithuania 0.748 (0.021)  0.816 (0.020)  0.648 (0.024)  0.617 (0.038)  0.658 (0.040)  
Germany 0.838 (0.015)  0.887 (0.014)  0.667 (0.020)  0.708 (0.036)  0.590 (0.034)  
Mongolia 0.767 (0.021)  0.824 (0.020)  0.698 (0.022)  0.679 (0.035)  0.684 (0.035)  
Estonia 0.760 (0.025)  0.802 (0.025)  0.479 (0.031)  0.666 (0.035)  0.693 (0.036)  
France 0.767 (0.022)  0.780 (0.021)  0.577 (0.026)  0.802 (0.028)  0.729 (0.028)  
Hungary 0.840 (0.013)  0.893 (0.012)  0.722 (0.018)  0.840 (0.019)   0.866 (0.019)  
Sweden 0.782 (0.023)  0.802 (0.025)  0.615 (0.027)  0.528 (0.038)  0.730 (0.044)  
Albania 0.797 (0.017)  0.832 (0.016)  0.681 (0.021)  0.653 (0.020)  0.741 (0.031)  
Bulgaria 0.755 (0.018)  0.860 (0.015)  0.754 (0.018)  0.831 (0.025)  0.749 (0.025)  
Georgia 0.930 (0.011)  0.905 (0.012)  0.538 (0.025)  0.852 (0.019)  0.820 (0.020)  
Macedonia 0.811 (0.016)  0.834 (0.016)  0.682 (0.020)  0.853 (0.019)  0.812 (0.019)  
Belarus 0.893 (0.012)  0.913 (0.012)  0.580 (0.026)  0.867 (0.029)  0.619 (0.029)  
Ukraine 0.834 (0.011)  0.876 (0.010)  0.710 (0.015)  0.724 (0.021)  0.693 (0.021)  
Moldova 0.906 (0.008)  0.931 (0.008)  0.796 (0.013)  0.746 (0.022)  0.780 (0.022)  
Armenia 0.874 (0.011)  0.938 (0.009)  0.745 (0.017)  0.868 (0.030)  0.533 (0.029)  
Kyrgyzstan 0.518 (0.029)  0.752 (0.024)  0.725 (0.024)  0.709 (0.025)  0.798 (0.025)  
Montenegro 0.893 (0.010)  0.914 (0.009)  0.696 (0.018)  0.886 (0.015)  0.809 (0.017)  
Russia 0.775 (0.014)  0.889 (0.012)  0.707 (0.017)  0.782 (0.019)  0.713 (0.019)  
Tajikistan 0.786 (0.017)  0.858 (0.015)  0.672 (0.022)  0.827 (0.017)  0.841 (0.017)  
Kazakhstan 0.876 (0.011)  0.901 (0.011)  0.730 (0.019)  0.803 (0.021)  0.735 (0.022)  
Azerbaijan 0.806 (0.015)  0.901 (0.011)  0.758 (0.016)  0.908 (0.023)  0.562 (0.026)  
Uzbekistan 0.905 (0.007)  0.936 (0.006)  0.731 (0.015)  0.805 (0.013)  0.886 (0.012)  
 




STANDARDIZED FACTOR LOADINGS Model 3 Courts And Police Error Correlation 
Country 
Trust in   
Government  





Trust in  
Police  Trust in Courts         
Kosovo 0.758 (.015) 0.903 (.010) 0.794 (.014) 0.385 (.028) 0.780 (.015) 
Albania  0.758 (.017) 0.863 (.014) 0.686 (.020) 0.413 (.029) 0.693 (.020) 
Georgia 0.895 (.009) 0.934 (.008) 0.561 (.025) 0.561 (.024) 0.768 (.016) 
Mongolia 0.743 (.020) 0.817 (.018) 0.730 (.021) 0.404 (.032) 0.631 (.025) 
Tajikistan 0.756 (.017) 0.880 (.012) 0.681 (.020) 0.646 (.023) 0.840 (.014) 
Azerbaijan 0.786 (.014) 0.905 (.009) 0.776 (.015) 0.722 (.018) 0.863 (.011) 
Macedonia 0.776 (.016) 0.866 (.013) 0.684 (.019) 0.571 (.024) 0.709 (.019) 
Montenegro 0.877 (.009) 0.925 (.008) 0.705 (.018) 0.677 (.019) 0.832 (.012) 
Estonia  0.733 (.023) 0.825 (.022) 0.494 (.030) 0.394 (.033) 0.537 (.030) 
Italy 0.830 (.013) 0.890 (.012) 0.739 (.017) 0.290 (.030) 0.501 (.026) 
Bulgaria 0.734 (.018) 0.859 (.015) 0.774 (.018) 0.544 (.026) 0.598 (.025) 
France 0.727 (.021) 0.813 (.019) 0.588 (.025) 0.484 (.029) 0.565 (.026) 
Croatia 0.827 (.013) 0.891 (.011) 0.747 (.017) 0.405 (.029) 0.661 (.020) 
Latvia 0.718 (.022) 0.876 (.019) 0.615 (.025) 0.355 (.032) 0.463 (.031) 
Britain 0.822 (.013) 0.873 (.012) 0.695 (.016) 0.309 (.026) 0.446 (.023) 
Turkey 0.745 (.019) 0.885 (.016) 0.555 (.016) 0.448 (.029) 0.638 (.023) 
Romania 0.762 (.016) 0.900 (.013) 0.635 (.022) 0.377 (.029) 0.708 (.019) 
Sweden 0.762 (.024) 0.816 (.025) 0.619 (.027) 0.343 (.035) 0.442 (.033) 
Belarus 0.880 (.012) 0.923 (.010) 0.588 (.026) 0.598 (.024) 0.651 (.022) 
Armenia 0.867 (.010) 0.939 (.007) 0.754 (.017) 0.640 (.022) 0.851 (.012) 
Serbia 0.834 (.011) 0.893 (.009) 0.734 (.014) 0.510 (.021) 0.664 (.017) 
Kyrgyzstan 0.510 (.029) 0.782 (.023) 0.706 (.024) 0.526 (.030) 0.647 (.026) 
Kazakhstan 0.868 (011) 0.893 (.010) 0.749 (.017) 0.641 (.022) 0.773 (.017) 
Lithuania 0.743 (.021) 0.812 (.019) 0.656 (.024) 0.355 (.032) 0.528 (.028) 
Czech Rep 0.800 (.015) 0.881 (.013) 0.736 (.018) 0.410 (.029) 0.590 (.024) 
Poland 0.798 (.012) 0.889 (.010) 0.719 (.014) 0.466 (.022) 0.693 (.016) 
Russia  0.756 (.014) 0.897 (.011) 0.719 (.016) 0.600 (.020) 0.671 (.018) 
Slovakia 0.838 (.013 0.878 (.012) 0.751 (.017) 0.452 (.028) 0.635 (.022) 
Moldova 0.897 (.008) 0.938 (.007) 0.798 (.013) 0.544 (.024) 0.738 (.016) 
Hungary 0.831 (.013) 0.906 (.011) 0.712 (.018) 0.522 (.025) 0.636 (.021) 
Ukraine 0.827 (.011) 0.880 (.010) 0.713 (.015) 0.526 (.021) 0.641 (.017) 
Bosnia 0.865 (.009) 0.960 (.007) 0.748 (.015) 0.516 (0.024)  0.701 (.017) 
Germany 0.833 (.014) 0.893 (.013) 0.664 (.020) 0.418 (.028) 0.561 (.024) 







STANDARDIZED FACTOR LOADINGS Simple Political Trust Model 
Country 
Trust in  
Government 
Trust in  
Parliament 
Trust in  
Political  
Parties 
Trust in  
Local  
Government 
Albania 0.800 (0.017) 0.852 (0.016)  0.646 (0.022)  0.611 (0.023)  
Armenia 0.889 (0.010) 0.926 (0.009)  0.736 (0.018)  0.752 (0.016)  
Azerbaijan 0.790 (0.014)  0.909 (0.009)  0.762 (0.016)  0.866 (0.011)  
Belarus 0.907 (0.009)  0.898 (0.010)  0.559 (0.027)  0.853 (0.012)  
Bosnia 0.887 (0.008)  0.943 (0.006)  0.741 (0.015)  0.856 (0.010)  
Bulgaria 0.774 (0.017)  0.849 (0.015)  0.749 (0.018)  0.602 (0.024)  
Croatia 0.844 (0.013)  0.879 (0.012)  0.740 (0.017)  0.626 (0.022)  
Czech Rep 0.822 (0.016)  0.884 (0.014)  0.703 (0.019)  0.465 (0.027)  
Estonia 0.689 (0.027)  0.882 (0.027)   0.476 (0.031)  0.382 (0.032)  
France 0.735 (0.023)  0.813 (0.023)  0.576 (0.026)  0.399 (0.031)  
Georgia 0.923 (0.008)  0.913 (0.008)  0.538 (0.025)  0.857 (0.011)  
Germany 0.879 (0.012)  0.851 (0.013)  0.654 (0.020)  0.707 (0.018)  
Great Britain 0.832 (0.012)  0.861 (0.011)  0.699 (0.016)  0.670 (0.017)  
Hungary 0.851 (0.013)  0.903 (0.011)  0.685 (0.019)  0.695 (0.018)  
Italy 0.848 (0.013)  0.880 (0.012)  0.730 (0.017)  0.569 (0.023)  
Kazakhstan 0.907 (0.010)  0.884 (0.010)  0.697 (0.020)  0.809 (0.014)  
Kosovo 0.796 (0.014)  0.898 (0.011)  0.763 (0.015)  0.754 (0.016)  
Kyrgyzstan 0.622 (0.027) 0.748 (0.024)  0.635 (0.027)  0.708 (0.025)  
Latvia 0.743 (0.022)  0.851 (0.020) 0.619 (0.025)  0.430 (0.031) 
Lithuania 0.760 (0.021)  0.820 (0.020)  0.625 (0.025)  0.479 (0.029)  
Macedonia 0.777 (0.016)  0.870 (0.013)  0.680 (0.019)  0.763 (0.016)  
Moldova 0.917 (0.008)  0.927 (0.008)  0.785 (0.014)  0.704 (0.017)  
Mongolia 0.782 (0.020)  0.814 (0.019)  0.684 (0.023)  0.646 (0.024)  
Montenegro 0.934 (0.008)  0.880 (0.010)  0.669 (0.020)  0.817 (0.012)  
Poland 0.812 (0.012)  0.887 (0.010)  0.701 (0.015)  0.702 (0.015)  
Romania 0.782 (0.017)  0.892 (0.015)  0.620 (0.023)  0.526 (0.025)  
Russia 0.759 (0.014)  0.915 (0.010)  0.689 (0.017)  0.773 (0.013)  
Serbia 0.828 (0.011)  0.902 (0.009)  0.728 (0.014)  0.695 (0.015)  
Slovakia 0.852 (0.013)  0.874 (0.013)  0.737 (0.017)   0.573 (0.024)  
Sweden 0.773 (0.021)  0.823 (0.021)  0.608 (0.026)  0.691 (0.023)   
Tajikistan 0.789 (0.015)  0.881 (0.012)  0.630 (0.022)  0.852 (0.013)  
Turkey 0.779 (0.017)  0.854 (0.015)  0.543 (0.026)  0.778 (0.017)  
Ukraine 0.844 (0.011)  0.873 (0.010)  0.699 (0.015)  0.632 (0.018)  
Uzbekistan 0.913 (0.006)  0.934 (0.005)  0.726 (0.014)  0.883 (0.007)  
     






3) Table of trust means per country 
 
 Pres.            
 





Albania  3.009 2.595 2.733 2.806 2.535 2.419 3.249 3.219 2.325 
Armenia 2.680 2.565 2.673 2.827 2.425 2.422 2.791 3.781 2.419 
Azerbaijan 4.553 3.513 3.077 3.151 3.163 2.722 3.359 4.216 3.048 
Belarus 3.430 3.339 3.282 3.234 3.390 2.784 3.261 3.555 3.415 
Bosnia 2.236 2.193 2.243 2.363 2.232 2.128 2.982 2.907 2.437 
Bulgaria 2.665 2.478 2.488 2.653 2.138 1.966 2.825 2.904 2.158 
Croatia 3.213 1.904 2.255 2.267 1.880 1.807 3.118 3.313 2.211 
Czech Rep 3.348 2.426 2.782 3.071 2.314 2.172 3.092 3.232 2.718 
Estonia 3.628 2.899 3.363 3.404 2.748 2.573 3.840 3.958 3.283 
France 2.365 2.381 3.048 3.406 2.652 2.038 3.308 3.444 2.782 
Georgia 3.414 3.236 3.246 3.213 3.087 2.615 3.657 3.701 3.029 
Germany 3.329 2.724 3.013 3.205 2.858 2.396 3.802 3.438 3.634 
Gr. Britain 3.478 2.338 - 2.640 2.436 2.295 3.654 4.161 3.255 
Hungary 3.177 2.945 - 3.302 2.777 2.271 3.043 2.985 3.049 
Italy 3.053 2.235 2.566 2.693 2.305 1.954 3.702 3.631 2.728 
Kazakhstan 4.072 3.515 3.416 3.355 3.455 3.063 3.033 3.507 3.046 
Kosovo 2.594 2.410 - 2.790 2.547 2.496 2.818 3.788 2.525 
Kyrgyzstan 2.412 2.461 2.728 2.876 2.556 2.538 2.724 3.303 2.234 
Latvia 2.735 2.133 - 2.842 1.987 1.862 3.169 3.260 2.751 
Lithuania 3.714 2.073 2.458 2.559 2.005 2.052 3.001 3.129 2.363 
Macedonia 2.581 2.412 - 2.565 2.302 2.118 2.976 3.137 2.248 
Moldova 2.342 2.366 2.499 2.633 2.287 2.276 2.528 3.026 2.282 
Mongolia 2.899 2.817 2.987 3.077 2.725 2.346 3.319 3.724 2.655 
Montenegro 3.268 3.128 - 3.123 3.053 2.793 3.282 3.374 3.139 
Poland 3.079 2.798 3.027 3.080 2.731 2.506 3.348 3.461 3.090 
Romania 1.803 1.594 2.216 2.514 1.643 1.594 2.855 3.139 1.998 
Russia 3.432 3.116 2.865 2.794 2.736 2.411 2.648 3.244 2.677 
Serbia 2.641 2.125 2.272 2.294 2.089 1.870 2.948 3.136 2.331 
Slovakia 3.074 2.501 2.689 2.873 2.406 2.323 3.048 3.306 2.659 
Slovenia 2.863 2.247 - 2.853 2.288 2.269 3.076 3.220 2.620 
Sweden 3.441 3.536 3.265 3.379 3.598 3.085 4.013 3.344 3.985 
Tajikistan 4.639 4.304 4.133 4.017 3.968 3.434 3.612 3.987 3.835 
Turkey 3.595 3.395 3.491 3.452 3.334 2.994 3.697 3.799 3.429 
Ukraine 2.504 2.367 2.492 2.653 2.205 2.212 2.313 2.991 2.116 
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Table B1. Variable Descriptions  
Variable Name Description Coding 
High Corruption 
(dummy) 
“In your opinion, how often do people like you have to make 
unofficial payments or gifts in these situations?”[1=Never, 5= 
Always]  a) Interact with the road police, b) Request official 
documents (e.g. passport, visa, birth or marriage certificate, land 
register, etc.) from authorities, c) go to courts for a civil matter, d) 
Receive public education (primary or secondary), e) Receive 
public education (vocation), f) Receive medical treatment in the 
public health system, g) Request unemployment benefits, h) 
Request other social security benefits  
All categories summed into one index, 
broken into terciles. “High corruption” 
dummy: 1 for respondents in the third 
tercile (those who perceive the highest 
amount of corruption), 0 for 





Polity Scores 1=Autocracy, 2= Anocracy, 3= 
Democracy 
Satisfied with 
Financial Situation  
(categorical 
predictor) 
“All things considered, I am satisfied with my job as a whole.”[1= 
Strongly disagree, 5= Strongly agree] 
5 response categories, those scoring ‘1’ 





“On the whole, I am satisfied with the present state of the 
economy.” [1=strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree] 






“Approximately how much does your household spend on each of 
these items per month?” a) food, beverages and tobacco; b) utilities 
(electricity, water, gas, heating, fixed line phone); c) transportation 
(public transportation, fuel for car) 
3 categories summed and converted to 
USD based on Sept 1, 2010 exchange 
rate. This measure is used to construct 




“Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first 
step, stand the poorest 10% people in our country, and on the 
highest step, the tenth, stand the richest 10% of people in our 
country. On which step of the ten is your household today? [1-10] 
The ladder is collapsed into 5 
categories: 1= steps 1&2, 2= steps 







“All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now” [1= 
strongly disagree, 5= strongly agree] 
5 response categories, those scoring ‘1’ 





I subtracted respondents’ evaluations of their situation on the 
ladder four years ago from the step they believe they are on today 
(see Ladder Question). Positive numbers indicate that respondents 
believe there has been an improvement to their condition, negative 
numbers indicate a deterioration.  
5 response categories. 1= a 
deterioration of 4 or more steps, 2= a 
deterioration of 1, 2 or 3 steps, 3= no 
change, 4= an improvement by 1, 2 or 
3 steps; 5= an improvement by 4 or 





I subtracted respondents’ predictions of where they will be on the 
ladder 4 years from now from the step they believe they are on 
today (see Ladder Question). Positive numbers indicate there is an 
expected improvement in the future; negative indicate an expected 
deterioration.  
5 response categories. 1= an expected 
deterioration of 4 or more steps, 2= an 
expected deterioration of 1, 2 or 3 
steps, 3= no change, 4= an expected 
improvement by 1, 2 or 3 steps; 5= an 
expected improvement by 4 or more 
steps 
Education (Low, 
Middle and High 
categorical predictor) 
“what is the highest level of education you already completed?” Three categories: 1= low ed (reference 
group, those with no ed, primary or 
lower secondary ed as highest 
attained), 2= middle ed (those with 
upper secondary ed as the highest 
attained), 3= high ed (those with a 
tertiary, BA or graduate level ed) 
 
Table B2. Baseline OLS with country fixed effects (no interactions), DV= Political Trust sum score, scaled 1-100, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Satisfied 
with financial 
situation 
Model 2: Satisfied 
with national 
economy 
Model 3: Consumption 
Quartiles 
 





-2.462*** (0.325) -3.640*** (0.373) -3.504*** (0.341) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 8.295*** (0.460) 10.052*** (0.396) -0.689 (0.471) 5.301*** (0.491) 
3 14.143*** (0.471) 19.754*** (0.451) -0.491 (0.488) 9.154*** (0.518) 
4 19.671*** (0.494) 26.007*** (0.505) -2.073*** (0.522) 13.336*** (0.570) 
5 21.287*** (0.864) 25.173*** (0.923) N/A 16.266*** (0.917) 
Female 0.962*** (0.299) 0.466 (0.291) 0.884*** (0.333) 0.878*** (0.305) 
Age -0.276*** (0.048) -0.234*** (0.047) -0.342*** (0.054) -0.354*** (0.049) 
Age^2 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Household Size 0.168 (0.103) 0.159 (0.099) 0.188 (0.122) 0.057 (0.105) 
Urban -1.142*** (0.324) -1.086*** (0.315) -0.937*** (0.362) -1.334*** (0.330) 
Capital -1.975*** (0.399) -1.820*** (0.388) -1.699*** (0.451) -2.130*** (0.407) 
Middle Ed 0.246 (0.392) 1.187*** (0.379) 1.220*** (0.437) 0.212 (0.400) 
Upper Ed 0.114 (0.412) 1.689*** (0.397) 2.075*** (0.460) 0.281 (0.423) 
Anocracy -11.022*** (1.284) -9.996*** (1.240) -12.065*** (1.471) -11.435*** (1.305) 
Democracy -44.001*** (1.131) -41.394*** (1.105) -44.595*** (1.269) -46.945*** (1.159) 
197 
 
R Sq 0.323 0.359 0.270 0.289 
N 23313 23253 20383 23538 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p < 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table B3. OLS with country fixed effects, DV= Political trust sum score, scaled 1-100, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Satisfied 
with financial 
situation 
Model 2: Satisfied 
with national 
economy 
Model 3: Consumption 
Quartiles 
 





-5.026*** (1.377) -7.054*** (1.443) -8.441*** (1.489) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 8.875*** (0.559) 10.183*** (0.484) -0.396 (0.568) 4.995*** (0.588) 
3 14.441*** (0.574) 20.289*** (0.545) -0.276 (0.588) 8.839*** (0.622) 
4 19.006*** (0.598) 25.543*** (0.613) -2.000*** (0.627) 13.296*** (0.688) 
5 21.586*** (1.030) 25.761*** (1.121) N/A 15.365*** (1.148) 
Ref= Corr x 1 
Corr x Sat. with 
financial situation 
Corr x Sat. with 
national economy 
Corr x consumption 
quartiles 
Corr x ladder 
 
Corr x 2 -1.836* (0.970) -0.373 (0.822) -1.009 (0.989) 0.943 (1.056) 
Corr x 3 -0.966 (0.975) -1.630* (0.918) -0.776 (0.986) 0.928 (1.094) 
Corr x 4 1.821* (1.014) 1.172 (0.996) -0.409 (1.000) 0.112 (1.176) 
Corr x 5 -1.238 (1.851) -1.880 (1.911) N/A 2.419 (1.865) 
Female 0.963*** (0.299) 0.474 (0.291) 0.885*** (0.333) 0.881*** (0.305) 
Age -0.278*** (0.048) -0.236*** (0.047) -0.343*** (0.542) -0.356*** (0.049) 
Age^2 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Household Size 0.174* (0.104) 0.161 (0.099) 0.199 (0.122) 0.058 (0.105) 
Urban -1.165*** (0.323) -1.112*** (0.315) -0.963*** (0.362) -1.369*** (0.330) 
Capital -1.941*** (0.399) -1.779*** (0.388) -1.653*** (0.451) -2.090*** (0.408) 
Middle Ed 0.270 (0.466) 1.299*** (0.452) 1.162** (0.522) 0.248 (0.476) 
Upper Ed 0.585 (0.484) 2.063*** (0.467) 2.164*** (0.544) 0.672 (0.496) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.155 (0.793) -0.439 (0.769) 0.125 (0.884) -0.188 (0.812) 
Upper Ed x Corr -1.309* (0.784) -1.107 (0.760) -0.180 (0.878) -1.068 (0.803) 
Anocracy -12.707*** (1.369) -11.758*** (1.329) -14.113*** (1.581) -13.237*** (1.391) 
Democracy -45.395*** (1.175) -42.514*** (1.155) -45.693*** (1.316) -48.317*** (1.201) 
Corr x Anoc 4.873*** (1.305) 4.813*** (1.290) 5.801*** (1.495) 5.868*** (1.335) 
Corr x Democ 4.407*** (1.118) 3.608*** (1.121) 4.145*** (1.262) 5.035*** (1.146) 
R Sq 0.324 0.361 0.271 0.289 
N 23313 23253 20383 23538 
198 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p < 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
Table B4. DV is sum score without local government, scaled 1-100, country fixed effects, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Satisfied 
with financial 
situation 
Model 2: Satisfied 
with national 
economy 
Model 3: Consumption 
Quartiles 
 





-4.816*** (1.409) -6.687*** (1.482) -8.408*** (1.524) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 8.848*** (0.573) 10.036*** (0.494) -0.238 (0.581) 4.779*** (0.601) 
3 14.689*** (0.588) 21.046*** (0.556) -0.002 (0.602) 8.525*** (0.636) 
4 19.162*** (0.612) 26.191*** (0.626) -1.665***  (0.642) 13.412*** (0.704) 
5 21.548*** (1.051) 26.351*** (1.138) N/A 15.679*** (1.177) 
Ref= Corr x 1 
Corr x Sat. with 
financial situation 
Corr x Sat. with 
national economy 
Corr x consumption 
quartiles 
Corr x ladder 
 
Corr x 2 -1.951** (0.994) -0.247 (0.839) -1.242 (1.013) 1.159 (1.078) 
Corr x 3 -1.132 (0.999) -1.686* (0.938) -1.228 (1.010) 0.968 (1.117) 
Corr x 4 1.401 (1.038) 1.093 (1.017) -0.871 (1.025) -0.197 (1.202) 
Corr x 5 -0.105 (1.892) -1.738 (1.947) N/A 2.836 (1.908) 
Female 0.901*** (0.306) 0.364 (0.297) 0.752** (0.341) 0.808*** (0.312) 
Age -0.284*** (0.049) -0.240*** (0.048) -0.361*** (0.055) -0.363*** (0.049) 
Age^2 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Household Size 0.132 (0.105) 0.119 (0.102) 0.121 (0.125) 0.012 (0.107) 
Urban -0.741** (0.332) -0.658** (0.322) -0.441 (0.371) -0.958*** (0.338) 
Capital -1.621*** (0.408) -1.391*** (0.396) -1.239*** (0.462) -1.755*** (0.417) 
Middle Ed 0.112 (0.478) 1.122** (0.461) 1.024* (0.535) 0.113 (0.488) 
Upper Ed 0.718 (0.495) 2.154*** (0.476) 2.296*** (0.556) 0.793 (0.507) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.095 (0.812) -0.420 (0.786) 0.032 (0.906) -0.202 (0.831) 
Upper Ed x Corr -1.131 (0.803) -1.003 (0.776) -0.121 (0.899) -0.936 (0.822) 
Anocracy -13.312*** (1.406) -12.382*** (1.361) -14.513*** (1.625) -13.907*** (1.427) 
Democracy -47.245*** (1.209) -44.305*** (1.184) -48.018*** (1.354) -50.283*** (1.234) 
Corr x Anoc 4.276*** (1.341) 4.212*** (1.323) 5.543*** (1.536) 5.369*** (1.371) 
Corr x Democ 4.409*** (1.149) 3.513*** (1.148) 4.126*** (1.297) 5.093*** (1.176) 
R Sq 0.331 0.371 0.282 0.299 
N 23581 23521 20608 23813 





Table B5. DV= Presidential Trust scaled 1-100, OLS with country fixed effects, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Satisfied 
with financial 
situation 
Model 2: Satisfied 
with national 
economy 
Model 3: Consumption 
Quartiles 
 





-0.248 (1.428) -2.952** (1.469) -1.558 (1.608) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 10.942*** (1.171) 12.871*** (1.139) 1.203 (1.251) 5.741*** (1.149) 
3 16.648*** (1.234) 22.473*** (1.261) -0.082 (1.316) 11.903*** (1.279) 
4 22.656*** (1.339) 29.604*** (1.384) -0.485 (1.398) 13.963*** (1.528) 
5 23.618*** (2.723) 30.030*** (3.043) N/A 14.718*** (3.363) 
Ref= Corr x 1 
Corr x Sat. with 
financial situation 
Corr x Sat. with 
national economy 
Corr x consumption 
quartiles 
Corr x ladder 
 
Corr x 2 -1.909 (1.878) -1.352 (1.777) -2.220 (1.976) -1.892 (1.866) 
Corr x 3 -1.181 (1.941) -3.032 (1.915) 0.810 (1.985) -4.121** (2.013) 
Corr x 4 -4.243** (2.053) -4.321** (2.012) 0.549 (2.012) -3.430 (2.301) 
Corr x 5 -9.078** (4.263) -12.379*** (4.301) N/A -2.271 (4.728) 
Female 1.452** (0.650) 0.966 (0.643) 0.928 (0.720) 1.142* (0.659) 
Age -0.113 (0.101) -0.109 (0.099) -0.256** (0.111) -0.203** (0.101) 
Age^2 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Household Size 0.177 (0.219) 0.198 (0.215) 0.164 (0.255) 0.006 (0.221) 
Urban 0.467 (0.703) 0.541 (0.698) 0.358 (0.788) 0.244 (0.713) 
Capital -1.544* (0.930) -0.958 (0.917) -0.296 (1.045) -1.372 (0.938) 
Middle Ed 1.759* (0.968) 2.448*** (0.954) 2.442** (1.067) 1.623* (0.979) 
Upper Ed -0.487 (0.941) 0.713 (0.928) 0.735 (1.045) -0.499 (0.956) 
Anocracy -30.384*** (1.568) -29.715*** (1.549) -34.878*** (1.754) -32.839*** (1.573) 
Democracy -37.483*** (1.337) -33.425*** (1.344) -41.377*** (1.443) -39.099*** (1.357) 
R Sq 0.415 0.438 0.391 0.392 
N 8048 7931 6955 8140 







Table B6. Weighted Fixed Effects OLS, DV= Political Trust sum score, scaled 1-100, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Satisfied 
with financial 
situation 
Model 2: Satisfied 
with national 
economy 
Model 3: Consumption 
Quartiles 
 





-3.772 (2.672) -7.843*** (2.643) -7.778*** (2.987) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 12.321*** (1.435) 11.317*** (1.059) -2.082* (1.249) 4.943*** (1.606) 
3 17.360*** (1.494) 22.739*** (1.513) 0.381 (1.442 10.805*** (1.691) 
4 23.389*** (1.568) 28.564*** (1.564) -2.538 (1.584) 15.088*** (1.929) 
5 23.544*** (2.253) 28.413*** (3.310) N/A 17.295*** (2.529) 
Ref= Corr x 1 
Corr x Sat. with 
financial situation 
Corr x Sat. with 
national economy 
Corr x consumption 
quartiles 
Corr x ladder 
 
Corr x 2 -6.010*** (2.239) -0.873 (1.810) -0.288 (1.944) 1.259 (2.407) 
Corr x 3 -4.272* (2.292) -2.962 (2.033) -0.161 (1.869) 0.039 (2.298) 
Corr x 4 -2.324 (2.392) -0.975 (2.239) 2.664 (2.132) 0.671 (2.631) 
Corr x 5 -0.291 (3.772) -0.289 (3.923) N/A 7.202* (4.011) 
Female 1.815*** (0.665) 1.211** (0.599) 1.522* (0.803) 1.597** (0.688) 
Age -0.467*** (0.102) -0.329*** (0.099) -0.379*** (0.107) -0.474*** (0.101) 
Age^2 0.006*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.01) 
Household Size 0.236 (0.249) 0.245 (0.237) 0.389 (0.284) 0.260 (0.256) 
Urban -1.733 (1.199) -1.771 (1.082) -1.579 (1.263) -1.301 (1.257) 
Capital -2.091 (1.936) -2.503 (1.826) -1.842 (2.156) -2.093 (2.004) 
Middle Ed -0.224 (1.098) 0.791 (1.019) 0.392 (1.209) -0.482 (1.113) 
Upper Ed -0.763 (1.185) 0.448 (1.084) 0.450 (1.238) -0.859 (1.241) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.446 (1.808) -0.377 (1.711) -0.388 (1.925) -1.473 (1.726) 
Upper Ed x Corr -2.559 (1.693) -1.179 (1.562) -1.686 (1.671) -2.573 (1.739) 
Anocracy -14.521*** (2.722) -13.243*** (2.579) -15.837*** (3.273) -15.020*** (2.848) 
Democracy -45.364*** (2.644) -42.396** (2.075) -46.209*** (2.703) -49.559*** (2.529) 
Corr x Anoc 9.412*** (2.919) 8.902*** (2.728) 10.001*** (3.435) 10.379*** (2.916) 
Corr x Democ 5.415*** (2.098) 4.609** (2.075) 6.830*** (2.321) 7.220*** (2.143) 
R Sq 0.317 0.359 0.270 0.283 
N 23357 23297 20427 23582 





Table B7. SEM with DV as a latent factor of political trust, no fixed effects, ML estimation, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Satisfied 
with financial 
situation 
Model 2: Satisfied 
with national 
economy 
Model 3: Consumption 
Quartiles 
 





-0.482*** (0.056) -0.615*** (0.058) -0.582*** (0.060) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 0.447*** (0.025) 0.496*** (0.021) -0.073*** (0.026) 0.249*** (0.026) 
3 0.674*** (0.025) 0.974*** (0.024) -0.073*** (0.026) 0.429*** (0.028) 
4 0.975*** (0.026) 1.354*** (0.026) -0.181*** (0.028) 0.599*** (0.030) 
5 1.118*** (0.026) 1.370*** (0.049) N/A 0.711*** (0.052) 
Ref= Corr x 1 
Corr x Sat. with 
financial situation 
Corr x Sat. with 
national economy 
Corr x consumption 
quartiles 
Corr x ladder 
 
Corr x 2 -0.123*** (0.044) -0.012 (0.037) -0.032 (0.045) 0.007 (0.047) 
Corr x 3 -0.073* (0.044) -0.048 (0.041) -0.017 (0.045) 0.003 (0.049) 
Corr x 4 0.011 (0.045) 0.024 (0.044) -0.011 (0.045) 0.006 (0.053) 
Corr x 5 -0.036 (0.083) 0.028 (0.084) N/A 0.116 (0.085) 
Female 0.064*** (0.013) 0.029** (0.013) 0.053*** (0.015) 0.059*** (0.014) 
Age -0.016*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002) -0.018*** (0.002) -0.020*** (0.002) 
Age^2 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
Household Size 0.054*** (0.004) 0.042*** (0.004) 0.064*** (0.005) 0.055*** (0.004) 
Urban -0.095*** (0.014) -0.085*** (0.014) -0.076*** (0.016) -0.114*** (0.014) 
Capital -0.078*** (0.017) -0.079*** (0.017) -0.057*** (0.020) -0.081*** (0.018) 
Middle Ed 0.044** (0.021) 0.093*** (0.020) 0.083*** (0.023) 0.048** (0.021) 
Upper Ed 0.055*** (0.020) 0.099*** (0.020) 0.115*** (0.023) 0.071*** (0.021) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.028 (0.036) -0.027 (0.034) -0.014 (0.040) -0.029 (0.037) 
Upper Ed x Corr -0.084** (0.035) -0.069** (0.034) -0.054 (0.040) -0.077** (0.036) 
Anocracy -1.027*** (0.034) -0.838*** (0.033) -1.212*** (0.039) -1.115*** (0.034) 
Democracy -1.296*** (0.028) -1.014*** (0.028) -1.429*** (0.032) -1.396*** (0.028) 
Corr x Anoc 0.452*** (0.051) 0.501*** (0.050) 0.584*** (0.057) 0.507*** (0.052) 
Corr x Democ 0.453*** (0.043) 0.409*** (0.043) 0.516*** (0.048) 0.470*** (0.470) 
 























N 25509 25368 22188 25805 




Table B8. 2 Level Random Slope, ML Estimation (no country dummies), DV= Political Trust scaled 1-100, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Satisfied 
with financial 
situation 
Model 2: Satisfied 
with national 
economy 
Model 3: Consumption 
Quartiles 





-4.148** (1.936) -6.259*** (2.071) -7.663*** (2.097) 
Economic Context (see column heading)   
2 8.975*** (0.560) 10.266*** (0.486) -0.392 (0.567) 5.063*** (0.588) 
3 14.607*** (0.576) 20.436*** (0.549) -0.264 (0.587) 8.963*** (0.624) 
4 19.279*** (0.603) 25.756*** (0.622) -1.941 (0.627) 13.455*** (0.692) 
5 21.851*** (1.033) 25.963*** (1.126) N/A 15.582*** (1.152) 
Ref= Corr x 1 
Corr x Sat. with 
financial situation 
Corr x Sat. with 
national economy 
Corr x consumption 
quartiles 
Corr x ladder 
 
Corr x 2 -2.126** (0.975) -0.558 (0.832) -0.924 (0.989) 0.816 (1.058) 
Corr x 3 -1.447 (0.989) -1.966** (0.944) -0.653 (0.985) 0.733 (1.104) 
Corr x 4 1.011 (1.036) 0.667 (1.037) -0.292 (1.001) -0.391 (1.197) 
Corr x 5 -2.036 (1.866) -2.299 (1.941) N/A 1.809 (1.888) 
Female 0.974*** (0.299) 0.493* (0.290) 0.901*** (0.333) 0.893*** (0.305) 
Age -0.275*** (0.048) -0.234*** (0.047) -0.343*** (0.054) -0.355*** (0.049) 
Age^2 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.105) 
Household Size 0.184** (0.102) 0.169* (0.099) 0.199 (0.121) 0.069 (0.105) 
Urban -1.197*** (0.323) -1.149*** (0.315) -0.997*** (0.362) -1.393*** (0.330) 
Capital -1.931*** (0.400) -1.804*** (0.389) -1.609*** (0.453) -2.071*** (0.409) 
Middle Ed 0.307 (0.468) 1.348*** (0.453) 1.159** (0.524) 0.224 (0.479) 
Upper Ed 0.692 (0.490) 2.226*** (0.473) 2.292*** (0.551) 0.749 (0.504) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.354 (0.809) -0.656 (0.785) 0.078 (0.904) -0.186 (0.829) 
Upper Ed x Corr -1.729** (0.828) -1.693** (0.801) -0.704 (0.925) -1.393 (0.852) 
Anocracy -18.695*** (6.697) -14.701** (5.831) -19.798*** (7.569) -19.716*** (7.329) 
Democracy -25.401*** (5.448) -19.616*** (4.747) -26.157*** (6.157) -27.167*** (5.963) 
Corr x Anoc 5.013** (2.187) 4.814** (2.199) 5.315** (2.468) 5.527** (2.374) 
Corr x Democ 4.323** (1.822) 3.249* (1.841) 3.644* (2.047) 4.704** (1.974) 
ICC .16 .13 .19 .19 
N 23313 23253 20383 23538 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p < 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p <0.01. In this two-level analysis, a variance components 
analysis indicates that there is significant variation in the trust-corruption relationship across countries, with an ICC of 0.28. 
The ICC listed in this table indicates the correlation of political trust responses between two people after accounting for regime 














-7.821*** (2.445) -3.138 (4.571) 
Economic Context (see column heading)  
2 8.132*** (0.726) 6.253*** (1.270) 6.226** (2.698) 
3 14.479*** (0.706) 9.175*** (1.271) 10.809*** (2.680) 
4 19.713*** (0.695) 10.851*** (1.307) 13.784*** (2.684) 
5 22.000*** (0.968) 13.019*** (3.159) 10.591*** (2.914) 
Ref= Corr x 1 
Corr x Life 
Satisfaction 
Corr x Retrospective 
Evaluations 
Corr x Prospective 
Evaluations 
Corr x 2 -0.180 (1.231) 0.061 (2.175) -4.711 (4.442) 
Corr x 3 0.566 (1.192) 1.325 (2.165) -3.768 (4.405) 
Corr x 4 1.549 (1.169) -0.434 (2.216) -4.537 (4.406) 
Corr x 5 1.819 (1.636) -5.716 (4.651) -5.941 (4.746) 
Female 0.740** (0.298) 0.897*** (0.309) 1.077*** (0.329) 
Age -0.256*** (0.048) -0.347*** (0.049) -0.294*** (0.053) 
Age^2 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 
Household Size 0.039 (0.102) 0.129 (0.106) 0.088 (0.114) 
Urban -1.250*** (0.323) -0.971*** (0.336) -1.026*** (0.356) 
Capital -1.689*** (0.398) -2.022*** (0.414) -1.904*** (0.442) 
Middle Ed -2.310* (1.216) 1.089** (0.482) 1.521*** (0.512) 
Upper Ed -2.577** (1.138) 2.345*** (0.498) 3.062*** (0.529) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.299 (0.792) -0.066 (0.818) -0.269 (0.869) 
Upper Ed x Corr -1.156 (0.783) -1.087 (0.808) -0.884 (0.862) 
Anocracy -12.519*** (1.363) -12.787*** (1.410) -12.856*** (1.501) 
Democracy -44.170*** (1.176) -46.317*** (1.218) -45.629*** (1.283) 
Corr x Anoc 5.398*** (1.307) 6.207*** (1.355) 6.988*** (1.461) 
Corr x Democ 5.088*** (1.124) 4.953*** (1.168) 4.919*** (1.254) 
R Sq 0.319 0.275 0.282 
N 23552 23371 20559 





Table B10. 3 Level Analysis (contextual effects), DV=political trust 1-100, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Regional 
Proportion Most 
Satisfied with Personal 
Finances 
Model 2: Regional 
Proportion Most 
Satisfied with National 
Economy 
Model 3: Regional 
Proportion on Steps 6-10 




-3.788* (2.213) -6.848*** (1.982) 
Economic Context (see column heading)  
2 7.776*** (0.452) 9.489*** (0.393) 4.759*** (0.481) 
3 13.241*** (0.465) 18.618*** (0.451) 8.576*** (0.511) 
4 18.754*** (0.492) 24.760*** (0.507) 12.206*** (0.569) 
5 20.391*** (0.851) 24.029*** (0.916) 15.462*** (0.909) 
Regional Proportion 4.201 (3.747) 9.932** (3.947) 4.142 (3.494) 
Corr x Regional 
Proportion 2.193 (3.631) -2.039 (3.628) 1.714 (3.672) 
Female 1.075*** (0.289) 0.647** (0.282) 0.955*** (0.295) 
Age -0.259*** (0.047) -0.223*** (0.046) -0.339*** (0.047) 
Age^2 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
Household Size 0.109 (0.100) 0.108 (0.098) -0.016 (0.102) 
Urban -1.351*** (0.348) -1.203*** (0.339) -1.613*** (0.355) 
Capital -4.681*** (1.093) -4.429*** (1.024) -5.175*** (1.123) 
Middle Ed -0.296 (0.456) 0.671 (0.444) -0.317 (0.466) 
Upper Ed 0.308 (0.478) 1.747*** (0.463) 0.536 (0.489) 
Mid. Ed x Corr -0.623 (0.794) -0.879 (0.775) -0.527 (0.809) 
Upper Ed x Corr -1.834** (0.807) -1.771** (0.788) -1.703** (0.824) 
Anocracy -18.698*** (6.192) -13.313*** (5.020) -19.901*** (7.010) 
Democracy -24.722*** (5.005) -17.463*** (4.117) -27.134*** (5.655) 
Corr x Anoc 5.405** (2.239) 4.518** (2.275) 5.792** (2.342) 
Corr x Democ 3.796** (1.765) 2.599 (1.920) 4.072** (1.798) 
ICC (at region) 0.23 0.18 0.26 
N 23313 23253 23538 
Note: In this three-level analysis, there are 30 countries and 444 subnational regions with an average of 52.5 
observations per region. The ‘regional proportion’ variable calculates the proportion of individuals in each 
region who scored a 4 or 5 (out of 5) on satisfaction with personal finances or the national economy, or steps 
6-10 (out of 10) on the income ladder. A variance components analysis indicates that there is significant 
variation in the trust-corruption relationship on both country and regional levels. The intra-class correlation 
(ICC) of political trust responses at the region level is .34 (or the correlation of responses between two people 
in the same region). The regional ICC in this table indicates the correlation between two people after accounting 




Table B11. ZZC Replication (in their sample) 
 Government Bribe 
Victimization 
Bribe Victimization High Bribe Victimization 
Corruption -5.67 (3.51) 5.78*** (1.87) 2.26 (3.33) 
Sociotropic (Ref 1)    
2 7.03*** (0.66) 8.89*** (0.90) 7.52*** (0.66) 
3 14.45*** (0.65) 17.68*** (0.89) 15.07*** (0.66) 
4 20.93*** (0.74) 24.45*** (1.00) 21.46*** (0.74) 
5 21.96*** (1.53) 28.19*** (2.07) 22.07*** (1.53) 
Pocketbook (Ref 1)    
2 1.12 (0.93) 0.99 (1.38) 1.09 (0.94) 
3 2.15** (0.91) 2.40* (1.31) 2.03** (0.91) 
4 5.69*** (0.97) 5.51*** (1.41) 5.57*** (0.97) 
5 6.29*** (1.43) 5.87*** (1.87) 6.23*** (1.39) 
Corr x Sociotropic    
Corr x 2 2.42 (2.33) -3.56*** (1.20) -4.07** (2.02) 
Corr x 3 3.91 (2.41) -6.02*** (1.18) -4.72** (1.90) 
Corr x 4 3.49 (2.47) -6.81*** (1.35) -4.04* (2.20) 
Corr x 5 0.07 (5.78) -12.37*** (2.74) 0.21 (5.05) 
Corr x Pocketbook    
Corr x 2 0.21 (3.66) 0.06 (1.87) 0.79 (3.39) 
Corr x 3 0.58 (3.50) -0.54 (1.79) 2.63 (3.19) 
Corr x 4 0.71 (3.62) 0.44 (1.89) 3.28 (3.34) 
Corr x 5 4.79 (5.30) 0.91 (2.61) 8.37 (5.80) 
Voted for Incumb 12.61*** (0.35) 12.55*** (0.35) 12.58*** (0.35) 
Income -4.52*** (0.80) -4.79*** (0.79) -4.72*** (0.80) 
Age -0.42*** (0.09) -0.39*** (0.09) -0.41*** (0.09) 
Female 0.99*** (0.26) 1.07*** (0.26) 1.04*** (0.25) 
Educ -3.15*** (0.67) -3.17*** (0.66) -3.32*** (0.67) 
Urban -0.67 (0.44) -0.72 (0.44) -0.72 (0.45) 
R sq 0.28 0.28 0.28 
N 28464 28594 28594 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.  *p< 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Each column represents a 
replication of the ZZC model with a different petty corruption perceptions measure. ) Government 
bribe victimization = “In the last twelve months, did any government employee ask you for a bribe?”, 
local bribe victimization = asked to pay a bribe either at school, hospital or work in the last 12 months, 
high local bribe victimization = asked to pay a bribe in all three of the above places (school, hospital 






18 Table B12. Predicted Probabilities of Critical Authority Orientations Among High and Low Corruption Perceivers 
Across Levels Economic Satisfaction 
Sat. with National 
Economy 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low/No Corruption .448 .353 .242 .269 .204 
95% CI .421-.474 .331-.376 .215-.268 .242-.298 .119-.289 
High Corruption .443 .323 .232 .249 .225 
95% CI .406-.479 .286-.361 .195-.269 .203-.294  .163-.287 
Sat. with Personal 
Finances 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low/No Corruption .432 .335 .281 .309 .254 
95% CI .401-.462 .312-.358 .259-.303 .282-.336 .179-.328 
High Corruption .437 .332 .263 .284 .287 
95% CI .399-.475 .299-.365 .217-.309 .237-.331 .228-.346 
 
Question Wording:  
 
Authority orientations are measured by the following question: “How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means 
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right, and if 
your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between, you can choose any number in between. 
 
“As citizens, we should be more active in questioning the actions of our authorities” (1)  “In our country today, we 
should show more respect for our authorities” (10) 
 
The binary category in this probit estimation was composed of respondents who answered ‘1’ on this scale versus the rest of 
the scale. The analysis was repeated for relative critical authority orientations by combining the top three Likert response 
scale options into a binary category against the rest (54.91 percent of the sample). The results are robust to this analysis. 
Replication files are available upon request from the author. 
 
Note on the Analysis:   
 
These predicted probabilities are calculated holding all predictors at their means, medians or modes (respondents who are 
female, of average age and education, in average household size and urbanity). Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level.  
 
19 Table B13. Predicted Probabilities of Preferences for Democracy Among High and Low Corruption Perceivers Across 
Levels of Economic Satisfaction 
Sat. with National 
Economy 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low/No Corruption .514 .546 .569 .591 .618 
95% CI .475-.553 .522-.570 .544-.596 .555-.626 .571-.665 
High Corruption .546 .546 .528 .552 .501 
95% CI .508-.585 .515-.576 .475-.580 .507-.597 .404-.597 
Sat. with Personal 
Finances 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low/No Corruption .475 .544 .558 .606 .639 
95% CI .440-.509 .519-.569 .535-.581 .583-.629 .594-.684 
High Corruption .499 .534 .529 .586 .589 
95% CI .455-.545 .502-.567 .492-.565 .538-.634 .526-.654 
207 
 
Question Wording:  
 
Preferences for Democracy are measured by the following question: 
 
“With which one of the following statements do you agree most?” 
 “Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system” 
 “Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a democratic one”  
 “For people like me, it does not matter whether a government is democratic or authoritarian” 
 
The binary category in this probit estimation was composed of respondents who answered that democracy is preferable 
(54.39 percent of the sample) versus those who chose the other two options.   
 
Note on the Analysis:   
 
These predicted probabilities are calculated holding all predictors at their means, medians or modes (respondents who are 
female, of average age and education, in average household size and urbanity). Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. 
 
20 Table B14. Predicted Probabilities of Election Preferences Among High and Low Corruption Perceivers Across Levels 
of Satisfaction with National Economy 
 
Local Elections 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low/No Corruption .779 .778 .765 .777 .738 
95% CI .752-.808 .759-.796 .741-.790 .739-.815 .681-.796 
High Corruption .748 .721 .708 .742 .685 
95% CI .719-.777 .699-.744 .683-.733 .715-.769 .599-.771 
 
Regional Elections 
1 2 3 4 5 
Low/No Corruption .687 .665 .641 .643 .613 
95% CI .654-.719 .638-.692 .604-.679 .591-.696 .562-.664 
High Corruption .640 .628 .572 .590 .492 
95% CI .604-.676 .595-.660 .533-611 .547-.634 .363-.621 
Question Wording:  
 
Election Preferences are measured by the following question: 
 
“Do you think elections of the leaders of local (and regional) administration are necessary, or should these leaders be 
appointed by higher authorities?”  
 “elections are necessary” 
 “leaders should be appointed” 
 “it does not matter”  
 
The binary category in this probit estimation was composed of respondents who answered that elections are necessary 
(77.19 percent of the sample prefer local elections; 66.90 percent of the sample prefer regional elections) versus those who 




Note on the Analysis:   
 
These predicted probabilities are calculated holding all predictors at their means, medians or modes (respondents who are 
female, of average age and education, in average household size and urbanity). Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. Results are robust to pocketbook economic satisfaction. Some interpretive caution is required because regional and 
local government levels can mean different things to respondents across these countries. 
 
21 Table B15. Predicted Probabilities of Corruption Condemnation Among High and Low Corruption Perceivers Across 
Levels of Economic Satisfaction 
 
Public Official Favor 1 2 3 4 5 
Low/No Corruption .687 .665 .641 .643 .613 
95% CI .654-.719 .638-.692 .604-.679 .591-.696 .562-.664 
High Corruption .640 .628 .572 .590 .492 
95% CI .604-.676 .595-.660 .533-.611 .547-.634 .363-.621 
Buying Uni Degree 1 2 3 4 5 
Low/No Corruption .689 .606 .561 .565 .601 
95% CI .653-.725 .572-.639 .531-.592 .533-.597 .500-.701 
High Corruption .695 .619 .564 .547 .636 
95% CI .650-.739 .584-656 .521-.606 .479-615 .539-.733 
Question Wording:  
 
Corruption Condemnation is measured by the following question: 
 
“Some people think that certain behaviors are always wrong, whereas others believe that there are occasions when breaking 
the rules may be justified. How wrong, if at all, do you consider the following behaviors to be?”  
 “A public official asking for a favor or gift in return of services” (1=not wrong at all  4=seriously wrong) 
 “Buying a university degree that one has not earned” (1=not wrong at all  4=seriously wrong) 
 
The binary category in this probit estimation was composed of respondents who answered that these behaviors are 
“seriously wrong” (50.18 percent of the sample for the public official asking for a favor or gift; 60.32 percent for the 
university degree) versus those who chose the other response categories.   
 
Note on the Analysis:   
 
These predicted probabilities are calculated holding all predictors at their means, medians or modes (respondents who are 
female, of average age and education, in average household size and urbanity). Standard errors are clustered at the country 
level. Results are robust to pocketbook economic satisfaction.   
 
 
Table B16. Huhe and Tang model in my sample: fixed effects OLS, 30 countries 
 
Model 1: Satisfied 
with financial 
situation 






Model 4: Ladder 
Question 
 
Model 4: Life 
Satisfaction 
 
Economic Context (see column heading)    
2 11.739*** (1.539) 17.520*** (1.814) 0.439 (1.204) 8.385*** (1.409) 12.358*** (2.062) 
209 
 
3 18.112*** (1.556) 28.424*** (1.766) -0.131 (1.213) 11.887*** (1.449) 19.033*** (2.012) 
4 26.314*** (1.517) 37.708*** (1.729) -4.066*** (1.229) 12.622*** (1.547) 29.086*** (1.943) 
5 26.825*** (2.209) 37.859*** (2.225) N/A 10.304*** (2.328) 30.868*** (2.271) 
Anocracy -6.600*** (1.940) 2.332 (2.124) -10.220*** (1.551) -8.713*** (1.964) -1.402 (2.437) 
Democracy -35.399*** (1710) -28.219*** (1.920) -41.709*** (1.370) -41.733*** (1.689) -31.963*** (2.152) 
Economic 
Context x Regime 
Sat. with financial 
situation x Regime 
Sat. with national 
economy x Regime 
Consumption 
quartiles x Regime 
Ladder question x 
Regime 
Life Satisfaction x 
Regime 
2 x Anoc -2.275 (1.872) -9.406*** (2.038) -3.159* (1.629) -2.665 (1.823) -4.274* (2.459) 
2 x Democ -3.759** (1.611) -7.065*** (1.858) -1.410 (1.300) -3.921*** (1.497) -4.805** (2.150) 
3 x Anoc -3.029 (1.902) -10.826*** (2.049) -0.472 (1.632) -2.413 (1.876) -4.435* (2.416) 
3 x Democ -4.759*** (1.629) -8.817*** (1.826) -1.033 (1.305) -3.689** (1.545) -4.787** (2.096) 
4 x Anoc -4.568** (1.894) -13.070*** (2.085) 0.936 (1.642) -1.480 (2.065) -10.589*** (2.339) 
4 x Democ -7.570*** (1.604) -11.840*** (1.822) 1.691 (1.315) -0.059 (1.654) -9.997*** (2.028) 
5 x Anoc -4.653 (3.063) -10.865*** (3.153) N/A 4.585 (3.325) -9.621*** (2.956) 
5 x Democ -5.619** (2.404) -12.619*** (2.471) N/A 6.168** (2.523) -8.339*** (2.420) 
Female 1.171*** (0.273) 0.639** (0.265) 1.099*** (0.307) 1.163*** (0.279) 0.997*** (0.273) 
Age -0.315*** (0.044) -0.239*** (0.042) -0.386*** (0.049) -0.396*** (0.044) -0.296*** (0.044) 
Age^2 0.004*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.000) 0.004*** (0.000) 
Household Size 0.223** (0.093) 0.198** (0.091) 0.317*** (0.111) 0.111 (0.096) 0.071 (0.093) 
Urban -1.406*** (0.297) -1.263*** (0.288) -0.963*** (0.335) -1.525*** (0.304) -1.493*** (0.297) 
Capital -2.423*** (0.366) -2.148*** (0.355) -2.175*** (0.416) -2.849*** (0.375) -2.384*** (0.366) 
Middle Ed 0.213 (0.359) 1.068*** (0.348) 1.329*** (0.405) 0.245 (0.369) -0.064 (0.360) 
Upper Ed -0.256 (0.378) 1.193*** (0.364) 1.865*** (0.425) 0.035 (0.388) -0.875** (0.380) 
R Sq 0.321 0.362 0.269 0.284 0.317 
N 28423 28294 24516 28671 28702 
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